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THE ROLE OF THE RECIPIENT AND SACRAMENTAL SIGNIFICATION

I

INTENTION AND SACRAMENTAL SIGNIFICATION

IT is the teaching of the Church that, in the measure that it is possible, the subject must have an intention of receiving a sacrament, under pain of invalid reception. The purpose of this article is to investigate in the light of St. Thomas' teaching the precise ontological connection between this intention and the sacrament. It will be maintained that in virtue of his intention and (in the sacraments other than baptism) his baptismal character the subject intervenes in the sacrament as a material instrumental cause—a mode of causality that is to be found only in the sacraments which are not merely efficient causes but also, and primarily, signs of faith.

No such explicit conclusion is to be found in St. Thomas; but it is, as it appears, indicated in his teaching that the char-

acter is a participation in the priesthood of Christ and as such reducible to the category of instrumental power. The Thomistic commentators, with one exception, make little attempt to explain the instrumentality of the baptismal character. The exception is John of St. Thomas who developed so fully the symbolic concept of the sacraments. It is in dependence on the notion that a sacrament is a sign, and therefore in dependence on the first principle of St. Thomas' sacramental theology, that he explains the character. Before developing this line of thought an examination must be made of the explicit teaching of St. Thomas on the part played by the subject in the sacraments.

Commentary on the "Sentences"

In the preliminary discussion on the sacraments in general no question or article is devoted to analyzing the acts of the subject in relation to the sacrament. This is a matter that St. Thomas reserves for treatment when he is dealing with those sacraments that are perfected only when they are used. The article on the constitution of the sacraments speaks of "use" and its relation to the essence of the sacrament; but it is clear from the context that it is question of administration.¹

More precise ideas are formulated in the discussion on baptism. Distinguishing two effects of the sacrament, grace and the character, St. Thomas says that, although the second is given whether or not the will of the subject is disposed for the first, even it demands "some desire of receiving the sacrament."² It is to be noticed that, in conformity with the outlook of the *Sentences*, it is the connotation of causality that here predominates in the notion of sacrament and it is in this framework that the matter is solved. The same immediate recourse to the demands of causality as a principle of solution is to be

¹ *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2.

² *Ibid.*, d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 1: "Duplex est effectus baptismi. Primus qui est res et sacramentum, scil., character. Et quia character non imprimitur ad praeparandam voluntatem ut aliquid bene fiat cum non sit habitus sed potentia . . . ideo hunc effectum voluntatis indispositio non impedit, dummodo aliqualis sit voluntas sacramentum recipiendi."

found in sol. 2 of this article and in the article on the constitution of the sacrament.³

The part played by this desire of receiving the sacrament is formulated explicitly when the question is answered: Whether an intention or act of will is required in the subject of this sacrament:

In baptism the subject receives two things, the sacrament itself, and the effect of the sacrament. But for receiving these two things there is no need for the intervention of any causality on the part of the recipient. Nothing more is required than the removal of any obstacles; obstacles, that is to say, which consist in opposition of the will to either of the two things mentioned.⁴

The same teaching is repeated in positive terms in the following article:

The soul cannot be submitted to anything unless it be willing. The purpose of the act of will, the intention, is therefore that man should submit himself to the sacrament; but the purpose of faith is that he should submit himself as he ought. Consequently, faith is required only for the reception of the grace of the sacrament, but the intention is required for the reception of the sacrament itself.⁵

What degree of intention—actual, habitual or (as modern terminology has it) virtual—is required of subjects in various states of consciousness is a psychological problem that St. Thomas has already discussed when explaining how children and others who have not the use of reason can receive the effects of baptism.⁶ His teaching does not differ from that given later in the *Summa*.

St. Thomas formulates the principle that governs his conclusions on the part played by the subject in the sacraments when he deals with penance:

³ *Ibid.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1; d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, d. 6, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, d. 6, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1, ad 3. For extreme unction, cf. *ibid.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 2, ad 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, d. 4, q. 3, a. 1.

Certain of the remedies used for bodily sickness require no action on the part of the patient but consist in submitting to the curative—for example, surgery or poulticing—while others consist in the exercise of the patient—for example, the taking of a cure. In just the same way certain of the sacraments require no act on the part of the subject so far as the substance of the sacrament is concerned, unless it be *per accidens*, for removing obstacles (as is clear in baptism and confirmation and the like); others require essentially and *per se* an act of the subject for the essence of the sacrament (as is clear in penance and marriage). Thus in those sacraments that are performed without any act of ours, it is the matter that causes and signifies, in the fashion of a medicament externally applied. But in those sacraments which demand our acts, there is no such matter; instead it is the external actions themselves that now take the place of the matter in the other sacraments.⁷

In this respect reception of the Eucharist is distinguished from baptism in that the former demands faith:

For receiving baptism sacramentally nothing more is required of the subject but that he submit himself to the action of the Church, with the intention of receiving what she administers, even though, on occasion, he may believe that she is doing nothing. But the person who receives the Eucharist is not simply a receptacle or passive subject; he is also an agent because he eats. Consequently if he is to eat the Eucharist sacramentally, it is required that he use the sacrament as a sacrament.⁸

This means that, though the true Body of Christ is eaten by all who receive the sacrament, only a believer (who has the other qualifications demanded) can use it as a sacrament. It should be observed, however, that there is not an exact parallel between reception of baptism and Communion since, as St. Thomas observes: “the perfection of the other sacraments consists in use . . . the perfection of (the Eucharist) consists in the consecration of the matter.”⁹ Consequently, what St. Thomas calls “sacramental eating” corresponds to fruitful reception of

⁷ *Ibid.*, d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 1. Cf. *ibid.*, d. 17, q. 3, a. 3, sol. 4, and d. 34, q. un., a. 1, ad 1 (concerning matrimony).

⁸ *Ibid.*, d. 9, a. 2, sol. 2, ad 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, d. 9, a. 1, sol. 3, ad 2.

baptism rather than to reception of the sacrament as such. Nevertheless, it is clear from what St. Thomas says here that the Eucharist cannot be classed as a "remedy externally applied." This is an indication that the medical parallel must not be applied too rigidly as though some sacraments excluded all acts of the subject.

What is said in these places about the part played by the subject remains unrelated, at least explicitly, to the suggestions already put forward by St. Thomas about the function of the character of baptism which is said to deputize its bearer to "participate in all spiritual receptions."¹⁰

A hint of a wider frame of reference for solving sacramental problems than that of the causality exercised by the sacraments is given when faith is stated to play a role in the sacraments *preliminary to causality*:

In the sacraments it is primarily faith that is operative [and not any of the other virtues; see objection], for through it the sacraments are in a certain fashion connected with their principal cause and also with the recipient.¹¹

In contrast to this the faith and hope of the subject are said to "have nothing to do" with the sacrament itself, though they can either promote or impede the effect.¹² It is the faith of the Church that establishes the connection between sacrament and divine cause by "relating the instrument to the principal cause and the sign to the thing signified."¹³ In the *Sentences* there is no suggestion that the subject as such plays any part here.

In the *Sentences*, as appears from all this, St. Thomas reduces the participation of the subject to the minimum: for the majority of the sacraments it involves nothing more than an intention of reception which is a *removens prohibens*; in penance and matrimony it enters the essence of the sacrament. Given the understanding of the sacraments St. Thomas defends in the *Sentences*, no other teaching would be possible. He looks on

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, d. 7, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 1.

¹² Cf. *ibid.*, d. 2, q. 2, a. 4.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 2, ad 2.

¹³ *Ibid.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 3.

them merely as *causes* of the sacramental characters and of grace—hence his division of them into two kinds of remedies. If they are also signs, as he admits they are, they are signs precisely of *causes* and of what is to be caused. If this view is taken of the sacraments it is clear that, with the exception of those that are obviously based on a human action, they will be thought of as requiring nothing more of the subject than the removal of obstacles to their action. The possibility of a wider view of the whole sacramental ceremony is only touched upon in the *Sentences* when the role of faith is mentioned. This is an idea that will be developed in the *Summa* where St. Thomas brings to the foreground the idea of a cultural sign of faith.

A further hint of a more strictly sacramental approach is to be found in the *Sentences* where St. Thomas explains why orders may be given only to a man or boy, and extreme unction only to a sick person. There are certain requirements on the part of the subject if the sacrament is to be validly received:

Hence, even if a woman went through all the ceremonies of ordination, she would not receive orders; for since a sacrament is a sign there is demanded for its administration, not only the effect, but the signification of the effect; just as for extreme unction the subject must be sick so that the sign of one who needs cure may be complete. Since, therefore, the state of preeminence cannot be signified in female sex, it being the state of subjection, a woman cannot receive the sacrament of orders.¹⁴

When an objector tries to argue on lines parallel to these that the irregularity of "bigamy" cannot be dispensed since its absence is necessary for receiving the sacrament of orders, St. Thomas makes a distinction. He admits that freedom from such an impediment is signified by the sacrament. However, not every signification is of the essence of the sacrament, but only that one which pertains to the office of the sacrament.¹⁵

This is a distinction equivalent to that between requirements for validity and for liceity in ordination.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, d. 27, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3; cf. also *Suppl.*, q. 66, a. 5, ad 3.

Summa Theologiae

Again in the *Summa*, when he compares penance with the other sacraments,¹⁶ St. Thomas uses the distinction between medicines externally applied and cures that depend on the patient's own resources, but he is careful to avoid any appearance of a mechanistic conception of sacraments that belong to the former category.

The quotation from St. Gregory at the beginning of the article reflects St. Thomas' awareness in his later years of the inadequacy of the category of cause to deal with the sacraments and his consequent adoption of the notion of sign as the primary concept of sacramental theology:

A sacrament consists in a ritual action which is carried out in such a way that we receive, under the form of a sign, something belonging to holiness.¹⁷

The reply to the first objection, again in reference to a statement of Gregory, explains the broad interpretation to be placed on the idea of "the material element" (*res corporales*) in the sacramental sign. It includes, besides the water of baptism and the chrism of confirmation, the external actions of the subject in penance. A material object, goes on St. Thomas, is used in those sacraments "in which an exceptional grace is given, surpassing altogether the proportion of any human act." This is the case in baptism, confirmation and extreme unction. His concern here being solely with the manner in which the various sacraments signify the *efficient production of grace*, St. Thomas simply concludes that any acts of the subject in these three sacraments are dispositions for the reception of grace:

Wherefore, if there are any human acts in these sacraments, they are not the essential matter of the sacrament, but are dispositions for the sacrament. On the other hand, in those sacraments whose effect corresponds to some human acts, the human acts themselves take the place of matter, as in the case of penance and matrimony.¹⁸

¹⁶ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 84, a. 1.

¹⁷ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁸ *Loc. cit.*, ad 1.

The emphasis of this text merits closer attention. It is on signification, and specifically on the signification by the ritual of the mode of production of grace in the soul. The matter of a given sacrament is an external action of the subject or a material object according as the effect of the sacrament corresponds more or less to the internal acts of the subject. In the second case the ceremony signifies primarily the giving of grace from outside the subject; the stress is laid on its gratuitousness. In the first case the sacrament emphasizes man's necessary cooperation. This is all on the level of signification. In both cases, on the ontological level, grace is from without and is gratuitous; and in both cases man must cooperate in the measure he is able. These are general principles that cannot be laid aside. There is nothing to prevent the cooperation of the subject being signified by the sacramental action even of baptism, confirmation and extreme unction; just as, conversely, the gift of grace is signified in penance by the words of the minister. (This indicates a possible explanation of what St. Thomas implies in this text when he admits the possibility of the acts of the subject being "in" these three sacraments.) When the sacrament is considered strictly as a cause of grace, however, the subject's acts, where they are not actually the matter of the sacrament, can be thought of only as "dispositions for the sacrament," dispositions, that is to say, for the effect of the sacrament.

That the sacramental sign in fact signifies more than the bare efficient production of grace is made clear by St. Thomas in several places. In his discussion of the constitution of baptism he distinguishes *sacramentum tantum*, *res et sacramentum* and *res tantum*, and explains the first in this way:

That which is "sacrament only" is something visible and outward; the sign, namely, of the inward effect; for such is the very nature of the sacrament.¹⁹

Into this exterior sign he now introduces the subject. Hugh of

¹⁹ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 66, a. 1.

St. Victor seems to say that baptism is water; but this opinion is false,

for, since the sacraments of the New Law effect a certain sanctification, there the sacrament is completed where sanctification is completed. Now, sanctification is not completed in water; but a certain sanctifying, instrumental virtue, not permanent but transient, passes from the water, in which it is, into man who is the subject of true sanctification. Consequently the sacrament is not completed in the water itself, but in applying the water to man, that is, in the washing²⁰

In reading this text the nuances of the word "sacrament" for St. Thomas and the immediate context must not be forgotten. An appeal is made to the manner of the production of grace by the sacrament in order to decide what elements are to belong to the external sign (*sacramentum tantum*). Man is the subject of the sacrament's causality; therefore, the sign of his sanctification must be not merely water but water in the act of washing man.²¹

This says nothing more about the part played by the subject in the sacramental sign than could be satisfied by mere physical submission to the action of the minister; but the teaching of the Church shows that more is needed; and St. Thomas modifies accordingly his notion of the scope of signification of the sacrament:

By the fact that a man offers himself to be cleansed by baptism he signifies that he is disposed for interior cleansing.²²

²⁰ *Ibid.*, cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 3, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 2.

²¹ The same idea is to be found in *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 66, a. 10: "De necessitate quidem sacramenti est et forma, quae designat principalem causam sacramenti, et minister, qui est causa instrumentalis, et usus materiae, scilicet ablutio in aqua, quae designat principalem sacramenti effectum"; *De forma absolutionis poenitentiae sacramentalis*: "In baptismo etiam verba prolati super aquam tantum non faciunt sacramentum sed super aquam adhibitam baptizato, quod totum est loco materiae." (*Opusc. theol.*, Marietti, 1954, vol. I, pp. 169 f.; n. 708); *I ad Cor.*, c. 11, lect. 5 (660); *de Verit.*, q. 27, a. 4, ad 4; *ibid.*, ad 17: "Actio naturalis materialis instrumenti adiuvat ad effectum sacramenti, in quantum per eam sacramentum suscipienti applicatur, et in quantum sacramenti significatio per actionem praedictam completur, sicut significatio baptismi per ablutionem."

²² *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 68, a. 4.

Here St. Thomas makes no distinction comparable to that used by theologians concerned with the practical administration of the sacraments between "conditions" required in the subject for valid, and those required for fruitful, reception of the sacraments. Taking for granted validity, he considers the act of reception of the sacrament as a *sign of faith* of one in the proper dispositions. The faith of the subject and of the Church, he says again, operate towards the effect of baptism.²³ He is more precise in the *First Quodlibet*:

In baptism something is required on the part of the minister, namely, that he pour the water and utter the words, and something is required on the part of the subject, namely, that he form an intention and that he be washed.²⁴

The intention required of the subject in baptism is discussed in III, q. 68, aa. 7 and 8.²⁵ In the *corpus* of a. 7 St. Thomas accounts for the necessity of this intention by indicating the obligations undertaken in baptism. The new form of life that they involve must be accepted willingly; and consequently the ceremony that initiates a person into that life must be the object of an act of will, an intention. The subject may be the "patient" so far as justification goes, but he must adopt this position willingly.²⁶ Article eight deals more precisely with the amount of knowledge required for making this intention. St. Thomas distinguishes between what is demanded for receiving the character and what is demanded for receiving grace —this is a distinction between requirements for validity and those for fruitfulness. For grace, faith is necessary, since without faith there can be no justification. On the other hand, for the character:

true faith is not necessarily required in the subject for baptism, just

²³ *Ibid.*, q. 39, a. 5.

²⁴ *Quodl. I*, q. 6, a. 1.

²⁵ Cf. also *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 69, a. 9, "Utrum fictio impedit effectum baptismi."

²⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 68, a. 7, ad 1: "In justificatione quae fit per baptismum non est passio coacta, sed voluntaria."

as true faith is not required in the minister; provided that all the other requirements for the sacrament are present.²⁷

When faith is lacking, goes on St. Thomas,

it is sufficient for receiving the sacrament to have a general intention of receiving baptism as Christ instituted it and as the Church administers it.²⁸

The close parallel between the object of the subject's intention and that of the minister's is to be noted. The minister's intention is required to direct the sacramental action to a determined purpose.²⁹ It is not, however, necessary that the minister believe in that purpose, but simply that he place his actions at the service of the Church:

Therefore he is required to make an intention of subordinating himself to the principal agent; so that he intends to do what Christ and the Church do.³⁰

The cooperation of minister and subject in completing the sacramental sign and thus giving effect to the intention of the Church is explicitly referred to in the same article:

In the words uttered (by the minister) the intention of the Church is expressed; and this suffices for completing the sacrament, unless the contrary be outwardly expressed on the part of either the minister or the recipient of the sacrament.³¹

If the subject has not placed an intention baptism must be administered again.³² Though children are clearly incapable of such an intention, St. Thomas will not dispense the requirement in their case. The intention is made for them, he says, by those

²⁷ *Ibid.*, a. 8.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, ad 3.

²⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, q. 64, a. 8: "Ea quae in sacramentis aguntur possunt diversimode agi: sicut ablutio aquae, quae fit in baptismo, potest ordinari et ad munditiam corporalem, et ad sanitatem corporalem, et ad ludum, et ad multa alia huiusmodi. Et ideo oportet quod determinetur ad unum, id est ad sacramentalem effectum, per intentionem abluentis."

³⁰ *Ibid.*, ad 1.

³¹ *Ibid.*, ad 2.

³² Cf. III, q. 68, a. 7, ad 2.

who offer them to be baptized³³ and who, in this, act on behalf of the Church.³⁴

Besides the intention there is another requirement for the reception of all the sacraments except baptism. This is the baptismal character, an instrumental power, directed, as has been seen, towards validity of the sacrament. Of confirmation St. Thomas says:

The character of confirmation of necessity supposes the baptismal character: so that, in effect, if one who is not baptized were to be confirmed, he would receive nothing, but would have to be confirmed again after receiving baptism.³⁵

St. Thomas does not explicitly correlate the two requirements in the subject. He accounts for the necessity of the character for confirmation by reference to the analogy of birth and growth which he uses to distinguish the first two sacraments.

The study devoted in the *Summa* to the subject of the sacraments, it will be seen from what has been said, is considerably more suggestive than that of the *Sentences*. It is not that St. Thomas retracts or contradicts anything that he said in the earlier work; but he has discovered the riches of a new dimension in the sacraments. He no longer feels himself constrained to limit the participation of the subject to that of *removens prohibens*. The sacraments are integral parts of human worship and in the realm of signification the subject may be allowed a part that can be said to be "in the sacrament, always without prejudice to the special part played by the minister and the matter and form." Nor is this a purely physical subjection to the action of the sacrament; it demands willing cooperation, without which the sacrament itself is void. In a baptized member of the Church it involves a physical power in the subject's intellect, a power that is instrumental. In the

³³ Cf. a. 9, ad 1.

³⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2. Cajetan, in *Summam Theol.*, III, q. 68, a. 7, n. 7, argues inversely: since the child forms no intention for baptism, neither, *per se*, need an adult. This conclusion is explicitly rejected by all the principal succeeding commentators. See below.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 72, a. 6.

context of causality or production of grace, however (which is "posterior in nature" to signification), it is the objective elements of the sacrament that are active; the subject's part is "dispositive." St. Thomas does not explain in detail what this implies; but it is clearly more positive than the solution proposed in the *Sentences*.

An attempt must now be made to draw out the implications of St. Thomas' teaching by interpreting in the light of his key sacramental concepts some of his apparently uncorrelated conclusions and thus discovering their hidden harmony.

Most of the commentators devote their discussion of the subject's intention to refuting an opinion put forward by Cardinal Cajetan. They are concerned with showing the faults in the arguments on which this opinion is based and it is usually only in the briefest fashion that they say what the intention does. This debate serves to indicate the way most theologians think about the matter.

Cajetan and his opponents on the necessity of the subject's intention.

The practice in the Church of baptizing children, together with a letter sent by Pope Innocent III to the Bishop of Arles in 1201 dealing with the consent required for receiving baptism,³⁶ raises certain problems concerning the necessity and the role of the subject's intention.

Cajetan, with this material, takes up the extreme position that, "speaking *per se*, an intention or act of will is not required of the subject of baptism." It is required, as St. Thomas teaches in the *Sentences*, only as a *removens prohibens* to remove a contrary will should it have ever existed.³⁷ He gives two reasons for this. The first is based on the authority of Innocent III ("The sacramental action gives the character since it finds no obstacle in the will"). What is at issue here is a question of psychology, namely, what constitutes an ob-

³⁶ Innocent III, Ep. *Maiores Ecclesiae causas*; cf. Denz. 410, 411.

³⁷ Cajetan, in *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 68, a. 7, n. 7: "Dicendum mihi videtur quod non exigitur intentio seu voluntas ex parte baptizandi."

stacle, *obex*, in the will; and on these terms Cajetan's opinion is discussed and refuted by later Thomists. Their arguments will be considered later.

Cajetan's second reason is a strictly sacramental one. He argues that what is not necessary in one subject of baptism is not necessary for the sacrament, speaking *per se*, in any subject; however, an intention is not necessary in a child; therefore, it is not *per se* necessary for the sacrament. Nothing more is required than the absence of an obstacle in the will. He supports the minor of the argument by denying an objection. The intention of the child's parents provides no disposition; it merely procures the approach of patient to agent. He gives an example of a child presented for baptism by Jewish parents for some human motive. The Church, he asserts, does not intend that such a child should receive baptism; yet, in fact, the sacrament is valid. As for the text of St. Thomas, in the article he is commenting on where an intention is said to be necessary, Cajetan declares:

This is to be understood of what always in fact happens in adults. Such a subject will never be found neutral, but he will either intend or refuse baptism, implicitly or explicitly, etc. Hence it is true to say that "if an intention of receiving the sacrament is lacking in an adult, he would have to be re-baptized" for the lack of intention would be attached to a contrary intention.³⁸

The Salmanticenses oppose Cajetan, maintaining that precisely for the validity of the sacrament there is required an intention on the part of the subject.³⁹ This they characterize as the common opinion of theologians⁴⁰ and as the teaching of St. Thomas in the *Summa*, if not in the *Sentences*.⁴¹ It is to be noted that, whereas Cajetan confines his remarks to the sacrament of baptism (though his principles can be applied to other sacraments), the Salmanticenses speak in general terms.

They reply to Cajetan's argument based on child baptism

³⁸ Cajetan, *loc. cit.* n. 10.

³⁹ Salmanticenses, *Cursus theologicus*, tr. 22, disp. 8, dub. 1.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, n. 8.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, n. 11.

that, though the requirements on the part of the sacrament itself are always the same, this is not true of what is required of the subject,

for it often happens that what is not required on the part of one subject is called for on the part of another on account of diverse dispositions or states of the subjects.⁴²

Consequently, just as children are justified without any act on their part whereas adults must freely consent, so the requirements for validity of sacraments differ according to the powers of the subjects.⁴³

The Salmanticenses are careful to note that the intention of the subject does not intervene in the sacrament "actively, as an efficient cause removing original sin or causing grace." They say that it "intervenes dispositively" in relation to the validity and effect of the sacrament; and this they appear to understand in the sense of *removens prohibens*.⁴⁴

Billuart, who also opposes Cajetan, holds that the intention is a *conditio sine qua non*.⁴⁵ This is the common teaching of manualists.⁴⁶

It appears, however, that these theologians, though they correctly reject Cajetan's arguments, do not react sufficiently against his position. Adequately though it may respond to the

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Cf. *ibid.*: "Quoniam parvuli sunt incapaces talis consensus [ad valorem sacramentorum], adulti vero sunt capaces illius: unde oportet quod habeant diversam applicationem ad sacramenta: sicut ob idem motivum diverso modo justificantur."

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*: "Sicut ille motus [voluntatis] concurrit dispositivo excludendo oppositam voluntatem, et carentiam debitae intentionis, sic etiam dispositivo concurrit tam ad valorem, quam ad effectum sacramenti."

⁴⁵ Billuart, *Summa*, diss. 6, a. 1. Replying to Cajetan's argument: "Quod est necessarium in uno ad substantiam sacramenti est necessarium in omnibus; ergo. Resp. dist. ant. Quod est necessarium ut quid essentiale, conc.; quod est necessarium ut dispositio subjecti tantum et conditio sine qua non, subdistinguo: si subjectum sit capax illius, conc.; si sit incapax ut sunt pueri et amentes, neg. . . . Non dicimus intentionem subjecti requiri essentialiter ad sacramentum, sed tantum ut conditionem ex parte subjecti."

⁴⁶ E. g., V. Zubizarreta, O. Carm., *Theologia dogmatico-scholastica*, vol. 4, *De sacramentis* (ed. 3, Bilbao, 1939), n. 175; L. Billot, S.J., *De Ecclesiae Sacramentis*, t. 1, q. 64, th. 19 (Rome, 1893).

broad requirements of the defined doctrine of the Church, their conclusion with its single-minded concentration on essentials sweeps aside the whole delicate system of man-centered sacramentalism constructed by St. Thomas. It is a conclusion that depends, not on the first principle of St. Thomas' sacramental theology, but on a false interpretation of that principle which gives to it a formally non-sacramental sense. Those theologians who teach it are concerned only with the fact that the sacraments cause grace, whatever be the mode of causality they defend. They leave out of consideration the fact that the sacraments are primarily (by a primacy of nature) signs.⁴⁷ On this basic, strictly sacramental level the participation of the subject is more than a condition. The very idea of condition—something that is required for a cause to operate, while not itself entering into the causality—belongs to the order of efficient causality, not to that of signification, nor to that of efficient causality based on signification. These assertions must be explained.

The essence of the sacrament.

A sacrament may be considered in its essential qualities as an active principle, signifying the giving of grace and used as a physical instrument by God in effecting what it signifies. As such it abstracts from the requirements for its valid reception which vary according to the condition of the individual subject. Its essential parts are its matter and form which are united by the intention of the minister. Hence result the three traditional requirements for completing the sacrament. In this connection St. Thomas' teaching in the short work *De articulis fidei et Ecclesiae sacramentis*⁴⁸ has a particular interest because of its use by the Council of Florence in drawing up the Decree for the Armenians. The Council summarizes St. Thomas and states:

⁴⁷ Even Billot is concerned with the causality of the sacraments. His theology of sign does not involve the subject in the same way as does St. Thomas' concept of signs of worship.

⁴⁸ *Opusc. theol.*, Marietti, 1954, vol. I, pp. 139 f. Date: 1261-1268 (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 139, 140).

All these sacraments are made up of three elements, namely, things as matter, words as form, and the person of the minister who administers the sacrament with the intention of doing what the Church does. If any of these elements is lacking, the sacrament is not completed.⁴⁹

It is to be noted that in the use of this hylomorphic terminology there is question of an analogy taken from the physical order. It is not to be understood in a physical sense of the sacraments but in terms of signification. The form further determines the natural symbolism of the matter and gives it its specifically Christian and sacramental signification.⁵⁰

The essence of a sacrament thus formed is what determines the particular nature of its operation and effect. This is not sufficient, however, to give concrete existence and activity to a sacrament which is perfected only when it is actually being received by a subject, that is to say, to any sacrament other than the Eucharist.

Even when considered in the abstract, according to its essence, as an active principle of grace, signifying and causing by material elements and by words, the sacrament is transcendentally related to a subject. This it has in common with all action (excepting creation), which is essentially related to a subject or patient and which draws its effect from the potentiality of the subject. Thus, in the concrete, there can be no possibility of sacramental causality without a subject. *This is reflected on the level of signification.* The adequate sign of causality must include the application of the material elements to a subject: not water, but washing, is required for baptism.⁵¹

Mere physical submission to the sacraments on the part of

⁴⁹ Cf. Denz. 695. Cf. 22nd. question proposed to Wycliffites and Hussites in the Bull, *Inter cunctas*, 22 Feb., 1418 (Denz. 672); Council of Trent, sess. 14 (Denz. 895): ". . . materia et forma quibus sacramenti essentia perficitur . . ."; Leo XIII, Ep., *Apostolicae curae*, 18 Sept., 1896 (Denz. 1963): "In ritu cuiuslibet sacramenti . . . discernunt . . . partem essentialem quae materia et forma appellari consuevit."

⁵⁰ Cf. H. E. Schillebeeckx, O. P., *De Sacramentele heilseconomie*, Antwerp, 1952, Sectio II, Hoofdstuk II (pp. 355 f., esp. pp. 380-382) and Hoofdstuk III (pp. 393 f., esp. pp. 405-416).

⁵¹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 66, a. 1 and places noted in n. 21, above.

one who has the use of reason is not, however, enough.⁵² Man is a free agent and he is moved by God to accept freely the grace given him; so it is required that he freely submit himself to the action of the sacrament. If he has no intention of receiving the sacrament his external acceptance of it is not a true sign of his interior disposition. Consequently, the complete sign-action of the administration of the sacrament is not true. The sacrament such as it is performed and applied by the minister is not received by the subject. It is reduced by the fault of the subject to an unnatural state. It still signifies the salvific will of God but no longer as concretely effective for this individual subject. If, however, while not properly disposed to receive grace, the subject seriously intends to receive the sacrament, the external submission he makes is a true sign and the sacrament is actually received by him and produces whatever effects do not depend on his state of soul.

It is the primary submission of the subject that makes the individual sacrament a practical sign of faith; and this even when the subject himself is an unbeliever. Without this intention the sacrament is not properly a sign of the faith of the Church. This idea must be examined.

The faith of the Church as a constituent of the sacrament

The faith of the Church is required for the very existence of the sacraments. This is a consequence of their nature as signs, existing, therefore, formally as relations imposed by an intelligence. Since they are practical signs and causes of sanctification they can be set up only by God.⁵³ Thus the original imposition of signification on certain ceremonies was effected by the mind of Christ. The signs that He instituted can be recognized as such only by faith since they are supernatural. Likewise the

⁵² Cf. *ibid.*, q. 61, a. 1, ad 1: "Exercitatio per usum sacramentorum non est pure corporalis, sed quodammodo est spiritualis: scilicet per significationem et causalitatem." See also places noted above, nn. 24 f.

⁵³ Cf. *ibid.*, q. 60, a. 5; q. 64, a. 2. On the nature of the sacraments as signs, cf. John of St. Thomas, *Cursus theologicus*, disp. 22, a. 1; H. Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-143.

reference of sacramental rites performed by the Church to the institution of Christ and to His salvific will can be made only by faith; and without this reference the rites cannot be sacramental, cannot, that is, exist as signs.⁵⁴ The faith of the Church which imposes this relation of signification on individual ceremonies is based on the faith of the Apostles to whom Christ revealed his intention.⁵⁵ This practical act of faith is what the Church "does" (*quod facit Ecclesia*) in the sacraments; and it is this that the intention of the minister serves⁵⁶ by pronouncing the form over specified matter.⁵⁷

St. Thomas' insistence on the intervention of the *faith* of the Church demonstrates beyond any doubt that he regards the intentions of those concerned in the sacraments as pertaining directly and immediately to the order of *signification*—they impose or cause the signification of an individual ceremony. Efficient causality of grace comes after this as a consequence, an entirely gratuitous complement granted by God, not essentially (though infallibly) connected with the ceremonial of the Church.

It is precisely for the perfection of the ceremonial of the Church, *as applied to an individual adult*, therefore for the perfection of a *concrete* sacramental sign, that the intention of the subject is essential. The subject must signify genuine acceptance of what the Church offers. Otherwise the sacrament is not a *concrete, practical* sign; it is merely a speculative sign

⁵⁴ Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 3: "Principale autem et per se agens ad justificationem est Deus sicut causa efficiens, et passio Christi sicut meritaria. Huic autem causae continuatur sacramentum per fidem Ecclesiae quae instrumentum refert ad principalem causam, et signum ad signatum." See Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, pp. 379, 404 f.

⁵⁵ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 174, a. 6: "Super revelatione facta Apostolis de fide . . . fundatur tota fides Ecclesiae"; III, q. 64, a. 2, ad 3: "Apostoli et eorum successores sunt vicarii Dei quantum ad regimen Ecclesiae institutae per fidem et fidei sacramenta"; *ibid.*, ad 1.

⁵⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, III, q. 64, a. 8, ad 1; *ibid.*, a. 9, ad 1: "Potest (minister) intendere facere id quod facit Ecclesia, licet existimet illud nihil esse. Et talis intentio sufficit ad sacramentum, quia . . . minister sacramenti agit in persona totius Ecclesiae, ex cuius fide suppletur id quod deest fidei ministro"; q. 67, a. 5, ad 2.

⁵⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2; q. 60, a. 7, ad 3.

of the divine will to save all men. Faith is not required of the subject. He simply accepts the sign of the Church's faith.⁵⁸

The willing cooperation of a subject who has the use of reason is, therefore, an integral part of the sacramental ceremony. Without it, those sacraments which exist only at the time of use, even though they have their essential parts, lack something required for their perfection.⁵⁹ It is only when they are perfect as signs received by an individual that there is any possibility of their acting as causes.

Certain difficulties remain to be solved concerning those who are incapable of forming an intention.

Variations in the intention

What is required of the subject for the existence of a true sacrament (*sacramentum tantum*) varies according to his state of consciousness. What is essential to the sacrament is that it should signify the giving of grace to a subject. The state of the individual subject to whom the sacrament is concretely applied determines the signification of the complete sign-action. Thus the administration of baptism to a child signifies justification of an unconscious being whereas the willing submission of an adult signifies justification of a responsible human person. The dispositions of will required for valid administration of baptism are discussed by the commentators in connection with Cajetan's

⁵⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, q. 68, a. 8, ad 3; *IV Sent.*, d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 2, ad 2: "In sacramentis praecipue fides operatur, per quam sacramenta quodammodo continuantur suae causae principaliter agenti et etiam ipsi recipienti." The force of "quodammodo" has already been explained; viz., directly, by way of signification; indirectly, by way of efficient causality (which is to be attributed to God as agent, not to faith). It is to be observed also that if, as the Church intends, the subject does believe, his faith is assumed under the faith of the Church and thus plays a part in directing the intention of the minister.

⁵⁹ Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, appears to go too far when he asserts that without the intention of the subject the sacrament is not an action of the Church. (Cf. p. 482: "Zonder de vrije beaming van het *sacramentum* kan de ritus geen symbooldaad van de Kerk zijn, daar deze symbooldaden wezenlijk sacramentale, kerelijke handelingen zijn die aan een menselijk subject en wel op menselijke wijze worden voltrokken.") The Church authentically *offers* the sacrament and this is signified by the ritual.

interpretation of Innocent III's letter. The discussion resolves itself into the purely psychological question: what constitutes an obstacle in the will to reception of a new responsibility? Though this formulation of the question reflects the pastoral concern of the Church with the administration of fruitful sacraments and the speculative preoccupation of these theologians with the *efficient causality* of the sacraments, the replies given to it are valid for determining the requirements of the sacraments as *signs*.

The teaching of the Pope contains the following conclusions. Those who accept baptism under duress, in the same way as those who accept it while feigning good dispositions, receive the character, since they are really, if conditionally, willing. On the contrary,

a person who has never given consent, but persists in refusal, receives neither grace nor the character, since express refusal goes beyond lack of consent. . . . Those who are sleeping or are mentally unbalanced, if they persisted in refusal before they became unbalanced or went to sleep, do not receive the character even if water is poured on them since their resolution to refuse is understood to remain. The effect is otherwise if they were preparing for baptism and had the intention of receiving it; and so in these cases the Church administers baptism if necessity demands. Then the sacramental action gives the character since it finds no obstacle in the will.⁶⁰

All are agreed, including Cajetan,⁶¹ that a person with the use of reason cannot be neutral in regard to the reception of a sacrament. He will either refuse it or accept. In the second case his intention is either actual or virtual; therefore exercising a real influence over his action.⁶² Children and those who have always been of unbalanced mind are incapable of an intention. The difficulty concerns adults who are unconscious (or whose reception is not a human act, i. e., is not governed by an actual

⁶⁰ Innocent III, Ep. *Maiores Ecclesiae causas*, 1201 (Denz. 410, 411). Cf. *de Ver.*, q. 28, a. 3, ad 2; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 3, ad 1.

⁶¹ In *Summam Theol.*, III, q. 68, a. 7, n. 4.

⁶² Cf. Salmanticenses, tr. 22, disp. 8, dub. 1, n. 8.

or virtual intention) and those who have lost their balance of mind after coming to the use of reason. Cajetan maintains that Pope Innocent teaches that baptism can have an effect on such as these if they have never at any time explicitly refused to accept it. The absence of such refusal, he argues, constitutes an absence of obstacle to the sacrament.

The Salmanticenses refuse to accept this argument. If baptism were independent in this way of the subject's consent, they reason, the Church should not deny it to those who have become of unbalanced mind after reaching the use of reason and who have not, when they were capable, consented to accept it.⁶³ Their explanation of the practice of the Church is that

an adult who makes no positive act of consent to the reception of the sacraments virtually refuses it and puts it away from him . . . because every person who has the use of reason has the intention, at least virtually and interpretatively, that nothing shall be done concerning his person in matters of moment without his personal and positive consent.⁶⁴

The meaning of *obex* is clear, they go on, from the whole of Innocent's letter.

He does not at all mean that a neutral will, or a mere lack of contrary intention, is sufficient for validity of the sacrament; he means by "an obstacle of contrary intention" both an intention formally and positively contrary and an intention interpretatively contrary, as is to be considered the lack of consent in adults to whatever is done to their persons in matters of moment.⁶⁵

The Pope's use of the phrase "contrary will" is accounted for by the particular question he has in mind, namely, forcible baptism.

From this it follows that a positive, habitual intention (in the modern sense of the term) is required of the subject who receives a sacrament in a state of unconsciousness or who is

⁶³ *Ibid.*, n. 8.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 9.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, n. 11. Cf. Billuart, diss. 6, a. 1. He defines *obex*: "non solum resistentia positiva, sed etiam dissensus negativus seu carentia consensu, ita ut ex negatione intelligenda et supponenda sit affirmatio contraria."

so distracted at the moment of reception that he is not performing a human act.

Applying these psychological notions to the order of signification in the sacraments two possibilities are to be envisaged. (Baptism is taken for granted in the case of the subject of the other sacraments). The subject will be either conscious or unconscious. In the former case, if his reception of the sacrament is a human act, his intention will intervene actively either actually or virtually. The sacramental sign, to be true, demands such participation. If his intention is merely habitual he is not placing a human act, and if he receives the effect of the sacrament he receives it in the same way as an unconscious person. If the subject is unconscious (or unbalanced, whether so from birth or after attaining the use of reason, or so completely distracted as not to be placing a human act) there is no question of active intervention of his intention, even supposing that he has one habitually. If he actually receives the sacrament—and one sacrament at least, matrimony, he cannot receive—it will be in the fashion of a child, *ad modum pueri*, that is, without any active cooperation on his part here and now.⁶⁶ If the unconscious subject is a child or an imbecile from birth, the sacramental sign will be true simply through physical submission. If the subject, however, is one who previously had the use of reason—whether he is now asleep, intoxicated, completely distracted or mentally unbalanced—the sacramental sign will be true only if his will habitually accepts the sacrament, since what is signified is justification of one who is unconscious and who places no obstacle in the way of the sacrament (and of sacramental grace, though falsehood as regards this element does not imperil validity). The Church has no means of knowing whether the sign is true or not, except conjecture, based more or less firmly on what she knows of the subject's previous life; but the same may be said of administration of the sacraments to those who are conscious. There is

⁶⁶ This idea is to be found in Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.* p. 483.

always the possibility of deception and consequent falsity in the sacramental sign.

There is, therefore, a whole scale of necessary participation in the sacramental signs by the subject, depending on his state of consciousness. Since the psychological truths on which this conclusion is based are acknowledged by nearly all theologians it is a matter for wonder that there is current among manualists—and it appears even in Billuart—the phrase (or some variation on it): The subject does not require an intention of the same degree as the minister;⁶⁷ as though to say that no subject need have more than an habitual intention. This is true of an unconscious or distracted subject but of no other. As much is required for *conscious* reception of a sacrament as is required for any human act. This would be true no matter what were the function to be assigned the intention in relation to the sacrament.

The baptismal character

A complete account according to the principles of St. Thomas' theology of the role of the subject's intention requires the correlation of what has already been said with the teaching in the *Summa* on the sacramental characters, in particular that of baptism. St. Thomas himself does not do this in more than very summary and indirect fashion when he indicates the cultural purpose of the character. His analysis of the subject's intention is placed in the discussion of baptism so that any reference to the activity of the character is excluded since it is this sacrament that produces the character.

St. Thomas' teaching on the baptismal character is tantalizing in its omission of details. The account of it proposed by John of St. Thomas appears to be the only one that faithfully interprets its boldly drawn lines by consistent reference to the nature of sacraments as signs. It is the only one that pro-

⁶⁷ Billuart, diss. 6, a. 1: "Non requiritur tanta intentio in suscipiente ac in ministrante." Cf. Billot, *loc. cit.*; Zubizarreta, *loc. cit.*; D. Prümmer, O.P., *Manuale theologiae moralis*, t. III, n. 63 (ed. 11, 1953).

vides a satisfying explanation for St. Thomas' application of the concept of instrumental power to the character of baptism as well as to that of orders.

John of St. Thomas indicates the essential interdependence of intention and character. The character itself—and this applies to all characters—has no proper action. Man is able through the character to subordinate his actions to Christ the Priest.⁶⁸ Thus the character does not produce the intention of submitting to the sacrament (an act of the will) nor does it produce the act of the practical intellect by which the intention is implemented. These are produced by the bearer of the character, whether minister or subject, as a principal cause. The character gives to these acts a mode which makes them valid sacramentally and by which they serve ministerially the priesthood of Christ.⁶⁹ Thus John of St. Thomas sees the character as the means by which human activity enters the sacramental order and thereby serves Christ in His priestly activity. The character of orders permits its subject to enter as an active principle, the character of baptism permits entry as a passive principle; so that minister and subject, each in his own way, serve in the sacraments as ministers and therefore instrumentally.⁷⁰ As will appear below, this refers formally not to the causality of the sacraments but to their existence as *signs*.

The minister in virtue of his character serves as the active

⁶⁸ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus theologicus* (Paris: Vivès, 1886, t. 9) disp. 25, a. 4, n. 36: "Non ergo character habet aliquem actum proprium . . . sed solum homo mediante charaktere debet subordinare et conformare actus suos sacerdotio Christi."

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, n. 35: "Quid autem sit ministerialiter concurrere et habere actus dicimus quod non est producere aliquem actum cognitionis aut volitionis, quia totum quod est in volitione aut cognitione procedere debet a causa vitali et ad modum principalis se habente, sed producere hos actus et dirigere actiones exteriores sacramentaliter et secundum subordinationem ad sacerdotium Christi." N. 44: "Ad id quod dicitur, an sit operativus actus vitalis interioris, dico quod neque exterioris, quantum ad substantiam et elicientiam, cum isti eliciantur a subiecto ut a causa principali; sed tam interioris quam exterioris, quoad modum, seu ministeriale rationem, qua servitur sacerdotio Christi."

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, disp. 25, a. 2, n. 17: "Character est potentia competens ministris sacramentorum, ut solum ministerialiter concurrunt ad illa, sive passive, sive active; potentia autem ministerialis instrumentalis est." Cf. *ibid.*, n. 80.

element in the sign; the subject in virtue of his character serves as the passive element in the sign. Activity is demanded of each if he is to serve in his respective function.

The instrumentality thus attributed to the priest by reason of his character is not directed immediately towards the production of grace. Formally it consists in making the priest's actions valid in the sacraments, thus subordinating them to Christ in the order of signification; and in this it differs from the instrumentality attributed to the subject only in the function it procures for the priest in the sign-action.⁷¹ The fact that, according to the teaching of St. Thomas, the priest is physically elevated as an instrument by God in producing the effect of the sacrament is something that is to be distinguished from this primary instrumentality which is procured formally by the character and which is identified with the validity of human actions in the sacraments.⁷² In relation to the secondary instrumentality the priestly character and, in fact, the priest himself are evidently passive insofar as they are elevated and applied by God to the production of grace; this aspect does not concern us here. The precise function of the priestly character is to introduce the priest's actions into the liturgy to serve Christ actively; just as the function of the baptismal character is to introduce the subject's actions to serve Christ passively; in both cases the service is carried out on the level of worship, of signs of faith.⁷³ It is as a consequence of the validity given

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, disp. 25, a. 2, n. 143: "Character non est potentia instrumentalis primo et per se ad gratiam producendam sed ad conficienda sacramenta valide et per se primo in genere sacramentali, ita quod sine illo sunt nulla." Cf. *ibid.*, n. 123: "Per characterem non datur activitas ad effectum sacramentorum, qui producitur instrumentaliter, sed validitas ad actus, ut non sint nulli, sed validi in genere sacramentali."

⁷² On this interpretation of St. Thomas, cf. C. O'Neill, O.P., "The instrumentality of the sacramental character. An interpretation of *Summa theol.*, III, q. 63, a. 2," *Irish Theol. Quart.*, 25 (1958).

⁷³ John of St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*, n. 124: "Si dices: ergo omnis character est potentia passiva quia non habet activitatem respectu instrumentalis concursus et motionis; respondetur quod character non datur in ordine ad instrumentalem motionem ut ad proprium actum (quia etiamsi non daretur physica motio instrumentalis adhuc daretur character) sed in ordine ad ea quae sunt protestationes

to the priest's action by his character that the priest further receives (if the subject is properly disposed) the *vis fluens* which applies him physically to producing the effect of the sacrament.⁷⁴

The sacramental characters bring it about, therefore, that when priest and subject, acting as principal, secondary causes, perform together certain acts of worship in accordance with the prescriptions of the Church, their actions signify and consequently put into effect the divine decree of justification in respect of an individual. The moral value of the acts of worship is from the devotion of the faithful; their sacramental validity from the characters.⁷⁵

It is precisely because grace is given in the sacraments, not by bare efficient causality, but *sacramentally*, that is, by efficient causality *based on a sign-action*, that the baptismal character is needed.⁷⁶ If it were merely a matter of receiving

divini cultus et [ad] actiones sacras exercendas et in his vel passive se habet vel active; ad operandum autem instrumentaliter [in the strict sense: in relation to grace-production] semper passive se habet, sed non ad operandum ministerialiter et sacramentaliter [*'instrumentally'* in the wide sense: in the order of signification]. Quia in aliquibus configuratur Christo agendo, in aliis recipiendo."

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, disp. 24, a. 1, n. 440: "Minister per characterem non praebet activitatem quasi physicam ad effectus supernaturales sed voluntarie utitur hoc charactere ad hoc ut actus protestativi fidei sint vere sacramentales et valide atque in ordine ad ea quae sunt cultus Dei ministerialiter ordinentur secundum ordinem ad sacerdotium Christi; et ex hac validitate facit sibi debitum concursum elevativum sacramenti aut ministri ad operandum supernaturalia." Disp. 23, a. 1, n. 15: "Id quod assumitur ad instrumentaliter causandum in sacramentis non est ipsa forma seu ratio signi, sed id quod naturale et sensible est in sacramentis." Cf. *ibid.*, disp. 25, a. 2, nn. 51, 122, 147.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, disp. 25, a. 4, n. 22: "Ad characterem . . . pertinet ministerialiter et sacramentaliter valide exercere signa sensibilia, habentia virtutem spiritualem, et protestativa fidei Christi, in quo ei character ministrat." *Ibid.*, a. 2, n. 146: "Sacerdos habet se sicut minister, seu instrumentum animarum [animatum?] quod confert gratiam non solum tamquam instrumentum pure efficiens ex motione sed *efficiens colendo* seu faciendo ea quae sunt cultus divini, et ideo requirit potestatem qua possit facere signa protestativa cultus huiusmodi; facit autem ea quae sunt cultus non sub ratione morali, et moralis virtutis, sed sub ratione cooperatoris et ministri Christi. . . . Moralitas huius cultus pertinet ad virtutem religionis."

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, disp. 25, a. 2, n. 93: "Redditur ergo per characterem baptismalem homo aptum subjectum ad sacramentaliter suscipiendum sacramenta quia suscipere sacramenta non est solum corpoream et sensibilem actionem extrinsecus applicatam suspicere quasi materialiter, sed sub ratione sacramenti formaliter."

directly from God the forms of grace and the other characters the soul would of itself be disposed; but a special potency is required for receiving these effects sacramentally, that is, as a result of first participating in the sign-action the material elements of which are then physically applied by God to the efficient production of these effects.⁷⁷ Hence the ambiguity and the possibility of confusion: the conscious subject participates *actively* in the sign-action as the *passive* element of the sign. In other words, his activity is required if the sign-action is to have its passive element. It is in these perspectives, according to John of St. Thomas, that St. Thomas' description of the baptismal character as a "passive" power is to be explained. Since a particular problem of textual interpretation arises here this point must be examined more closely.

A "passive power"

The phrase "passive power" used of the baptismal character by St. Thomas, in III, q. 63, a. 2, has caused a great deal of confusion in his readers. The fault, as will be seen, does not lie with him.

Taking the phrase in isolation and leaving out of consideration the whole theological fabric into which St. Thomas weaves it, not a few readers of the *Summa* have asserted that the baptismal character is a simple, inactive power of receiving the effects of the sacraments. Why, if this were his meaning, St. Thomas should not call it a disposition of the soul they do not say. Still less can they suggest any convincing *réason* why he should call it instrumental. Any such material idea of the character as a passive receptacle leaves no adequate reply to Suarez' very pertinent question: Passive to what? It is hard to conceive to what form the character could be passive. The major commentators, in reply, recognize a limited force in the

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 182: "Et licet ad recipiendum tales formas in genere entis seu accidentis sola natura animae aut potentiae sufficeret, sicut et ipsae suscipiunt characterem, tamen ad recipiendum illas ex officio et sacramentaliter (etsi physice suscipiantur) requiritur character, mediante quo valide suscipitur sacramentum et gratia sacramentalis; ideoque etiam in suscipiendo ministerialis causa est, licet in recipiendis illis in ratione entis nulla ratio ministerii attendatur."

objection. They admit that the character is not itself passive to grace which is received in the essence of the soul, and say that for it to be called passive—at least in a wide sense—it is sufficient that it make the subject able to receive grace.⁷⁸ They suggest that it may be strictly passive to other characters in the sense that it receive them as a subject.⁷⁹ They nearly all admit that it must have some action of its own, whatever object they assign to this.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Cf. Salmanticenses, tr. 22, disp. 4, a. 2, n. 42: "Ad hoc ut aliquid sit et dicatur potentia passiva saltem minus proprie et rigorose . . . minime requiritur quod in se recipiat actum, vel formam, respectu cuius dicitur potentia passiva: sed sufficit quod subjectum rigorose receptivum coaptet ad recipiendum actum, vel formam. . . . Quare concessio quod character baptismi non recipiat in se illos effectus, ad quos homines aptat minime sequitur non esse veram potentiam passivam et receptivam, licet minus proprie." Gonet, *Clypeus theol. thom.*, *De Sacramentis*, disp. 4, a. 2, n. 79: "Sufficit ad rationem potentiae passivae quod reddat subjectum capax receptionis alicuius formae vel actus . . . Character baptismalis licet in se proprie non recipiat illa sacramenta aut alios characteres eo ipso tamen quod hominem disponat ad illorum receptionem habet sufficienter quod requiritur ad rationem potentiae physicae passivae." Contenson, *Theol. mentis et cordis*, Lib. 2, p. 7, diss. 1, cap. 2. Both Bañez (*in Summa Theol.*, III, p. 63, a. 2, n. 8) and Sylvius (*in Summa Theol.*, III, q. 63, a. 2) are led to propose that the character simply gives a moral right to receive sacramental grace.

⁷⁹ Cf. Salmanticenses, *ibid.*; Gonet, *ibid.*, n. 83 (cf., however, n. 79, quoted above, note 78); John of St. Thomas also admits this as a possibility, disp. 25, a. 2, n. 181, but this a secondary aspect of his teaching.

⁸⁰ Cf. Cajetan, *in Summa Theol.*, III, q. 73, a. 5: "Patet etiam non sic intelligendam characterem esse potentiam passivam tamquam si poneretur pure passive. Potest enim aliquem actum habere." Salmanticenses, disp. 5, dub. 3, n. 49: "Character baptismalis non est mera potentia aut capacitas passiva, sed importat etiam activam virtutem, praesertim ad eliciendum actus sub ratione dispositionis congruae ad suscipiendum caetera sacramenta; quamvis enim non insignitus eo charactere queat omnes illos actus secundum speciem elicere, non tamen secundum quod ad sacramenta disponunt." (The "causal" bias of the Salmanticenses is to be noted in the idea of disposition.) N. 50 they speak of the character as "quaedam potentia executiva instrumentalis . . . praesertim quantum ad susceptionem et administrationem sacramentorum. Quare character et debet esse participatio potentiae executivae Dei et recipi in potentia executiva animae. . . . Ad characterem spectat exequi actiones sacras externas, elevando scilicet intellectum practicum et concurrendo simul cum illo ad executionem et directionem praedictarum operationum. . . . Perficit (character) intellectum practicum ut efficiat operationes pertinentes ad cultum Dei et quantum ad hoc nos Christo facit consimiles. . . . Unde facile intelligitur characterem baptismi recipi in intellectu pratico, communicando eius imperio efficaciam, ut alias potentias moveat ad

In this they are merely reproducing what St. Thomas teaches explicitly in III, q. 63, a. 4 where he asks whether the subject of the character is a power of the soul:

The character is a certain seal impressed on the soul for receiving or giving to others what belongs to divine worship. Now, *divine worship consists in certain acts*. But it is the powers of the soul that are directed towards acts, in the same way as its essence is directed towards existence. Consequently, the subject of the character is not the essence of the soul, but one of its powers.⁸¹

The reply to the first objection states that grace is given to bearers of the character only in order

that they may carry out worthily what they are deputed to. Hence a subject is to be assigned to the character with reference to *the acts belonging to divine worship*, rather than with reference to grace.⁸²

Likewise the second reply defends the assignation of a power as the subject of the character on the grounds that

whatever is *directed towards action* is to be attributed to a power.⁸³

It is, finally, in the reply to the third objection of this important article that St. Thomas explains the new object given by the character to the power which is its subject:

The character is directed towards what belongs to divine worship. Divine worship is a certain *profession of faith by external signs*. Consequently, the character must be in the intellectual power of the soul, in which is faith.⁸⁴

St. Thomas makes no distinction here between the character of the minister and that of the subject. This article, and in particular the reply to the third objection, justifies fully the

validam receptionem caeterorum sacramentorum." Dom. Soto, *In IV Sent.*, dist. 1, q. 4, a. 6: "Susceptio et administratio est actus et exercitium divini cultus."

⁸¹ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 63, a. 4. Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 7, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 2.

⁸² *Ibid.*, ad 1.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, ad 2.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, ad 3. Cf. *ibid.*, a. 1, ad 1: "Fideles Christi . . . da actus convenientes praesenti Ecclesiae deputantur . . ."

teaching of John of St. Thomas that the characters are directed essentially towards giving sacramental validity to the worshipful acts of minister and subject. The distinction between the two characters corresponds to the parts played by minister and subject respectively in the sacramental sign-action and in the production of grace to which this action is finally directed.⁸⁵

Hence the "passivity" of the baptismal character in no way diminishes the personal activity of a conscious subject whose intention of receiving the sacrament is thus given sacramental validity and is enabled to complete the sign-action by making the sacrament *actually received* and hence operative. It is precisely because it is through the baptismal character that this validity is imparted to the subject's intention and that the sacrament is signified as "received" that this character is said to be "passive." It enables the subject to provide the passive element of the sign. It is because such validity implies divine intervention in the sacraments that the character is said to be instrumental. In other words, it can produce its formal effect, validity, only when the sacramental action actually signifies the divine decree of justification. These are conclusions that are implicit in St. Thomas' article.⁸⁶

Some modifications are to be made in the case of reception of the sacraments by an unconscious person. When one who is baptized receives a sacrament in this condition his intention—and he must have an habitual intention, whether implicit or explicit—cannot intervene actively; neither, therefore, can his character. As already explained, he receives the sacrament in the fashion of a child, *ad modum pueri*. Nevertheless, his character may be said to pertain to the perfection of the sacramental sign insofar as it is itself a sign of deputation to

⁸⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, q. 63, a. 2: "Divinus cultus consistit vel in recipiendo aliqua divina, vel in tradendo aliis. Ad utrumque autem horum requiritur quaedam potentia; nam ad tradendum aliquid aliis, requiritur potentia activa; ad recipiendum autem requiritur potentia passiva."

⁸⁶ Note that it is immediately after he has said that the baptismal character is a passive power that St. Thomas goes on: "Sciendum tamen quod haec spiritualis potestas est instrumentalis . . . Habere enim sacramentalem characterem competit ministris Dei." (*Ibid.*)

Christian worship.⁸⁷ Administration of a sacrament other than baptism (unless qualified by a condition in the form) signifies that the subject is a member of the Church. Here again, as with the habitual intention that is required of those who previously had the use of reason, if the subject does not in fact possess a character the sign-action is false and no effect can follow.

*An "instrumental power"*⁸⁸

This is the crucial point of St. Thomas' teaching on the baptismal character which, it appears, can be adequately explained only in the light of what John of St. Thomas says about the character as a passive power. The commentators follow St. Thomas in saying of all three characters that they are instrumental.⁸⁹ Since, however, they relate the instrumentality of the priestly character directly to the production of grace⁹⁰ they are at a loss to explain the instrumentality of the character of baptism and are content simply to report St. Thomas' own words.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, ad 4. This involves the knowledge that the Church has that a person has submitted to baptism. Cf. also John of St. Thomas, *loc. cit.* disp. 25, a. 2, n. 181: "Datur enim potentia passiva . . . ut [aliquid] sacramentaliter recipiatur; est autem sacramentaliter recipere, cum debita intentione *habituali*, vel *virtuali*, vel *actuali* recipere."

⁸⁸ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 63, a. 2: "Sciendum tamen quod haec spiritualis potentia est instrumentalis."

⁸⁹ Cf. Salmantenses, tr. 22, disp. 5, dub. 2, nn. 31, 37, 39, 51 (referring to baptismal character explicitly); Gonet, *De sacramentis*, disp. 4, a. 2, nn. 59, 72; Sylvius, in III, q. 63, a. 2; Bañez, in *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 63, a. 2, nn. 6, 8 (referring to baptismal character explicitly); Billuart, diss. 4, a. 2 and a. 3; Cajetan has no comment in *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 63, a. 2.

⁹⁰ Cf. Salmantenses, *ibid.*, nn. 34, 46; Gonet, *ibid.*, nn. 60, 72; Bañez, *ibid.*, n. 7; Billuart, *ibid.*; Sylvius, *ibid.*, however, does not agree and quotes III, q. 63, a. 4, ad 1: "Character directe quidem et propinque disponit animam ad ea quae sunt divini cultus exequenda."

⁹¹ Bañez, *loc. cit.*, n. 8, is an exception: "Potest dici instrumentalis," he explains, "eo quod non est proportionata secundum se ad recipiendum sacramenta, scil., gratiam quae est effectus sacramentorum, sed solummodo constituit hominem communicatorem divinorum quantum ad jus quoddam quod adquirit ex eo quod baptizatus est ad petenda et recipienda sacramenta. Et fortasse possemus dicere quod illa potentia dicitur instrumentalis moraliter, non physice, vel potius secundum

For John of St. Thomas instrumentality is implicit in the very notion of a passive *sacramental* power. He refers to Cajetan's teaching that the baptismal character is not a merely passive power and explains that,

just as the minister is a living instrument who is not simply passively applied to producing the effect of the sacrament but who is applied as a living being, so the baptismal character is given for receiving as a minister who is a living instrument.⁹²

This is a form of reception to which no parallel is to be found outside the sacraments; it is something that follows immediately on the nature of the sacraments as *signs* which are used by God for producing grace.

The sacraments are received by the body "naturally," that is to say, as corporeal entities; by reason of the character they are received "sacramentally" and as valid sacramental actions. . . . For this it is not required that the character itself receive the reality of the sacramental action, since its purpose is not to receive the sacrament "naturally" and as a physical entity, but that such a sacrament should be received with sacramental validity and precisely as a sacrament. Though the character is in the soul it is responsible for the whole man receiving the action sacramentally and not merely naturally.⁹³

This is to say that the character is a "passive" power in that its intervention enables the sacrament to exist formally as received by the subject. John of St. Thomas goes on to develop

quamdam similitudinem ad facultatem quae proprie dicitur instrumentalis. Quae similitudo consistit in hoc quod, quemadmodum facultas quae proprie dicitur instrumentalis non est proportionata ad effectum ad quem efficienter concurrit, ita etiam illa potentia ad recipienda sacramenta non est proportionata ad formam quae est effectus sacramentorum, scilicet ad gratiam."

⁹² John of St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*, disp. 25, a. 2, n. 129.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, n. 130: "Sacraenta recipiuntur in corpore quasi naturaliter, seu ut entitates quaedam corporeae, medio autem charactere sacramentaliter, et ut valide actiones sacramentales. . . . Ad hoc non requiritur quod character realitatem actionis sacramentalis suscipiat in se, quia non datur ad naturaliter et in genere entis suscipiendum characterem [sic—for *sacramentum*: see following phrase] sed ut tale sacramentum suscipiatur valide sacramentaliter et in ratione sacramenti. Et licet character sit in anima tamen facit quod totus homo sacramentaliter suscipit hanc actionem et non solum naturaliter."

this further. "What is involved," he asks, "in 'receiving sacramentally'?" He replies:

To receive the sacraments sacramentally, in other words, to receive them validly by reason of the character, this is [what is implied on the part of the subject by reason of the fact that] the sacraments depend *in their very existence as sacraments* on a subject actually receiving, in the category of a material cause.⁹⁴

It is of paramount importance to take account of the modification attached to the idea of material cause. The sacraments "in their very existence as sacraments" depend on the subject as on such a cause; and this means primarily that the subject acts as the passive element in the *sign-action* of the sacrament.

Again:

The action depends intrinsically *for its sacramentality* on the subject with a character, in the category of material cause.⁹⁵

Therefore, before a sacrament can exist as applied to an individual subject, that subject must possess a character and, if conscious, activate his character by forming an intention of receiving the sacrament. The sacramental *action* of administration is intrinsically deficient if this submission is not made. John of St. Thomas goes on to explain why this demands a physical passive power by drawing an analogy with the activity of the minister of the sacrament. Just as the minister requires a physical, active power if the actions which he performs are to be sacramental, that is, are to be valid sacramental *signs*, so the subject requires a physical, passive power if, in his reception, he is to serve as a material cause on which the sacrament depends, first of all in the order of signification, not as an empty human action, but precisely as enriched by the power of Christ.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 131: "Et si quaeras, quid sit sacramentaliter suscipere ut ad hoc requiratur potentia physica passiva, respondetur, quod *sacramentaliter suscipere sacramenta*, seu valide suscipere ex vi characteris, *est dependere sacramenta in ratione sacramenti a subiecto suscipiente in genere causae materialis.*"

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, n. 130.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 131: "Et sicut ad operandum sacramenta non solum in quantum

The character is not, consequently, itself receptive of the effect of the sacrament. It serves rather to make the sacrament effective insofar as it gives sacramental validity to the intention by which the subject completes the *sign-action* of administration and reception. It is in virtue of this intention that the subject acts as a term for the action of the sacrament, on the human level of signification; but by this very fact, in virtue of his character, the subject completes the application to himself of the sacrament as an action of Christ, first of all, and formally, on the level of signification, thus preparing the way for consequent efficient causality. It is only now that there is any possibility of the sacrament producing an effect. It is because the subject makes this final application of the sacrament to himself—an application that is itself strictly sacramental or on the level of signification and only consequently of causality—that he can be said to act as a minister of God. Whether he receives grace from the sacrament that he has helped to apply to himself in this way depends, not on his character, but on his dispositions, in other words, on whether he has used his character properly or not.⁹⁷

The passive power is consequently called instrumental,

not as though it were a movement and a power derived from the principal agent; for that would make of it an active power [that is, it is not an *efficient* instrumental power]. It is said to be instrumental insofar as it is ministerial and serving in ministerial fashion so that the effect may be *received* in the subject, *not entitatively and materially, but sacramentally*. For sacramental reception is in a certain sense ministerial. And therefore the power for receiving

actiones naturales sunt, v. g., absolutionem, unctionem, ablutionem etc., sed in quantum sacramentales sunt, indiget homo potentia quadam activa physica, quae est character; ita ad suscipiendum eiusdem actiones in quantum sacramentales sunt, indiget homo physica potentia passiva a qua in genere causae materialis dependet sacramentum ut sacramentum sit, id est, non ut purum elementum, aut elementalis actio, sed ut habet excellentias quas a Christi virtute participat sacramentum."

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 132: "Potentia passiva debet esse susceptiva actus in se quando est in principali agente; quando vero est in ministro, sufficit quod reddat illum aptum ad hoc sacramentum et collatum validum sit et valide susceptum, licet non conferat ut digne et debite sit susceptum."

effects *in this way* is not something perfect in the genus of power, since it is not for perfectly [or materially] receiving those effects, but for receiving them *sacramentally* and in ministerial fashion . . . insofar as a person moves himself to receive those things that belong to divine worship, as a minister and a living instrument.⁹⁸

Though the baptismal character does not receive a transient elevation from Christ, it can achieve its effect (that, namely, of giving validity to the subject's intention) only when the subject is actually subordinated as a material cause to the sacrament. This is the normal inter-play of formal and material causality. Hence the character is only "by reduction," *reductive*, a power.

Because it bears this power the intellect of the baptized Christian is enabled, in producing connaturally an external profession of faith, to serve as a minister the strictly sacramental action by which Christ sanctifies men.⁹⁹ The sign-action of the sacraments of the Church to which the characters of orders and baptism are directed has no other purpose than to signify and to put into effect the divine will of justification. Indeed, their very existence as sacraments of Christ is dependent less on the actions of men than on that of God and Christ. What the minister and subject produce as principal causes by that very fact is used by Christ as sign and as cause. Hence the essentially incomplete nature of what they do as principal

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, n. 185. Cf. *ibid.*, n. 181. John of St. Thomas suggests that the baptismal character may also physically receive not only the other characters but also sacramental grace precisely as sacramental and as perfecting the intellect in the performance of acts of worship (cf. *ibid.*, n. 184). As an accompaniment to his main theme he argues that even in receiving these forms the character would be a ministerial power since these all pertain to the subject's action as a minister. Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 181, 182.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, disp. 25, a. 4, n. 25: "Potentia [he is referring to the intellect] est tota inclinata ad actus, et inclinatio ad agendum, et ideo connaturaliter et juxta modum proprium solum est capax activitatis, quae sit actus primus aut secundus; ministerialiter autem est capax non solum activitatis quae sit actus primus, sed etiam potentiae, sive activae, sive passivae in ordine ad actus, quos ministerialiter debet exercere, si ministeriale illud exercitium habeat proportionem et convenientiam cum actibus illius potentiae in qua subjectatur; sic enim character cum sit potentia ad protestandum exterius fidem per signa sensibilia, convenienter in ipso subjecto fidei ponitur."

causes. It is something that must be brought to perfection by Christ. The subject's role may therefore be described as that of serving Christ ministerially or instrumentally as the person in whom the sacrament is to produce its effect; that is to say, in the category of material cause primarily in the order of signification, consequently in the order of causality. This is as far as John of St. Thomas goes; but it appears to be possible to determine more precisely the relation of the subject's participation in the sacramental action to the physical causality of grace by the sacrament.

In its strict and proper sense instrumental causality is verified only in the order of physical efficient causes. The instrument is active in producing the effect, not by reason of its own form, but because it is moved by the principal cause, receiving from it a transient efficacy, *vis fluens*.¹⁰⁰ The action of the instrument as such is the action of the principal cause insofar as the latter uses the proper action of the instrument.¹⁰¹ Thus the instrument produces the whole effect, in its own order and in subordination to the principal cause.

This notion is transferred to other contexts. Thus a delegate or a sign may be called an instrument, the one moral, the other logical, since both draw efficacy in their actions from some other source. Their separate relations to their "principal causes" are clearly analogical.

Likewise, within the order of physical causality itself, not all instruments correspond to the strict definition. Since God operates in all actions, even secondary causes may be said to be His instruments, though this does not involve any transient elevation of the creature.¹⁰² Nor do all entities that serve as instruments attain the effect of the principal cause; some produce only a disposition which calls for the final effect.¹⁰³ Of instruments that attain the final effect, some do so by disposing the material cause (*dispositio operata*), others modify the

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *de Verit.*, q. 27, a. 4; *ibid.*, ad 4.

¹⁰¹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 19, a. 1.

¹⁰² Cf. *de Pot.*, q. 3, a. 7.

¹⁰³ Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1.

action of the principal cause (*dispositio operans*).¹⁰⁴ An example of the latter is the imagination which is the instrument of the active intellect in producing a species in the passive intellect.¹⁰⁵ In all of these analogical applications the notion of instrument maintains one connotation: the instrument always attains some effect that lies beyond its natural power.¹⁰⁶

The sacraments are directed towards the production of grace and, together with the minister and in subordination to the humanity of Christ and God, intervene physically as instruments in the strict sense in causing this effect. The sign-action which precedes (by a priority of nature) and regulates this causal action is wholly attributable as a common act of worship to minister and subject insofar as they, as principal causes, intend to do what the Church does. Their proper action ends here; but it is to this action of theirs that God conforms His sanctifying action which is signified and put into effect by means of it. This constitutes the full instrumental intervention of the subject and the primary instrumental intervention of the minister. The subject does nothing more than provide a term for the action of God by appropriating the sign-action to himself. This is, strictly speaking, confined to the order of signification; but, since the causality of the sacrament follows on this order, the subject, by the action which his passive part in the sign demands, may be said to "modify" the divine action. The "instrumental" activity involved is that of *dispositio operans*, and it may be described by reason of its proper effect in the order of signification as *material* instrumental causality. (The subject, however, elicits the action in the manner of an efficient cause.) It is to be noted that this is a wholly unique form of instrumentality. In every other example of efficient causality the material cause receives immediately the effect. Only in the sacraments where efficient causality follows upon signification must an instrumental material cause intervene on the level of signification.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. John of St. Thomas, disp. 24, a. 1, n. 577.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. J. Gredt, *Elementa philosophiae*, vol. I, nn. 576-579, vol. II, nn. 765-768.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1.

Notes on certain of the sacraments

In the sacrament of baptism it is clear that no character intervenes on the part of the subject.¹⁰⁷ Here, however, the simple intention of an adult plays the same part as does an intention made valid by a character in the other sacraments. This is because of the very nature of the sacrament which is not for those who are already members of the Church, but for those who are seeking entrance.¹⁰⁸ An analogy to the inhering instrumental power of the character might be found in the case of baptism in the right won by Christ over all men in His passion.

In penance and matrimony the acts of the subject take the place of the matter of the sacrament and are used by God in producing the effect.¹⁰⁹ The character of baptism performs the same function in these sacraments as in the others insofar as it enables the subject to *receive* sacramentally. It is, therefore, only at the moment of absolution that the character is active in penance. The three acts of the penitent require its intervention only insofar as they are present at this moment. To enter into the contract of marriage requires no special sacramental power since it is a natural act; but to participate in the ceremony as a subject of a sacrament the baptismal character is required.¹¹⁰ Consequently, though it might be said that in a marriage of two baptized persons each partner is "minister" of the sacrament in relation to the other, this must be understood to be an analogical use of the term. The attempt

¹⁰⁷ B. Durst, O.S.B., *De characteribus sacramentalibus*, ("Xenia thomistica," vol. 2, Rome, 1924, pp. 541-581) attempts to show that the baptismal character intervenes in the sacrament of baptism itself. This is unnecessary; it was not taught by St. Thomas and appears contrary to his notions of baptism as spiritual generation and as the *janua sacramentorum*; cf. *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 59: ". . . ad susceptionem aliorum sacramentorum. . . ."

¹⁰⁸ Cf. John of St. Thomas, disp. 25, a. 4, n. 40.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 84, a. 2; q. 86, a. 6; *Suppl.*, q. 42, a. 1; q. 42, a. 3, ad 2; Cajetan, in *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 84, a. 2, n. 4.

¹¹⁰ Cf. John of St. Thomas, disp. 25, a. 2, n. 100: ". . . matrimonium autem, quia non fit per aliquam sacram actionem, sed per contractum naturalem; et ideo speciale deputationem non requirit administrationem eius, ad susceptionem autem requirit quod contrahentes sunt baptizati."

of some theologians to explain the activity that is to be attributed to the baptismal character by asserting that it is required for contracting marriage is unacceptable. The same is to be said of the suggestion that the baptismal character is active when a layman baptizes in case of necessity. Such efforts as these to extend the layman's participation in the sacraments serve only to confuse the notion of the passive cultual power by reason of which he plays an essential part in the Church's liturgy.

Notion of OPUS OPERATUM

Nothing of what has been said takes away from the inner power of the sacraments to justify and to bring increase of grace quite beyond what the subject could merit for himself. This is taken for granted as the teaching of the Church. The whole discussion has been concerned with what is required on the part of the subject for this power to be brought to bear on the soul.

It is accepted from the Church, therefore, that the sacraments produce their effects *ex opere operato*, that is, because of direct divine intervention; but what sense is to be given to the term *opus operatum*? The difficulty in replying to this question arises from the fact that St. Thomas does not use the *opus operans*, *opus operatum* terminology in the *Summa* and, consequently, nowhere interprets it in the light of his fully developed sacramental theology.¹¹¹ Philologically and historically¹¹² the original sense of the terms makes a distinction between two aspects of an action: first, as proceeding from an agent and as morally imputable to him (*opus operans*), and second, as having in itself a certain moral independence (*opus*

¹¹¹ 26 occurrences of one or other or both of the terms, or some variant of them, have been found in *III Sent.* and *IV Sent.* (Three at least of these texts reappear in the *Supplement*.) Only two other texts have been found: *in Ioan.*, c. 6, lect. 6, and *ad Heb.*, c. 3, lect. 3 (both *reportationes*).

¹¹² Texts may be found in A. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*, 3ter Teil, Band I (Regensburg, 1954), pp. 53 f., 145 f.; and E. Filthaut, O.P., *Roland von Cremona, O.P., und die Anfänge der Scholastik im Predigerorden* (Vechta i. O., 1936), pp. 161 f.

operatum). Though by the middle of the thirteenth century some liberty was taken in applying the distinction to more complex situations, the formal idea of *opus operatum* as something, under one aspect at least, independent of the moral dispositions of the agent was undisputed. Applied to the sacraments the term denominates a sacrament in relation to the minister and subject, denying its dependence for its powers on their merit or virtuous activity. St. Thomas adopts this usage in the *Sentences*, making *opus operatum* basically a synonym for the sacramental ceremony. In one place he raises this simple juridical idea onto a lofty plane by attributing the *opus operatum* to God: *quod est opus Dei*.¹¹³ This extended use of the term leaves the way open for later theologians to develop a derived, mystical sense of what was originally a moral, not to say legal, term.¹¹⁴

The sign-theology of the sacramental tract of the *Tertia Pars* imposes certain refinements on our notion of *opus operatum*. It has been shown that according to this theology the *opus operatum* which is used as the vehicle of the divine action is itself produced by the common action of minister and subject. The *opus operatum* is their common act of external worship, in which the minister plays the active, the subject the passive, part. These parts, as has already been seen, are denominated "active" and "passive" by reason of their respective functions in the sacramental *sign*. To fulfil these symbolic functions action is required of both minister and (conscious) subject. The *opus operans* is therefore twofold, distinguished according as the elements of the *opus operatum* are dependent on either minister or subject. In the *Sentences* the *opus operatum* was understood to be the result of the minister's action alone. The development of St. Thomas' doctrine in the *Summa* requires that the *opus operans* of the subject be also made partially responsible for the *opus operatum*. In this article the essential element of the subject's *opus operans*—his intention of re-

¹¹³ IV *Sent.*, d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 3, ad 1.

¹¹⁴ Dr. Schillebeeckx, *op. cit.*, pp. 641 f., is not wholly faithful to the text when he reads this derived sense into all the occurrences in the *Sentences*.

ceiving the sacrament—has been indicated. It remains to investigate what elements are required for integral or fruitful participation in the sacraments, and what is their relation to the *opus operatum*.

Conclusions

I In the *Sentences* St. Thomas reduces the participation of the subject to the minimum: for the majority of the sacraments it involves nothing more than an intention of reception which is a *removens prohibens*; in penance and matrimony it enters the essence of the sacrament. This follows on the point of view of the *Sentences* according to which the sacraments of the Church are considered merely as causes.

II In the *Summa* the sacraments are considered not as mere causes but as integral parts of external worship; and in the realm of signification the subject may be allowed a part that can be said to be "in" the sacrament, always without prejudice to the essence of the sacrament. This is no more than a hint; but taken in conjunction with St. Thomas' whole sacramental outlook—in particular his suggestions concerning the characters and his insistence on the cultual nature of the sacraments—it is extremely suggestive. Under pain of invalidity the subject must intend to receive the sacrament and must have the baptismal character for the sacraments other than baptism. In relation to the causality of the sacrament the subject's acts are dispositive.

III In common with all action except creation the causality of the sacraments cannot be exercised without a subject. What is peculiar to this form of action is that it is preceded (by a priority of nature) and specified by a *sign*. It is therefore required that the conscious subject *signify* his willing acceptance of the sacrament before the latter can be *actively* applied to him as a concrete, practical sign of the Church's faith used instrumentally by God in producing sacramental grace and the characters. Thus the subject's intention forms an integral part

of a true sacramental sign. Without it, those sacraments which exist only at the time of use, even though they have their essential parts, lack something required for their perfection. It is only when they are perfect as signs received by an individual that there is any possibility of their acting as causes.

IV Variations in the intention of the subject. What is essential to the sacrament is that it should signify the giving of grace to a subject. The state of consciousness of the individual subject to whom the sacrament is concretely applied determines the signification of the complete sign-action. Thus, although all those who are unconscious (or wholly distracted) are incapable of any active participation and consequently receive such sacraments as are administered to them and they are capable of *ad modum pueri*, the sacramental sign differs according to the particular condition of the subject. If the subject is a child or an imbecile from birth the sacramental sign-action signifies as such and is true simply through physical submission. If the subject, however, is one who previously had the use of reason (or who is temporarily distracted) the sacramental sign will be true only if his will habitually accepts the sacrament, since what is signified is justification of one who is unconscious and who places no obstacle in the way of the sacrament. A conscious subject whose reception of the sacrament is a human act (this excludes one who is distracted and who has only an habitual intention) must have at least a virtual intention. Consequently, no generalization assigning the intention of the subject a lower degree than that of the minister is acceptable.

V The baptismal character is required to give validity to the subject's intention so that the common act of worship performed by minister and subject (as principal causes), the actions of one forming the active element of the symbol, the actions of the other forming the passive element of the symbol, may be used by God and by Christ to signify and put into effect the divine decree of sanctification as brought to bear

on the individual subject. This is what is meant by calling the characters "instrumental" powers. The subject provides a term for the action of God by appropriating the sign-action to himself. Acting thus *on the level of signification* he may further be said to have a certain part to play in relation to the *causality* of the sacrament since the causality follows on (*posterioritate naturae*) the signification. The subject may be said to "modify" the divine action in this sense and hence to act as an "instrumental" cause in relation to grace, producing a disposition for the effect which is a *dispositio operans*, a disposition which consists in providing by his actions the passive element of the symbol. (This is not to be confused with the material dispositions required in the soul of the subject for receiving grace.) This is a wholly unique form of instrumentality. In every other example of efficient causality the material cause receives immediately the effect. Only in the sacraments where efficient causality follows upon signification must an instrumental material cause intervene.

Thus, in summary, the subject as an *efficient* cause provides the *material* or passive element of the *sign*—this action is "instrumental" insofar as it serves to complete the sign of the *divine decree of justification* as applied to the individual. Thus the subject *by way of the sign* applies the divine sacramental *action* to himself—therefore as an "instrumental" "material" cause. In relation to the actual infusion of grace the subject is a simple material—though human—cause.

VI The baptismal character is always a passive power in this sense. To think of it as "active" in matrimony or baptism administered by a layman is to confuse St. Thomas' notion of it.

VII The *opus operatum* "from" which (*ex*) the effect of the sacrament is produced is the common act of external worship of minister and subject which is the sign of the divine decree of justifying the individual. The *opus operans* is therefore two-fold, distinguished according as certain elements of the *opus*

operatum are dependent on the minister, others on the subject. The essential *opus operans* of the subject which is required for valid reception is willing acceptance of the sacrament. This involves the intention of receiving and, for sacraments other than baptism, implies the possession of the baptismal character.

(*To be continued*)

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IS HEIDEGGER A NIHILIST?

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THE shift in accent which occurs in the works posterior to 1930 marks Heidegger's concentration on developing the positive side of the doctrine of finite Being. Viewed thus positively, the Being revealed by the Dasein's existence is historical. Consequently, the sum-total of the historical destiny of mankind composes the immeasurably rich treasury of concrete human possibility, which, in the form of the progressive illumination of the things that are, can be called their Being. But because the Dasein *is* finite, the negative element, so strongly emphasized by Heidegger in *Was ist Metaphysik?* cannot be ignored, but joins with the positive to weave a chiaroscuro picture of a revelation of the things that are that is at the same time always a dissimulation.

In the Postscript to *Was ist Metaphysik?*, written in 1943, some 13 years after the Inaugural Lecture itself, Heidegger seeks to equilibrate the black and the white of what was said in the original discussion of the Nothing. After having admitted that *Was ist Metaphysik?* is thought "in transition" which has not borne its full positive fruit and which remains too much in reaction against the traditional ontology, Heidegger seeks to show that what was written there is nevertheless basically sound. To put the earlier doctrine into clear perspective, Heidegger proposes to allay three "misgivings" that have arisen concerning the work, with the intention of showing that the lecture may, and indeed *should*, in each case be interpreted in a way that leads past the forbidding negative assertions to a positive doctrine of Being. These misgivings are of particular interest, for they not only show the points about which the later Heidegger has become sensitive, but in the answers furnished to each problem we are provided with a vivid demonstration of the advances which the later Heidegger has made in coming into full, positive possession of the ontology he would find in breaking with the past.

The three misgivings are these: (1) Having made "nothing" (*das Nichts*) the subject of metaphysics, the lecture becomes the last word in Nihilism; (2) A philosophy of "*Angst*" paralyzes the will to act; (3) The anti-logicism of the lecture leads to a philosophy of pure feeling.¹ Let us examine the author's answer to each misgiving separately.

1. After reviewing the analysis in *Was ist Metaphysik?* that led to the affirmation of the Nothing, Heidegger seeks to forestall any possible nihilistic interpretation of his intentions.

It would be immature . . . to adopt the facile explanation that Nothing is merely the nugatory, equating it with the non-existent (*das Wesenlose*). We should rather equip ourselves and make ready for one thing only: to experience in Nothing the vastness of that which gives every being the warrant to be. That is Being itself. Without Being, whose unfathomable and unmanifest essence is vouchsafed us by the Nothing in essential dread, everything that "is" would remain in Beinglessness (*Sein losigkeit*). But this is not a nugatory nothing, assuming that it is the truth of Being that Being never essentializes itself without *Seienden*, and *Seienden* cannot be without Being.²

The opening of a transcendental horizon is not, indeed, a nugatory nothing, just as it is not either the work of a "something," —a *Sciende* in its *Sciendheit*. But when the philosopher wishes to introduce into history the proper presence of the Presence that opens an horizon, and he wishes to distinguish his conception of "Being" from the traditional metaphysical conception which always begins with *things as things*, then clearly the first effort at expression is bound to be negative. . . . Being is NOT *Sciendheit*. Even when Heidegger affirms that it is Anguish which reveals that the Nothing is at the heart of the transcendence of Being, this is not nihilistic in the visual sense. Indeed, anguish *is* the grasp of the radical freedom of our finitude, but it is that freedom in and through its finitude which makes possible that presence of the things-that-are which we call "Being." The accent then is positive when Heidegger

¹ *Was ist Metaphysik?* p. 45.

² *Was ist Metaphysik?* p. 46.

declares that it is because we can grasp our own finite end in death that we can stand-out, *Ek-sist* in a projection which makes it possible to render a sense to things. The Nothing, then, is "*abgrundig*" because it is not an infinite absolute and because there is none necessary in order that Being might be; it is "unfathomable" because of the vastness of our transcendence of the things that are and because of the vastness of the sum total of things themselves, a vastness not of infinity, but of great extent (*Weitraumigkeit*). In a word, finitude does not, for Heidegger, necessarily imply a nihilism, because Being can be fully real, fully transcendent, without needing to be infinitely Absolute. Both the *Dasein*'s freedom and the totality of the things that are are nonetheless "real" for not being either eternal or unmoving. They constitute a positive something, without for all that breaking through the bonds of finitude.

2. The second answer is basically prepared by the answer to the third, so let us save it for last. Heidegger answers the objection of illogicism by developing the notion that there is a more originative thinking than logic, upon which logic depends. Our author analyzes the derived, non-fundamental knowledge that we use in everyday life in terms of "calculation." Calculation begins its operations upon a whole that is already "given" and in which it does not interest itself as a whole, but only in terms of its sums and parts, which it takes apart and reassembles following the schemes it has erected out of the necessities of daily life.³ The whole, however, of that which it ignores "in its wholeness"—*because* it is incalculable—is nevertheless "always closer to man in its enigmatic unknowability than anything that 'is,' than anything he may arrange or plan; this can sometimes put the essential man in touch with a thinking whose truth no 'logic' can grasp."⁴

The distinction which Heidegger develops here between the *consumptivity* of calculation and the *originality* of "essential thinking" is very central to his whole philosophy. As we shall

³ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

see later, the same distinction—which declares that all human activity either gets to the root of things or not, either unfolds in view of the originative freedom of the Dasein or not—is at the heart of the authentic-inauthentic dichotomy, presented in *Sein und Zeit* as the two horns of human existence, providing the two poles of the necessary dialectic which must divide the “undifferentiated structure of the Dasein” in all of its determinations. All thinking then must abound in the “calculative,” but there can be no calculative if it were not for the fundamental originative unveiling; just as all existence must abound in the inauthentic, though the inauthentic is only possible because we *can* project freely in view of our true natures.

“Calculation uses everything that is, as units of computation, ready in advance, and in the computation uses up its stock of units. The consumption of what-is reveals the consuming nature of calculation.”⁵ Calculation achieves an appearance of productivity only because its units can be multiplied or divided indefinitely. The originative thinking (*anfängliche Denken*), by contrast, creates anew, adding to the richness of the treasury of Being. In a very difficult passage of the Postscript Heidegger seeks to describe this thinking which is, in the Heideggerian meditation, really the ultimate. Ultimates are hard to describe precisely because there is nothing lying beyond them in terms of which they can be described. The originative thinking, through which *Seienden* come to light for the first time, through which new ways of seeing things are invented out of nothing, is the very act of freedom itself, pushing back the darkness in an extension of the kingdom of light.

The thinking which does not only not calculate but is absolutely determined by what is other than the *Seienden* is called “essential thinking.” Instead of calculating on *Seienden* with *Seienden* it expends itself in Being for the Truth of Being. This thinking answers to the demands of Being in that man surrenders his historical Essence to the simple, sole necessity (*Notwendigkeit*) whose necessitation does not so much necessitate (*notigt*) by simply constraining, but rather creates the Need (*Not*) which is

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

consummated in the freedom of the sacrificial offering. The Need is that the Truth of Being will be verified and protected, no matter what can happen to man and the things that are. The sacrificial offering is freed from all constraint because it comes forth from the abyss of freedom, as the surging abandonment of the human essence to the veritative protection of the truth of Being on behalf of the existing thing.⁶

If Heidegger has recourse to religious language here it is because he is trying to express what religion has always spoken of, and what he himself will speak of as *das Heilige*, in his analyses of the poetic act of originative thinking. For religion has always concerned itself with the ultimate in virtue of which and for which we live. Sacrifice has always represented a willingness to accept the charge of this destiny intended for us by the root of our existence. But just as metaphysics has always looked *meta-ta-phusika* for the ground and reason of the *phusika*, so religion has also sought the *Heilige* in a Transcendent that is beyond man. Heidegger here relates almost religiously the message of all his previous works. The ultimate that is "beyond man" is *Da-sein*, the Being-there among the things that are that is founded in the ultimate transcendence of finite *Ek-sistenz*. In the language of the paragraph just quoted, the sacrificial offering which we must make lies in devoting our existence to the Being achieved in the wedding of the things that are and the temporal, transcendental horizon, which devotion in its purity would be the end of authentic *ek-sistenz*. The authentic existent, grasping our nature as the place where Being becomes, where the Light that lets the things that are *be*, offers himself to the ultimate reality, the *Wahrung der Wahrheit*. The thinker sacrifices himself to think, the artist offers up himself to his creation. As in all religious situations, the authentic religious grasp is founded in Need, for it is a freedom grounded in necessity. All religions recognize such a necessity as an expression of that given reality which is our "Essence." The more advanced religions recognize that essence as free. But this freedom, they realize, is not absolute, but finite. It

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

functions in terms of the necessity of the essence. Heidegger's revolutionary step, following Nietzsche, lies in the proposition that this *Notwendigkeit* is indeed a *Wendung* in the *Not*, which Need is the *Not* of a thirst for Being of a finite Being-understanding.

Being, then, interpreted as the Light which shines on the *Seienden* in the projection of a transcendental horizon, arises from the exercise of freedom generated by this originative need. When Heidegger insists that *das Nichts* is not a purely nugatory nothing, he is thinking of the positive generation of light by that Need which is a freedom seeking to fulfill its needs born of finitude, from out its strictly finite resources. This generation of light by *Dasein* is Being itself. The Being disclosed in the Opening cleared by the nothingness of freedom is that *for the sake of which* and that thanks to which we Ek-sist; it is just this that the religious of the metaphysical epochs sought to express in terms of its absolutes. In appropriating the religious language of the past Heidegger would conceive himself as rendering the traditional religions their ultimate—their *finite*—significance. I quote:

In sacrifice there is expressed that hidden *thanking* which alone does homage to the grace wherewith Being has endowed the nature of man that he might assume in his relationship to Being the guardianship of Being. The originative thinking is the echo of the favor of Being in which it illuminated the unique occurrence and lets itself prepare for Being's own advent, *that the Seiende be*. This echo is man's answer to the soundless voice of Being. The speechless answer of his thanking through sacrifice is the source of the human word, which is the prime cause of language as the enunciation of the Word in words.⁷

If one is still tempted to see in phrases which suggest that man is related to Being an indication that Being transcends man in the sense that a Transcendent Absolute founds the things that are, then one has, I think, missed the point entirely. Being and *Dasein* are, certainly, more than Man, but it is because they involve both man and *Seienden*, and these within the scope of

⁷ *Ibid.*

an historical horizon infolding a tradition that goes beyond this particular individual man. The exact nature of the man-Being relationship is very complex; Heidegger attempts to explain it in recent essays as a four-fold fusion of the brute thing, the ever escaping future, the past and the fusing presence of the ek-sistent who projects the transcendental horizon. For now it suffices in order to follow the discussion to see that it is to the originative erection of the thing so that it can be by being in an horizon to which man must devote himself. His thanking is wordless because, as devotion, it is what precedes, wills and thus makes possible, the Word, the Light, the Thing. The Word "comes home" in the word of common language, the term of most originative thinking.

In a continuation of the same paragraph Heidegger offers more insight into the nature of the act of thanking sacrifice.

If there were not in the various times (i. e., ekstasis, my note) a revealing thinking in the fundament of historical man, then it would never be possible that there should be a thanking, assuming that there must be thinking (*Denken*) in all consideration (*Bedenken*) and memory (*Andenken*), which thinking must originally think the Truth of Being. How else could mankind attain to original thanking unless Being's favor preserved for man, through his open relationship to this favor, the splendid poverty in which the freedom of sacrifice hides its own treasure? The sacrificial offering is the farewell from the things that are on the road to the preservation of the favor of Being. The sacrificial offering can be made ready by doing and working in the midst of the things that are, but can never be consummated there.⁸

For a finite thought the spirit of the Nothing can never be far away. The originative thinking that lies at the root of temporality, and which, through founding a temporal horizon, makes possible the truly revealing thought of each epoch, is rooted in the "splendid poverty" of freedom. This is achieved only by realizing freedom, through getting at the root of all Being, which can only be achieved when the *Dasein* thinks out and beyond the things that are. A thinking that remains a calcula-

⁸ *Ibid.*

tive thinking among the things that are can never achieve the goal which the traditional metaphysics established for itself. Thinking and working among *Seienden* already revealed insofar as they are revealed prepare the way for an originative thinking, just as the epochs and epochs of metaphysics prepare the way for a thinking that thinks the Truth of Being.

Heidegger terms originative thinking "sacrifice" to contrast it all the more with the calculative thinking that can only work within the light already won by previous "sacrifice." "Calculation always miscalculates sacrifice in terms of the expedient and the inexpedient . . . the search for a purpose dulls the clarity of the awe, the spirit of sacrifice ready prepared for anguish, which takes upon itself kinship with the imperishable."⁹

What does Heidegger wish to signal by the term "the imperishable?" A key can be found by considering what our author means when he speaks of the *Inständigkeit* of existence in its act of originative thinking. It is this standing-in the things that are (the German word can suggest at the same time an inwardness, a standing-in the things that are, and the instantaneity of the dense moment)¹⁰ that doots the Dasein in Being. The Dasein by its own freedom can plunge into the incalculable, seeking no stopping place in this or that *Seiende*, but rather seeking the ineluctable itself.¹¹ What the Dasein wins in the heroic, sacrificing act of originative thanking is the really-real and, as long as Dasein remains in earth to guard its memory, the imperishable.

We can gain an even more vivid picture of what occurs when the Dasein opens Being by rooting itself in the incalculable mass of the things that are if we consider for a moment what Heidegger says about the "Earth" in a lecture delivered in 1937, *Vom Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹⁰ And for Heidegger, all the structure of the Dasein is summed up in this word. Cf. Introduction to *Was ist Metaphysik?* "Nur müssen wir zumal das innestehen in der Offenheit des Seins, das Austragen der Innestehens (Sorge) und das Ausdauern im Aussersten (Sein zum Tode) zusammen und als das volle Wesen der Existenz denken," p. 15.

¹¹ *Was ist Metaphysik?* p. 50.

In this article Heidegger seeks to show how it is possible existentially that there should be such a thing as a work of art. That Heidegger insists that art exists because man has absolutely need of it is not surprising in view of what has been said about originative thinking. The work of art is the field of combat between a *Dasein* trying to open a world by casting forward the light of intelligibility, and the material in which the *Dasein* must root his efforts and from whose resisting mass he must try to pull into light the thing known. The work of art is the meeting of a *World* which endows it with all of its desires and ideas and lights (which in turn find stability and expression and accent in the work itself), and the *Earth*, the material from which the work is moulded, be it the stone of a temple, the sonorous mass of the words and musical sounds or the colors of a painting. The *World* absorbs these materials into its light, so that they yield up a meaning and become *Sein*. But the *Earth* does not want to give itself over completely. So it forces the *World* to sink its tentacles into its resistant soil and become a *Da*. Thus the temple takes its meaning from its site and is rooted in it. The Sanctuary of Poseidon is Sounion and would be essentially other in any other site other than this cape. But conversely the temple brings the light of its *World* to Sounion. Its Doric stability adds motion to the waves, its silhouette vastness to the sky, its stone foundations life to the grey rocks jutting into the Bay of Pyraeus. In the originative work of art the *Dasein* forces the earth to render up meaning it would essentially tend to keep to itself.¹²

The most fundamental work of art, according to the indication which we have noticed in the Postscript, is the Grounding of the Word in language. For this reason the Postscript closes on a poetical note, which it would not be unprofitable to understand in terms of the dialectic of *World* and *Earth* described in the essay "On the Origin of Artwork." The maintenance of the Word of Being in language grows out of Care (*Sorge*) in the use of language (*Es ist die Sorge für den Sprach-Gebrauch*).

¹² Kann die Erde als das sich verschliessende in ein Offenes drängen.

Out of long-guarded speechlessness and out of a care-full clarification of the domain which it must illuminate comes the thinker's "*Sagen*" (pronouncement). If like origin is the poet's "*Nennen*." Because those things which are like can only be like because they are also different, poetising and thinking are poles apart but alike in this respect: They both take great care of the Word. The thinker pronounces Being; the Poet names the Holy (*Der Denker sagt das Sein. Der Dichter nennt das Heilige*).¹³

How thought in the essence of Being, poetising and thanking and thinking exclude one another and are distinguishable is a complicated question which we shall have to leave open for now. Presumably thanking and poetising spring in different ways from originative thinking, which uses them without yet being able to be for itself a formal *Denken*.

3. The preceding discussions have presented something of the *positive* richness of a doctrine of essential finitude. It is only against this backdrop that the charges of Nihilism made against Heidegger can be approached appropriately. The second "misgiving" asks if the ensconcing of anguish at the heart of such a philosophy does not paralyze the will to act. This is one of those questions drawn from the order named by the traditional philosophy "practical" that tends to go to the heart of an ontological explanation in a way that tests as nothing else can its true human soundness. We are now in a position to see why Heidegger puts anguish at the center of things, and we begin to see quite well what it imports. It means that we must grasp the meaning of our being viewed in terms of its whole structure before we can project authentically, before we can render to the act of originative thinking its full meaning and true place, and before we can comprehend anything about a possible answer to the "Being-question." Anguish must lead to that grasp of the structural whole (which Heidegger names "*Sorge*"), because of what it is we are: finite freedom. The grasp of a freedom that can peer into the abyss of its own nothingness is not, in Heidegger's view, an invitation to in-

¹³ *Was ist Metaphysik?* p. 51.

activity, but a call to render our activity its full responsibility—to itself and to Being—and thereby become an invitation to an *authentic* activity. Anguish is not, then, a blind feeling but the ultimate intentionality; for it represents the intentional grasping itself in the roots of that finitude which conditions all intentionality.

What has Heidegger accomplished in this extended footnote added twenty years later to the famous lecture of 1929? What conclusions can we draw from an analysis of the development it represents concerning the present status of Heidegger's thought? Is Heidegger not trying to save, within the bounds of a conception that sees as its ultimate a finite freedom and a finite totality of *Seienden*, all the rich values of human existence which man in the past has insisted require an infinite Transcendent to render them their meaning and value? In this vein, DeWaelhens writes in his study on Heidegger,

If up to now all values have appeared to humanity as linked to God, the dismissal of God threatens to cause a collapse of values which will throw man into a sink-hole of anarchy. This is why the affirmation of the death of God must go hand in hand with an effort to transform values, with the pretention of endowing them with a sense which, in the older philosophy, then appeared to derive only from God.¹⁴

Is Heidegger not saying that the totality of the things that are is mysterious in its richness and the light which we cast to make them be in our temporal horizon is mysterious because *ultimate*—finite and ultimate, mysterious and limited are united in a world-view that would incorporate all that is real within it and cease the flight to a transcendent to explain things.

It is only in this sense that we can interpret the final lines of the Postscript. "One of the essential stages for speechlessness is anguish in the sense of the terror in which man, in the abyss of the nothing, stands determined. The Nothing as the Other to *Seienden* is the veil of Being. Each destiny of *Seienden* has already been fulfilled originally in Being."¹⁵ The two

¹⁴ DeWaelhens, *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*, p. 354.

¹⁵ *Was ist Metaphysik?* p. 51.

aspects of finitude are revealed in this passage: The Nothingness as limit of totality, revealing the very possibility of the opening of the light of Being, and the positive implication of all for all. If we recall what has been said concerning authentic temporality, namely, that the nature of the authentic past is to be a recalling of the concrete possibilities of Dasein, then we shall understand: Every destiny is always already fulfilled in the Being achieved by past Dasein. The Postscript concludes in this way:

The last poem of the last poet of the originative period of Greece—Sophocles' "Oedipus in Colonus," closes with the Word that harks back far beyond our ken to the hidden historical-destiny of these people and marks their entry into the unknown truth of Being:

But cease now, and nevermore lift up the lament:
For in all times and in all places it happens that the event
Protects a determination of the fulfillment (*Vollendung*).¹⁶

The critic is obliged, I think, to admit that Heidegger has scotched the effort to consider his thought nihilistic. If "nihilism" means a thought which, in abandoning recourse to a transcendent absolute, affirms in its place the absoluteness of the human will as arbitrary source of values as, for example, in the doctrine of the Will to Might, it is obvious from the recent texts we have just been examining, that Heidegger is opposed to the wholesale abandonment of traditional values and to any philosophy that in Heidegger's sense of the word lacks respect for the mystery of Being. The gist of our Author's recent criticisms of Nietzsche is just that: Nietzsche, in declaring the death of God, i. e., the end of all recourse to a supersensory world for explanation of the Being of the things that are, came close to discovering the roots of Being in freedom—he came very close, but missed it essentially and tragically nevertheless. Freedom is not will creating values to impose on things. Freedom, in the formula of *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, must be "a letting be of the things that are." Originative thinking respects mystery, protects transcendence, and this in two ways: by

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

being sensitive to and protective of the natures of the things that are, and by guarding as a precious gain the illuminations accomplished by past poetic revelations. The root of every origenerative thinking (*anfangliche Denken*) is that *Hören auf dem Sein* which the ancients named the *thaumatzein* of the philosopher.

Because Heidegger holds that the things that are are at one and the same time *real* and *finite* and because he believes that the revelation of their sense is a matter of an active, progressive inclusion of their meaning within the suite of a temporal horizon, authentic respect for Being becomes in this philosophy inseparable from authentic temporality. In fact, I believe that the difficulties inherent in the Heideggerian interpretation of the revelation of Being can best be brought out by a consideration of the temporal relationship in knowledge as it underlies the texts we have just been considering.

My folding back the veil of Being should begin, if it is to follow the needs of authentic existence, by an appropriation of the riches already accumulated by the past. Hence any orignativeness in my revelation will draw on and continue the accomplishments already worked on the things involved. It is only by inserting myself in the line of past revelation and by continuing it that I shall be able to hope to leap a bit beyond the outer limit of the revelation to discover something new. Authentic *ek-sistenz* begins in a grasp of its own historical conditions, so that it may cast down the dark corridor of the future a beam continuing from the past. Being then is more than just my confrontation with the brute thing. It is the brute thing endowed with the imprint of accumulated historical human existence, inserted in a tradition, establishing a vector that cries out to be respected and prolonged.

We can say, then, that the Heideggerian doctrine removes some of the ambiguity surrounding the visions of Nietzsche, and does so in a way that secures the maximum advantage for the elimination of the arbitrariness in human creativity. This is a gain in stability and in respect for Being conceived as something which goes beyond the moment when we bring to

bear on the things that are the arbitrary power of our finite wills. It is a gain, but is it enough to establish phenomenologically the solid basis of explanation needed to found a philosophy of Being in a finite reality? We apply to the past, says Heidegger, in view of the future, i. e., our making present a past is accomplished in view of a projection towards a future whose horizon we create by our self-extension forward in *existenz*. The only reason that we can enjoy a past is because of our ability to summon up out of our finite resources a capacity for self-propelling resolution. Past, present and future depend essentially, then, on the originativeness of the finite *Dasein*. What is Heidegger's explanation of the source and nature of this properly originative element in *Dasein*, of the really new, the really-real, the something-for-nothing that lies at the roots of every line of phenomenological investigation that Heidegger has published up to now?

This is the Need—the *Not*—of the finite Thirst for Being. This is the ultimate Nothing of the finite Ultimate.

The trouble is that this Nothing and this Need are not of their nature self-sufficient explanation for everything that depends on them for explanation in the Heideggerian philosophy. In *Sein und Zeit*, for instance, the appearance of the Nothing at both terms of a human existence—as the ineluctable thrownness of the origin, and as the anguished prospect of Being-toward-Death in the end—does not complete all investigation by answering all of the pertinent problems which the phenomenology of the human birth-to-death span has itself insistently raised. In fact, the appearance of the Nothing raises everywhere questions which Heidegger seems unwilling to pursue. Consequently, resting on no firm base of finished investigation, the Heideggerian philosophy as it has developed to date strikes me as a thought that, while remaining everywhere partially valid, yet remains partially but fundamentally open to serious question.

Allow me to illustrate this state of affairs by considering again the three "misgivings" with which the Postscript is concerned. The positive merit of each of Heidegger's answers to

these misgivings was, I hope, evident in our exposition. The positive respect for Being as it is developed within finite limits is admirable, the richness of the conception of the sacrificial thanking attendant upon the gift of originative thinking, the beauty of the description of the awesome conception of the world, these and like features contain a truth that presents itself with something like the force of poetical evidence.

Yet I think that we can still legitimately re-raise each of the misgivings which were supposed to have been completely allayed. In closing, let us consider the sense which each misgiving retains as long as the Heideggerian phenomenology does not succeed, as it has not up to the present moment, in penetrating beyond its self-imposed limitations.

1. The originative element in acts of interpretation and acts of ek-sistence cannot be explained as Nothing, with or without a capital "N," without running the risk of founding philosophy in the absurd. All explanation must come to a point where either all intelligibility is exhausted, or where mystery—genuine mystery in the sense of a Source of Being surpassing finite powers of explanation, is positively encountered. *Das Nichts* is neither. It raises more questions than it solves, and hence cannot pretend to terminate a line of investigation by revealing the fundamental intelligibilities which that line of analysis is seeking. Heidegger admits as much in invoking, in the context of his presentations of the Nothing, the mystery of Being. But is Being as Heidegger presents it really mysterious, or is it simply *enigmatic*? The fact that the originative element cannot be explained is not the result of a positive encounter with a real transcendent. It is rather an indication that the Heideggerian explanation simply fails to explain. It finishes in the absurd. Consequently, it depends too much on Nothing to ever insure itself adequately against the very charge of nihilism the Postscript would belie.

2. The Postscript affirms that a philosophy of anguish does not paralyze the Will to act because it serves to enhance the nobility of Dasein responsible to his own freedom for the ex-

tension of the light of Being in the world. Further, anguish directs Dasein to serve Being by devotion to its creativity out of nothing which rolls back the curtain of Being. This explanation does not, however, succeed in banishing an embarrassing "Why." Perhaps it is the ghost of that final causality of which modern philosophy has been having some trouble divesting itself. Looked at in the perspective of the *existentialia* my projections are all dependent for their authenticity on the whole structure of my eksistenz which is directed toward death. A consideration of that structure raises this question: Can man find real meaning for life within the limits imposed by the options of a philosophy finite by choice? It is not my intention here to demonstrate that he cannot. But it is Heidegger's responsibility, if he wishes to come to grips with the second misgiving, to convince us that he can. The arguments of the Postscript to *Was ist Metaphysik?* do not, in my opinion, achieve this. Granted we should act only in view of the full possibilities of that thing which we ourselves are, this is not sufficient to assure that what we are,—as Heidegger conceives the Dasein in any case—justifies courageous sacrifice in the name of humanity. A finite freedom "thrown" into the world, coming from nowhere and going toward death, i. e., toward nowhere, passing by way of an "imperishable" Being founded by the perishable acts of a Being-for-death does not provide an adequate ground for an explanation of the phenomenon of true sacrifice, of the total sacrifice of martyrdom, for instance; nor does it provide any basis for resolving in the name of a higher principle a conflict of several Dasein engaged in opposing acts of revealing Being. Heidegger, though attacking the doctrine of the Will to Might, leaves us with no basis for resolving the real conflicts which Nietzsche had in mind when proposing his solution. Heidegger needs, then, to explain not only why we should act, but why, sometimes, we should not.

3. Heidegger's philosophy is not, as the criticism presented in the third misgiving charges, a philosophy based on feeling. But its insufficient grounding of the aspects of its phenomen-

ology which function where in the tradition purely intellectual elements were to be found, invites the criticism that the description of originative thinking is more emotional than scientific. One can still agree with Heidegger's attacks on the notion of science without presupposition, one can follow with approval his analyses of the decisions underlying the scientists' division of the object, and underlying the criteria of evidence, without for all that being satisfied when it comes to the criteria of truth provided by the philosopher's analysis of the act of interpretation. Heidegger is, of course, basically struggling with Kant's problem . . . and the Lord knows that there are no easy answers in this domain. I do not intend to take anything away from Heidegger's stature, consequently, when I admit, as I must now, that I do not see that he has reached solid ground in the effort to explain what and how the interpretative element is brought to the thing-known by the knower. Heidegger's stature in this regard is great because he has unswervingly tried to walk the line of a perfect subject-object balance in his descriptions of the interpretative act. His awareness of the necessity for doing this, and his efforts to show the way to a more fundamental analysis of the knower-known relationship than has heretofore been attempted, are lasting contributions to the Western philosophical tradition. By establishing the emotive-voluntary-intellectual unity of the existent, Heidegger has passed beyond the point where criticisms of his philosophy as emotive are valid. To affirm this in approving terms amounts to affirming confidence in the validity of the phenomenological way. But our recurring criticism . . . that Heidegger's own phenomenology has not taken roots, i. e., has not uncovered any firm positive principle upon which to ground the phenomena he has uncovered, suggests once again that there is nothing automatic about the use of phenomenological analysis. No more than the analysis of Aristotle in the *Nichomachean Ethics* or of Plato in the *Thaetetus*, contemporary phenomenologies are not exempt from the danger of foreshortening by philosophical options. If Heidegger's recent writings show no sign of circum-

venting the impasse that leaves every phenomenological analysis since *Sein und Zeit* dangling over the edge of the nihilistic abyss, it is because the recent Heidegger shares with the young the same decision to protect the mystery of Being without recourse to a Transcendent.

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FREEDOM, RESPONSIBILITY AND DESIRE IN KANTIAN ETHICS

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A student of Philosophy who is particularly interested in moral questions need not be terrified by the ethical philosophy of Kant, as he may so easily be by his *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is indisputable that the latter work as well as the other non-ethical writings of Kant are difficult to follow especially by a student who has been trained in the Scholastic tradition. However, I do not think that he will come to the same conclusion when he has analyzed the first two chapters of the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*. The third chapter will cause difficulty because it concerns the metaphysical problem of freedom and can only be fully understood by someone who is acquainted with the general philosophy of Kant. Work on the subject-matter of this article—the problem of freedom—has compelled me to exercise myself on the broad philosophical principles of this German philosopher of whom it has been said: “ You can philosophize with Kant or against Kant, but you cannot philosophize without him.”

Kant lived in the Age of Reason, the age of Hume, Rousseau, and Voltaire and during the revolutionary period in America and France. In opposition to those who placed the roots of morality exclusively in theology Kant believed firmly in the rationality of man and sought to elaborate a rational morality. Just as he upheld a rational science that would manifest a knowledge valid and binding for all rational minds, so he championed a rational morality, a science of rational moral principles that would present a moral code valid and binding for all rational minds. From the very beginning of the Preface to the *Fundamental Principles* he seems to presume that it is in the very experience of moral obligation that an adequate testimony is given of the a priori source of morality. He denies

that the force of moral obligation is due in any way to empirical elements and asserts that it cannot be explained in terms of psychology, sociology or anthropology. Unless this conception of Kant is presumed, namely, that morality is binding on all men and is comparable in this respect to science, the elaboration of his reasoning is not understood. He clearly states at the very outset:

Everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i. e., to be the basis of obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the precept, 'thou shalt not lie,' is not valid for men alone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in which he is placed, but a priori, simply in the conceptions of pure reason; and although any other precept which is founded on principles of mere experience may in certain respects be universal, yet insofar as it rests even in the least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to motive, such a precept, while it may be a practical rule, can never be a moral law. . . . For in order that an action should be called morally good, it is not enough that it should conform to the moral law, but it must be done for the sake of the law, otherwise that conformity is only contingent and uncertain; since a principle which is not moral, although now and then it may produce actions conformable to the law, will also often produce actions which contradict it.¹

Therefore a moral principle is true necessarily and always, without any reference to the reason why it is true, without any reference to the conviction or denial of some one with regard to the proposition, without any reference to the effects or consequences that might follow from the acceptance or rejection of this moral principle. Kant therefore speaks of the categorical nature of moral propositions and he seeks the radical truth in them not from any command that God may have promulgated, not from any correspondence between the propositions and rational human nature, not from the consent of mankind, not from any one of the multiple sources of morality that we find in modern relativistic Ethics but solely in the one overwhelming

¹ Abbott, *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on The Theory of Ethics* (Longmans, 1927), pp. 3-4.

fact that moral propositions are true because they are true. Just as there are attributes of universality, necessity, and objectivity in rational knowledge which Kant explored in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, so these same qualities display themselves in every true moral proposition. Just as Kant did not attempt to prove that there is such a thing as a priori knowledge, so he does not do anything but presume that there are a priori propositions which no one will gainsay. He is willing to say that rational knowledge and rational morality are facts to be recognized and not hypotheses to be proved. Broad has shown how this constitutes a fundamental difference between the moral systems of Kant and Hume:

Ethics for Hume is concerned simply with mankind. It deals with the purely contingent fact that men have a disposition to feel emotions of approval and disapproval, and the equally contingent fact that in men this disposition is excited by contemplating the happiness or misery of human beings. Kant, on the other hand, holds that the fundamental laws of morality are the same for every rational being, whether man, angel, or God, since the ultimate criterion of rightness is deducible from the concept of rational being as such.²

So much for this a priori morality of Kant and the fundamental reason for his position. The problem of freedom with which we are concerned in the moral philosophy of Kant becomes quite baffling. This is because Kant oscillates between an attempt to demonstrate the reality of freedom and an attempt to show that no one can make this concept intelligible. Thus he holds that while there is no doubt about the freedom of the will, we cannot possibly render compatible and consistent the conflicting claims of moral experience and therefore we must say that this concept is "a possible and thinkable, but nevertheless empty notion." The question of freedom for Kant is a question that has been hanging fire since his studies in the problem of knowledge. In order to solve that problem, the findings of the first *Critique* are summoned before Kant. From the scientific point of view everything happens of necessity and

² Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory* (London, 1944), pp. 116-117.

yet, from the point of view of the moralist, Kant is honest in admitting that the very notion of "ought" implies in its very concept the notion of "can." Kant has the insight and tenacity to hold on to the oughtness in a moral imperative and to claim for it as much reality as the copula which he confronted in his first *Critique*. Nevertheless he comes to the conclusion that he is unable to solve the paradox involved in the acceptance of both:

The difficulty is how predeterminism, by which voluntary actions as events have their determining causes in preceding time (which with what it contains is no longer in our power), can be consistent with freedom, by which both the action and its opposite must be in the power of the subject at the moment of its taking place; this is what men want to discern.³

From these words of Kant we can understand that the problem of determination and freedom in the same volitional act arose for him, whether it was the problem of reconciling freedom with the concept of God as a necessary being or whether it was the problem of reconciling man's responsibility for evil with the perfection of God as man's creator. Kant's approach to the problem in either form is a mere restatement of his fundamental dual order of the phenomenal and the noumenal. According to him freedom belongs neither to the realm of experience nor to the realms beyond experience which are not accessible to our understanding. Freedom belongs to our reason and Kant emphasizes this so very much that some others among the Neo-Kantians make of it a fundamental category of the mind similar to the categories of space and time. From the celebrated formula of Kant: "You can because you should (*Du kannst, denn du sollst*)," we see that the reason requires our obedience to the moral law but that such an imperative would be meaningless if it were not possible for us either to conform or not to conform to that law. Let us scrutinize how Kant applies the dual order of phenomena and noumena to this problem of freedom and determination.

³ Abbott, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

Kant looks upon freedom as the power to effect absolute beginnings. Under this aspect it is easy to understand that he excludes this faculty of freedom from the field of phenomena, since the latter field is governed by the principle of causality and allows of only relative beginnings. According to Kant, therefore, our freedom belongs in the noumenal order, in the order of things in themselves. It is interesting to see how Kant repeats the idea in his first *Critique* that each of us has a double of his person, which, inasmuch as it is noumenal, dwells outside of experience, outside of time, and to the extent that it is such, it is free; whereas one's phenomenal self or one's phenomenal person submits to the illusions of causality. Kant's consistency is striking here in that he attributes this duality of aspect to all phenomena. This duality of aspect constitutes one of the most fundamental aspects of his entire philosophy. For him the explanation of every phenomenon is dual: inasmuch as it appears in time, on the one hand, it is by necessity subject to an association with an anterior phenomenon, and is hence determined; inasmuch as it is a thing-in-itself, on the other hand, it has causes outside of time, which are not phenomena, and its associations with these causes constitutes its freedom. Freedom, therefore, becomes a transcendent reality and Kant's belief in freedom, like his belief in the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, begins to exist in him by means of a faith which he describes as "a moral state of the reason in the consent it gives to things inaccessible to the understanding." Kant once again asserts that he detaches himself from metaphysics, at least from such a metaphysics which laid claim to knowledge of things-in-themselves. Freedom is ultimately inscrutable and unintelligible and it is not difficult to see why Kant thinks it so plausible to pass from the inscrutable character of freedom to the consideration of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.

In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant sets before himself the aim of showing that there is pure practical reason and that from this faculty transcendental freedom is also established. His interest is to explain how any action that takes place in

time can be within the power of the person at the moment of acting. He tells us that freedom is involved in the mere consciousness of duty, and that "the moral law, which does not itself require a justification, proves not merely the possibility of freedom, but that it really belongs to beings who recognize the law as binding on themselves."⁴ Kant says that the moral law is the principle of the deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove, viz., the faculty of freedom, for the moral law is in fact the law of the causality of free agents. Nevertheless, the entire question of freedom is pronounced insoluble because it is impossible to show how any action taking place in time can be within the power of the person at the moment of acting.

We would like to review the consideration that Kant has given to freedom in his ethical works. Only in that way shall we be able to make the conclusions that we shall draw at the end of this study. In his *Fundamental Principles* Kant treats of the question of the manner in which duty is to be done and he asserts that this is possible only on the assumption that the will is autonomous. To prove that the will is autonomous he exposes the concept of freedom in the following words:

The will is a kind of causality belonging to living things in so far as they are rational, and freedom would be the property this causality has of being efficient independent of external causes; just as natural necessity is the property characterizing the causality of non-rational beings, viz. that of being determined to action by the influence of external causes. The preceding definition of freedom is negative and therefore unfruitful for the discovery of its essence; but it leads to a positive conception which is so much more full and fruitful. Since the conception of causality involves that of laws, according to which, by something we call cause, something else, viz. an effect, must be produced; hence, although freedom is not a property of the will depending upon natural laws, yet it is not for that reason lawless; on the contrary, it must be a causality according to immutable laws, but of a peculiar kind: otherwise a free will would be an absurdity. Natural necessity is a heteronomy of efficient causes, for every effect is possible only according to this

⁴ Abbott, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

law, that something else determines the efficient cause to action. What else can freedom of the will be than autonomy, that is the property of the will to be a law to itself? But the proposition: The will is in every action a law to itself, only expresses the principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have an object itself as a universal law. Now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative, and is the principle of morality, so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same.⁵

You will notice in the statement above that Kant has said that, although the philosopher may say that freedom is not a property of the will depending on natural laws, he cannot say for that reason that the will is lawless. Kant always is preoccupied with keeping the will unlimited by any object which the will itself does not determine. Nevertheless he insists that simply because the will is free it has to recognize as indispensably necessary a priori a law according to which its freedom is circumscribed by conditions which make it consistent with itself. Whatever confusion there may be in the mind of Kant there is one locus in which he declares unreservedly that man is free. This passage only serves to make the paradox so much more profound for Kant because of his categorical insistence upon freedom:

Now, I say, every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is just for that reason in a practical point of view really free, that is to say, all laws which are inseparably connected with freedom have the same force for him as if his will had been shown to be free in itself by a proof theoretically conclusive. Now I affirm that we must attribute to every rational being which has a will that it has also the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this idea. For in such a being we conceive a reason that is practical, that is, has causality in reference to its object. Now we cannot conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter with respect to its judgments, for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its judgments not to its own reason, but to an impulse. Consequently, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it must regard itself as free, that is to say, the will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except under the

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

idea of freedom. This idea must therefore in a practical point of view be ascribed to every rational being.⁶

At the first reading of this reference to Kant one may represent Kant as defending the position that men are free simply because they feel free. However, we should appreciate the reason that he advances for this conviction of freedom, because it is the very one the Scholastics use in their own presentation of the psychological argument for the demonstration of freedom. He asserts that we must attribute to every rational being which has a will that it has also the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this idea because we cannot possibly conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter with respect to its judgments. If the person were aware of such a bias, he would ascribe the determination of his judgment not to its own reason but to influences from without. Equivalently Kant is saying that reason may be influenced by environmental factors of one kind or another but it is not consciously influenced by environmental extraneous conditions to such an extent that it does not recognize these elements as external to the freedom of the act. When the person becomes conscious of these influences, to that extent he realizes that his act is not free. This point is crucial in the ethical philosophy of Kant. We hold a man responsible for his action only on the hypothesis that his action expresses his free will in the matter. We all become moralists contesting with one another when anyone denies the cogency of the psychological argument for the existence of man's freedom. Such a denial would deprive our everyday ethical language of all meaning. It is accepted by all that it is impossible to be a moralist about our own conduct without consistently using the terms "ought, ought not, obligation, responsibility, accountable, answerable, deserved, undeserved, etc." Without freedom morality becomes a meaningless term. Kant was so concerned with the reconciliation of freedom with necessity that he spent 11 years thinking out a theory of knowledge which would validate the conception of free will. In this

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

sense his *Critique of Pure Reason* was thought out with a view to the *Critique of Practical Reason*. His argument reducing freedom to the noumenal order brings us straight back to the first *Critique*. At the conclusion of his reduction of freedom to the noumenal order, Kant believes that the possibility of freedom is still open. His words are important because he claims no more from his theory of knowledge in attempting a solution of the problem. Is it possible to find an argument that can possibly change for Kant this mere possibility into an actuality of freedom? Kant himself shows us a possible way and then declares that the indissoluble paradox remains. The only point, he says, is to change this possibility of freedom into actuality by rigid proof. That is, to show, in an actual case, that certain actions do imply freedom. Certainly, it is a duty to realize the moral law in our acts. Therefore it must be possible. ("I ought" implies "I can"). Therefore, every rational creature must assume whatever is implied by this possibility. Freedom of the will, independence of causal necessity, is implied by this possibility. The assumption is as necessary as the moral law, in connection with which alone it is valid. Freedom and duty reciprocally imply each other. It is the moral law, of which we become directly conscious, that leads directly to the notion of freedom. It is morality that first discovers to us the conception of freedom. The moral law "I ought" (which itself does not require any proof) proves the actuality of freedom in those who recognize it as binding on themselves. A man judges he can do, or refrain from doing, a certain act, and this because he is conscious that he ought to. No one would ever have been so rash as to introduce freedom into science had not the moral law forced it upon us.

Kant finally admits the paradox and says that morality requires us only to be able to think freedom without self-contradiction, not to understand it. It is enough that our notion of the act as free puts no obstacle in the way of the notion of it as mechanically necessary. Our notion is that the act stands in quite a different relation to freedom from that in which it stands to the mechanism of nature. From the point of

view of the *Critique of Pure Reason* this is possible; the doctrine of nature and necessity and the doctrine of morality and freedom may each be true in its own sphere. How freedom is possible, how we are to conceive it theoretically and positively, how man is a member of two worlds, how man's moral actions must always appear necessitated while they are nevertheless free—all this is not discoverable. Only that there is such a freedom is postulated by the moral law. How freedom is possible no human intelligence will ever fully fathom. That freedom is possible, on the other hand, no sophistry will ever wrest from the conviction of even the commonest man. Kant admits that the solution here proposed to the problem of freedom involves great difficulty. But he asks philosophers whether there is any other solution that is easier and more intelligible.

I would like to refer to the passage in which the problem of freedom is explained by Kant because from this locus we shall develop the considerations that follow:

Every rational being reckons himself qua intelligence as belonging to the world of understanding, and it is simply as an efficient belonging to that world, that he calls his causality a will. On the other side, he is also conscious of himself as a part of the world of sense in which his actions, which are mere appearances of that causality, are displayed; we cannot, however, discern how they are possible from this causality, which we do not know; but instead of that, these actions as belonging to the sensible world must be viewed as determined by other phenomena, viz., desires and inclinations. If, therefore, I were only a member of the world of understanding, all my actions would perfectly conform to the principle of autonomy; if I were only a part of the world of sense, they would necessarily be assumed to conform wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations, in other words, to the heteronomy of nature. . . . And thus what makes a categorical imperative possible is this, that the idea of freedom makes me a member of the intelligible world, in consequence of which, if I were nothing else, all my actions would conform to the autonomy of will; but as I at the same time intuit myself as a member of the world of sense, they ought so to conform, and this categorical "ought" implies a synthetic a priori proposition, inasmuch as besides my will as affected by sensible desires there is added further the idea of the same will, but as belonging to the world of understanding, pure and

practical of itself, which contains the supreme condition according to reason of the former will.⁷

We cannot agree with Kant that this explanation of man's unfortunate position of being a member of two worlds helps in the slightest to make duty intelligible. We cannot forget that we are members of two worlds and the question can always be asked just how a rational being who belongs to both the intellectual and sensible worlds is able to be convinced that he is really free and that he is making some advance in freedom and goodness. Kant certainly has no answer for us and in his own words he admits it:

To explain how pure reason can be of itself practical without the aid of any spring of action that could be derived from any other source, . . . is beyond the power of human reason . . . There must be here a total absence of springs, unless the idea of an intelligible world is itself the spring, . . . but to make this intelligible is precisely the problem we cannot solve.⁸

Kant in this referal to the theory of knowledge to validate the concept of freedom ultimately asserts his incapacity to legitimate the notion. With this admission of defeat in the explanation Kant makes the transit from Moral Philosophy to Theology. It is not difficult to see that the roots of Kant's difficulties are in his epistemology according to which the intellect can know only the appearances of things, the phenomena, but it cannot penetrate to the thing as such, the noumena. By his reduction of freedom, God, the immortality of the soul to the order of the noumena, Kant has given to the philosophical world three important conceptions which are empty, just empty hollow shells and anyone may choose to find any content at all in these shells. Kant has done for intellectual and moral concepts the very same irreparable damage. The words and the formulas remain but their content and meaning become the sport and whim of any philosopher.

For Kant, then, freedom, God, immortality are postulates

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

and they all proceed from the principle of morality which itself is not a postulate but a law, an imperative. These postulates are not theoretical doctrines, but suppositions practically necessary, i. e., required in the interests of practice. While they do not extend our speculative knowledge, they do give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general, and do give it a right to conceptions the possibility of which it could not otherwise venture to affirm. Thus respect for moral law leads, through these postulates, to conceptions which speculation might indeed present as problems but could never solve. However, these postulates represent nouemna that have contents which are unknown. Kant seems optimistic in concluding that from unknown mysterious noumena so much other speculation can follow that in itself is so barren and sterile.

Before we continue on the question of moral responsibility in Kantian Ethics it might be well to summarize the basic ideas in his argumentation. We see that he begins by assuming that a rational morality is the only morality and that this carries the characteristics of categorical and a priori. This permits him to eliminate three misleading conceptions—that it is a matter of feeling, that it is a matter of consequences, that it is a matter of agreement with God's will, since on these grounds it would be neither categorical nor a priori. Then he returns to the notion of rational morality as categorical and a priori and formulates its principle. This central principle he works over in terms of ought or duty and in terms of the good will. These considerations lead to the problem of free will for which he is forced to reach back into the *Critique of Pure Reason* in order to find a justification for the duality of necessity and freedom. Such are the main theses of his moral philosophy and it can be said that they engaged the attention of the most distinguished thinkers that followed him, from Jacobi, Schopenhauer and Hegel to many of the rational moral philosophers of our own day. Certainly in this department of Ethics it is impossible to rationalize without considering Immanuel Kant.

It has been shown by Paton in his critical study of the moral philosophy of Kant that the reduction of freedom to the nou-

menal order does not save freedom at all. In propounding this doctrine of the application of the two orders to the problem of freedom we are not being temerarious to suppose that Kant wants to explain how freedom is possible. Two main and obvious objections to such a theory are exposed by Paton. The first is that Kant appears to be claiming a knowledge of the intelligible world which he does not have on the principles of his own *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the second is that even if this knowledge were admitted his theory would supply a very inadequate explanation of the existence of freedom.

Even to call the world as it is in itself an "intelligible" world is unnecessarily ambiguous, if by "intelligible" he means only that although it must be conceived, it is inaccessible to our senses. He has, however, already described it as an intelligible world, and so presumably as one which is actively intelligent. There seems to be little doubt that he conceives the intelligible world as "the whole of rational beings" as things-in-themselves. Man, as he tells us in the present passage, knows nothing more of the intelligible world than this—than in it reason alone, and indeed pure reason, independent of sensibility, is the source of law; and it is added that the laws of the intelligible world apply to man categorically because only in the world is he his proper self.

All this suggests that Kant claims a surprising amount of knowledge about the intelligible world and is prepared to base his present defence of freedom, and even his justification of the categorical imperative, on such a knowledge. It is hard to see why he permits himself to use language which he knows to be misleading.⁹

We have, therefore, justification on the authority of Paton in saying that any attempt to explain how freedom is possible in Kantian terms is bound to end with no explanation at all. All that we can do in Kantian philosophy is to defend freedom against attack by showing that it must be conceived to belong to a man as rational and so as a member of the intelligible world and not as a member of the sensible world. Once we have understood that two standpoints are necessary and that from one of them we must conceive things-in-themselves to be the

⁹ H. J. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative—A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy* (Hutchinson's Library, London), p. 268.

hidden ground of phenomena, there is no contradiction in supposing man to be both free and determined, free as a member of the intelligible world and determined as a member of the sensible world. But is this satisfactory as an explanation? At the most it is negative in its assertion that it cannot be shown to be impossible that freedom can belong to the noumenal order. In much the same way we are confronted by theses in Scholastic Philosophy in which the repugnance of certain propositions cannot be demonstrated. For example, we have the thesis in Cosmology which states that it cannot be shown to be repugnant or impossible that accidents may exist apart from the substance which it usually accompanies. Again the existence of absolute mysteries in God cannot be shown to be impossible. Such negative proofs have a value but we are inclined to question the efficacy of the negative proof of Kant when he consigns freedom to the noumenal order. In every demonstration in which Scholastic philosophy uses the negative argument there is an intelligibility vindicated for the concept but the consignment of freedom to the noumenal order by Kant reduces it to the rank of the thing-in-itself which is always unknowable. What satisfaction do we get by this resolution of the problem?

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I would like to consider now after this analysis of Kantian freedom another aspect of Kantian morality. It is frequently said of Kant that the two most characteristic and startling doctrines of Kant are his view that the rightness of an action is to be determined *a priori* irrespective of the consequences and his denial of value to all actions that are motivated by desire. It is the second of these two characteristics that I would want to consider in the remainder of this paper. Kant frequently tells us that there is no greater harm to be done people especially the young than to induce them to be good from any other motive than duty.

To set before children as a pattern actions that are called noble, magnanimous, with a view to captivating them by infusing an

enthusiasm for such actions, is to defeat our end.¹⁰ It is nothing but moral fanaticism and exaggerated self-conceit that is infused into the mind by exhortation to actions as noble, sublime, and magnanimous, by which men are led into delusion that it is not duty, that is, respect for the law, that constitutes the determining principle of their actions . . . flattering themselves with a spontaneous goodness of heart that needs neither spur nor bridle, for which no command is needed, and thereby forgetting their obligations which they ought to think of rather than merit.¹¹

Therefore, for Kant it is never sufficient to will what duty or law prescribes. The will may operate because of mere natural inclination or expectation of personal gain or advantage. The morally determining element of the will, then, is its motive. The will-act becomes simply good because its motive is solely that of duty done for duty's sake. Now duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law and law and law alone can determine the will-act. Neither this nor that particular prescription of law but law in general—this is to serve the will as a principle. Any alteration in the purest motivation of this will-act perverts the morality of our behavior.

Now it is certainly true that duty done for duty's sake is noble and worthy of praise, but do we have to admit the Kantian conclusion that only such acts are good? A person who acts in conformity with his conscience out of a desire for eternal beatitude or out of fear of losing it certainly acts morally though his action may not be the most perfect. We do not have to agree with Kant that every self-regarding motive perverts the morality of the act. It seems that Kant came to this conclusion on the single motivation of respect for the law independent of any other motive from his long acquaintance with the works of Rousseau. He had become convinced that moral education consists in encouraging one another in the appreciation of moral obligations and in recognizing in duty the sole and sufficient motive to moral action.

Before we attempt to criticize this characteristic in the moral

¹⁰ Abbott, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

philosophy of Kant, I would like to develop this idea in his theory. He always maintains that to repel children from wrong by appealing to pain and punishment and to attract them to virtue by forms of enjoyment—this only leads children to regulate their actions with reference to their own interest. It is just as ridiculous for him to consider God looking upon such moral education of the young with favor. Kant agrees that some preliminary training of the child may compel parents to use the technique which he deplores in the behavior of an adult, but it should be put aside as soon as possible. "As soon as this mechanical work, these leading strings, have produced some effect, then we must bring before the mind the pure moral motive, because it teaches a man to feel his own dignity, and gives the mind a power unexpected even to itself."¹²

Children can be taught early to recognize the distinction between prudence and goodness, between regret and remorse, between approbation and self-esteem, in order to foster a true appreciation of duty and a true estimation of the worth a person can give himself only by doing his duty. Kant believes that children so guided will examine with great interest some of the doubtful maxims that are passed down to them.

I do not know why the educators of youth have not long since made use of this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon the most subtle examination of the practical questions that are thrown up; and why they have not, after first laying the foundations of a purely moral catechism, searched through the biographies of ancient and modern times with a view to having at hand instances of the duties laid down, in which they might exercise the critical judgment of their scholars. This is a thing in which they would find that even in early youth, which is still unripe for speculation of other kinds, would soon become very acute and not a little interested.¹³

Kant continues to reason along these lines until he makes bold to say that morality must have more power over the human mind the more purely it is presented. Kant does not say that duty is a sufficient motive to good conduct if a person

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 250.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

only examines the facts, but he is asserting that the pure motive of duty is the most powerful of all human motives and needs only to be purged of all empirical accretions and refined in order to be appreciated as such.

The pure concept of duty, unmixed with any foreign addition of empirical attractions, exercises on the human heart an influence so much more powerful than all other springs which may be derived from the field of experience that in the consciousness of its worth, it despises the latter, and can by degrees become their master; whereas a mixed ethics compounded partly of motives drawn from feelings and inclinations, and partly also from conceptions of reason, must make the mind waver between motives which cannot be brought under any principle.¹⁴

Kant would never agree with Hume that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions and therefore should be satisfied in serving and obeying the passions. The law-giver in him for Kant is always stronger than any human desire or inclination, stronger than the sum total of desires and inclinations. He insists that anyone who does not appreciate this fact of the stronger exercise of pure duty upon moral behaviour, is just unaware of his own experience. The influence of duty is not only a difference in degree or grade of attraction but constitutes a motive essentially different from any other. The very fact that we use such words to describe the influence of desire—attraction, allurement, seduction, bewitchment—imply that duty exercises a greater hold upon us than any transient desire.

It has been pointed out that this conception of duty has not been accepted in the history of philosophy with unstinted praise but has been roundly condemned. What Schiller found objectionable in this theory of Kant is what every other serious person reflecting on the same point would find repugnant. It is not that Kant maintains that duty for the person is respect for the moral law but it is the great divorce which he places between duty and desire, and his audacious insistence upon asserting that the purest morality of respect for the law is testified on the

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

moral experience of all men. I do not think that any rationalization of the position of Kant has saved him from the severity of the position that he takes. Professor Ewing introduces such a possibility of redeeming Kant when he discusses this question of the value or non-value of actions which are motivated by some desire and not by "respect for the law." He says that it is sometimes asserted that Kant supposed we could and ought to perform moral acts without having any desire to do so. He believes that while this is strictly accurate it is misleading since this "respect for the moral law," though sharply differentiated from other desires, is regarded by Kant as being analogous to a desire insofar as it can serve as a motive for action.

It really makes very little difference whether we describe the tendency to find satisfaction in doing one's duty as a desire, and then add, as we should have to do in any case, that it is different from other desires, or we deny, like Kant, that it is a desire and then add that it is something analogous to a desire. But it remains a paradox that value is ascribed only to actions motivated by respect for the moral law and not to actions motivated by a so-called higher desire, especially love. A distinction ought, however, to be drawn between (1) acting because of such a desire, and (2) merely acting in accordance with the desire, and I am not sure whether Kant meant to exclude all value from the latter or only from the former actions.¹⁵

Certainly most commentators on Kant interpreting his own words have understood him to say that the proportion of moral good in an action is perverted in direct relation to the amount of desire that it contains and the correlative absence of respect for the law. It is evident even in the acceptance by the Church of an act of imperfect contrition in the Sacrament of Penance that the act is not vitiated by the presence of the fear of hell and the desire to escape it. It is questionable whether many persons would testify in their own moral experience to the fact of Kant that consciously they appreciate the purest

¹⁵ A. C. Ewing, "The Paradoxes of Kant's Ethics, Philosophy," *The Journal of the British Institute of Philosophy*. Edited by Sydney E. Hooper, vol. XIII (1938), p. 50.

morality of their actions in the sheerest respect for the moral law unaccompanied by any other human desires. This is Kant's very statement. How many will bear him out?

Nevertheless it should never be overlooked that Kant does say that duty is the fulfillment of the will and command of God and if we keep this point in mind then the insistence of Kant upon the performance of duty out of the purest respect for the law acquires much significance. When Kant is speaking of conscience he makes this very clear:

Now this original intellectual and (as a conception of duty) moral capacity, called *conscience*, has this peculiarity in it, that although its business is a business of man with himself, yet he finds himself compelled by his reason to transact it as if at the command of *another person*. For the transaction here is the conduct of a trial (*causa*) before a tribunal. But that he who is *accused* by his conscience should be conceived as *one and the same person* with the judge is an absurd conception of a judicial court; for then the complainant would always lose his case. Therefore, in all duties the conscience of the man must regard *another* than himself as the judge of his actions, if it is to avoid self-contradiction. Now this other may be actual or a merely ideal person which reason frames to itself. Such an idealized person (the authorized judge of conscience) must be one who knows the heart; for the tribunal is set up in the *inward part of man*: at the same time he must also be all-obliging, that is, must be or be conceived as a person in respect of whom all duties are to be regarded as his commands; since conscience is the inward judge of all free actions. Now, since such a moral being must at the same possess all power (in heaven and earth), since otherwise he could not give his commands their proper effect (which the office of judge necessarily requires), and since such a moral being possessing power over all is called *God*, hence conscience must be conceived as the subjective principle of a responsibility for one's deeds before *God*; nay, this latter concept is contained (though it be only obscurely) in every normal self-consciousness.¹⁶

It is true that Kant finds the conditions of the categorical and the a priori in moral propositions in this divine source of morality and perhaps it is imprudent to think that Kant is not

¹⁶ Abbott, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

considering the love of God higher and more noble than the love of man when he proposes that morality should arise from the purest respect for the law. Perhaps we should find his inadequacy in looking upon God as merely a Law-Giver and not as a loving God. Perhaps the real error is in the Theology of Kant and not in his Ethics. Perhaps it is extreme to say that Kant's morality is so pure of all love that there is little difference between his morality and the morality of the devil. Nevertheless, his utter regard for the law, the appeal to the purest motive of respect for the law, the austerity, rigor, and almost forbidding doctrine of morality has deterred many from Kant and has made them question his practical psychology. The sharpness of the divorce between duty and desire appears as so much stoicism. Schiller accused him of this stoical strain but Kant seems to deny that this is the correct reaction to his rigorous principle.

Of what sort is the emotional characteristic, the temperament as it were of virtue; is it spirited and cheerful, or anxiously depressed and dejected? An answer is hardly necessary. The latter slavish spirit can never exist without a secret hatred of the law, and the cheerfulness of heart in the performance of one's duty is a mark of the genuineness of the virtuous disposition, without which one is never certain that he has taken a liking to good, that is to say, adopted it into his maxim.¹⁷

Equivalently Kant is saying here that, unless a man applies the Kantian principle with an unstoical mind, he cannot be acting from a real sense of moral obligation. This may be very plausible in the theoretical order, but once again we would like to see its vindication in psychology.

Such is the mind of Kant on the application of the principle of morality that a person must act out of pure respect for the law. To perform an action out of personal inclination or from a motive of self-interest renders the action only legally good but not morally good even though the action be in conformity with the moral law. Now our own psychological ex-

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 330-331.

perience argues that this is not so. We certainly do not judge only those actions to be morally good which proceed exclusively from a pure sense of duty and that personal inclination and self-interest pervert the moral value of an act. We consider almsgiving from a motive of compassion, neighborly assistance from a motive of friendliness, conjugal affection of spouses for each other and parental affection toward parents from a motive of love, to be morally good acts, even though they are not performed from a motive of pure and strict duty. It has been pointed out so often that according to Kant the motive of charity would have no moral value at all and that acts performed from the motive of charity would not be morally good. Everyone admits that many heroic acts in time of peace and war go far beyond the call of duty because duty does not demand such supreme sacrifices under the circumstances. Such acts are considered to be of the highest moral character because in the words of Our Divine Lord "greater love hath no man than that he lay down his life for his friends." Is it not a distortion of the truth and the negation of common prudence to consider such acts of supreme devotion and loyalty toward one's country and fellow-men only "legally but not morally good"? Kant's principle seems to be definitely at variance with the common conviction of mankind, because mankind always judges acts performed out of love and charity to be of greater moral value than those done merely from a sense of duty.

I am not convinced that Professor Ewing is representing the mind of Kant accurately when he asserts that he is in agreement with him on the non-value of the action of a person who is motivated solely by desire without regard for the objective goodness or wrongness of an act. The question to be decided is whether, presuming that there is conformity of the act with right conduct, a man is performing a moral act if his action is motivated exclusively by desire without respect for the moral law consciously present to him. Kant apparently answers in the negative and the general conviction of mankind is opposed to his position. The explanation of Professor Ewing, as far as

I can see, does not make the Kantian position any the more plausible. I am not impressed either with the distinction that this same writer makes in saying that we might vindicate *intrinsic value* for actions that are motivated by some other motive than pure respect for the law, but that *real moral value* belongs only to those actions to which Kant would ascribe it. Is this not merely a hopeless retreat into vague and confusing language? What is the meaning of something that has intrinsic but not *real moral value*? We are never told by Professor Ewing but he seems only to be interested in creating a separate species for those actions of Kant for which he ascribes moral value.

There certainly seems to me to be something quite specific about the nature of moral value as described by Kant sufficient to justify us in making it a separate species distinct from other kinds. It is also true that if a person possesses this kind of value he is in a fair way to attain himself and produce for other people the remaining kinds also, as far as physical obstacles permit, a circumstance which gives it a special importance. Also besides being instrumentally the most important, it is intrinsically the highest in some important sense of the word.¹⁸

We might advert to the fact that the distinction that Kant makes between the legal good and the moral good intimates the complete cleavage that he establishes between the juridical and moral orders. So complete is this dichotomy that scholastic ethics finds the source of the difference in a quadruple division —scope, obligation, origin and end. There is no rationalization of Kant's strict rigorous doctrine on the value of the moral act arising exclusively from respect of the law by the attempt of Professor Ewing to which we have alluded above by defining duty in terms of desire. Kant himself would be unwilling to accept this interpretation which would ultimately adulterate his ethical philosophy and would lead to the destruction of his own morality in substitution for a doctrine of more or less enlightened self-interest.

¹⁸ Ewing, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

We would like to conclude this study with the two propositions which we trust have received some clarification in the moral philosophy of Kant.

- (1) The reduction of freedom to the noumenal order does not explain freedom at all.
- (2) The denial of moral value to all actions that are in the least motivated by desire is not consistent with the psychological testimony of the general run of mankind. No reduction of duty in terms of desire nor any distinction between intrinsic value and real moral value according to Professor Ewing can save the rigorous stoicism of Kantian ethics.

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GENUS AND DIFFERENCE

CIV

I WOULD like to give the reader a firm thread to hold during his journey through the labyrinth which follows. My aim is to investigate the relation between Genus and Difference; and the whole of the discussion which follows is subordinated to this one aim. In order to accomplish this design I have to go abroad into the fields of grammar, logic, analogy, and participation. The very extent of the problem shows it to be a philosophical one, and shows, therefore, that my inquiries here can do little more than skim the surface of the subject. Nevertheless they may have value in leading to its more systematic study.

An ambiguity presents itself at the very outset. We use the words "difference" and "genus" in two different ways: one as indicating a mode of predication, the other as indicating a mode of being, the mode, namely, which determines the mode of predication. So, for example, we can say that *canine* is a difference, meaning either that the term "*canine*" is predicated in the predicate of difference, or that the mode of *canine being* is what differentiates dogs from cats and from all other animals. In the former case, we are discussing modes of predication: in the latter case, modes of being. But the important thing is that the mode of being determines the mode of predication,¹ for the only reason why the term "*canine*" is predicated in the predicate of difference is because the *canine* mode of *being* is what differentiates one type of animal being from another. In other words, our descriptions of things refer to the things as they are, and have truth value only insofar as they describe things as they are. Evidently this same truth holds for the predicate of genus just as it holds for all predicates. Now in what follows I do not use any special expression to distinguish

¹ ". . . modus praedicandi proportionatur ipsis rebus de quibus fit praedicatio." *St. Thomas, I Sent., d. 19, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1:* cf. also *V Metaphys.*, lect., 9, n. 890.

between these two usages of the terms "difference" and "genus." I leave it to the context to make clear to the reader which particular usage is in operation at a given moment.

Perhaps the simplest thing to do will be to begin with some grammatical or linguistic remarks, and then to work up from them to the more technical aspects of our inquiry, namely, the logical and metaphysical ones.

When we say that a dog is a canine animal, we use the term "canine" as an adjective qualifying the noun "animal." Now, from a grammatical point of view, adjectives are dependent upon their nouns, and serve to qualify them, or to "modify" them, as it is sometimes said. Nouns, on the other hand, are grammatically independent of their qualifying adjectives. Grammatically, generic terms are nouns, whereas differential terms (terms, namely, which indicate the difference) are adjectives. And the parallelism between grammar and logic seems to be such that the genus, indicated by the grammatically independent noun, is taken to be ontologically independent. This is especially true in the case of the category of substance which, being the category of what is primarily *being*, is therefore the category where the genus and the difference are primarily to be found.² On the other hand, the difference, indicated by the grammatically dependent and modifying adjective, is taken as indicating a special quality or modification of the ontologically independent generic being.

Now there is no lack of authorities for the view that the difference does not signify the essence of the thing, namely, what is basic and independent in the thing. Aristotle's authority is enough here, since if he asserted this view, there will be a whole host of his followers who will repeat him. He says that ". . . a thing's *differentia* never signifies its essence, but rather some quality, as do 'walking' and 'biped' . . .,"³ and that ". . . the *differentia* is always a quality of the genus."⁴

Now there would be no difficulties in this view about the

² Cf. *Metaphysics Z*, c. 1, 1028a 30-36, c. 4, 1030a 18-27, c. 5, 1031a 1-14, etc.

³ *Topics IV*, c. 2, 122b 16-17.

⁴ *Ibid.*, c. 6, 128a 28, and also 144a 19-21.

difference and genus, if another view were not also held by Aristotle and his followers. This other view is that the full statement of the essence of a thing is given, not by the genus alone, but by the genus and difference together. Yet how precisely something which does not even signify the essence can nevertheless contribute towards the full statement of the essence, is not easy to see; yet the difference is supposed to so contribute. And the difficulties in this theory become further apparent when we are told that the essence of a substance is *one*, and that, for example, in a man there is only one substantial essence, just as there is only one in a horse or in a dog. If there had been a multiplicity of substantial essences in a given substance, following the old *pluralitas formarum* viewpoint, it might have been possible to provide something for the difference to indicate, something other than what is indicated by the genus. And even then, since the difference indicates only a quality, in order to save the theory, it would be necessary to say that one essence was a quality of the other—a very suspect method of description. But since the *pluralitas formarum* thesis is rejected in Aristotelian thought, the above tentative interpretation is impossible. In Aristotelian terms, the *one* substantial form in each substance is completely described only when it is described by the genus *and* the difference. So the difference, which only signifies some quality of the thing, is a necessary element in defining the complete essence of the thing. This position is, to say the least, not without its difficulties.

Evidently the genus alone is not sufficient to describe the essence, since it does not serve to distinguish one species, say dogs, from another, say horses. On the other hand, according to Duns Scotus, the difference does not comprise the whole of the essence, otherwise the genus would be superfluous. The difference, for him, is merely "completive" of the substance of the thing.⁵ To say that the difference is "completive" does

"... non enim potest intelligi quod tota ratio quidditativa sit in ultima differentia: tunc enim genus superflueret in diffinitione: quia sola ultima differentia totam essentiam rei exprimeret: sed debet intelligi, quod completive est

not answer the question whether the difference is substantial or whether it is merely a property. Furthermore, Scotus gives us no good reason for asserting that the genus does have some independent predicable function after the difference has been predicated. He fails to prove that, as an addition to the difference, it is not superfluous.

What Fonseca has to say on the matter leaves things just as completely in the dark as do Scotus' theories. Fonseca tells us that the difference is neither a substance nor an accident, and avers that this is almost everyone's opinion on the matter.⁶ Taking this statement at its face value we would have to invent an extra category of being in addition to that of substance and those of accident in order to house the differences of things. But Fonseca goes on to avoid this consequence by saying that the difference is an incomplete substance, and is to be placed reductively in the predicament appropriate to genus, namely, that of substance. So the difference is nearly, but not quite, a substance. I suppose that if it were the substance of the thing, then the genus would once more be superfluous, and we would return once more to Scotus' standpoint. Now, if the difference were to be interpreted as a quality,⁷ one of the many results would be the raising of the unsympathetic ghost of Russell's criticism, namely, why draw a distinction between the difference and the property? But even as an in-

tota substantia rei, sicut a forma ultima completive est tota essentia habentis formam." *In VII Metaphys.*, summ. II, c. 12, s. 106.

⁶ "Vera igitur et fere omnium communis sententia est, differentias substantiarum neque accidentia esse, neque substantias directo positas in hoc Praedicamento: sed esse substantias incompletas, reductitie (sic) ad illud pertinentes." *In V Metaphys.*, by Pedro da Fonseca S.J., (1528-1599), c. 8, q. 2, s. 3 (Cologne, 1615), vol. 1, tome 2, p. 497 B: ". . . etsi nec substantiae completae, nec qualitates completae, tamen habent esse substantiae non inhaerendo in subjecto, et modum qualitatis in efficienda et specificanda (ut ita dicam) et quasi figuranda natura generum, et ad suas species trahenda." *ibid.*, s. 2, p. 496 EF.

⁷ For example, Albertus Magnus interprets Aristotle's statements as meaning that: ". . . nulla differentia in modo praedicandi dicit quid per se stans in natura rei sicut fundamentum formarum, sed magis significat quale per qualitatem essentialiem, quae qualitas est perficiens potentiam generis." *Liber IV Topicorum*, tract. I, c. 4 (Vives ed., vol. 2, p. 363).

complete substance, the difference fails to give unity to the essence. We cannot say that the genus refers to one part of the essence, and the difference to another; firstly, because the essence is a unity, and secondly, and more importantly, because the difference refers in some way to the whole essence just as the genus does.⁸ And this latter assertion brings us to another interpretation of the difference.

Aristotle in one of his mature writings, namely, the seventh book of the Metaphysics, tells us that ". . . it is plain that the definition is the formula which contains the *differentiae*, or, according to the right method, the last of these."⁹ In the same chapter twelve in which he tells us this, he also concludes from his premisses that ". . . clearly the *last differentia* will be the substance of the thing and its definition,"¹⁰ a statement which would seem to contradict what he says in the *Topics* but which has the merit of completely vindicating his theory of the unity of the essence. For he shows in this chapter how the final difference contains all the other differences and, presumably also the ultimate genus. On this view of the difference, the genus is strictly speaking superfluous, *once you have given the difference*; and so we read in St. Thomas' Commentary on this chapter that "the definition is the *ratio* from the differences only, since *the genus is not outside the differences*"¹¹ (my italics), and that ". . . it is evident that the ultimate difference will be the whole substance of the thing, and its total definition. For it includes in itself all the preceding particular

⁸ The following statement by Ferrariensis is, I believe, an appropriate summing up of the position: ". . . bene dicit (i.e., St. Thomas) quod *a materia* sumitur genus in rebus materialibus, aut *a materiali*: quia videlicet a tota natura speciei, ut potentialis est, sumitur proxime, tanquam a natura per ipsum, nomen generis significata; *a materia* vero sumitur remote et originaliter, tamquam a prima origine potentialitatis naturae. Similiter et ab ipsa eadem natura specifica, ut actualis est et determinans, sumitur proxime differentia, tamquam a natura nomine differentiae significata; *a forma* vero remote et originaliter sumitur, tamquam a prima actualitatis origine." *In II Cont. Gent.*, c. 95, v. 3.

⁹ *Metaphys.* Z, c. 12, 1038a 28-30.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1038a 19-20.

¹¹ "Definitio est ratio ex differentiis tantum, quia *genus non est praeter differentias*." *VII Metaphys.*, lec. 12, n. 1561. (my italics)

differences.”¹² Albertus Magnus tells us that “. . . thus the difference is convertible with the species”;¹³ and Suarez echoes his words, saying that “. . . these two are thought of as being the same, since the difference constitutes the species.”¹⁴

Here, then, we have a totally opposite attitude towards the difference. It is no longer an adjunct to the genus, and is no longer considered to be merely expressing a quality of the thing. Rather, it renders the genus superfluous in definitions, since the difference is by itself the substance of the thing; it is its species and contains the genus within itself. St. Thomas, for example, speaks of the genus as being material by comparison with the difference, the latter being formal,¹⁵ and also of the genus being indeterminate and being made determinate by the difference.¹⁶ Both these characteristics place the genus in a position of inferiority to and dependence upon the difference. From this point of view one might well wonder what purpose is served by the predicate of Species, since the difference already fulfils whatever function was intended for the species—every function, that is, except the purely linguistic one of providing a grammatically independent term, a noun, to express an ontologically independent status, that of a substance: for we talk of *dogs*, not of *canines*, and of *men*, not of *rationals*.

It is significant to note in this respect that Aristotle himself does not list Species as a predicate. He says:

¹² “. . . palam est quod ultima differentia erit tota substantia rei, et tota definitio. Includit enim in se omnes praecedentes particulas.” *ibid.*, n. 1555.

¹³ “Cum autem hic consideremus rei diffinitae unitatem, et unitas non sit a partibus potentialibus formae, sed ab ipsa tota ut est actus et terminus, hic consideramus eam prout est tota et actus et terminus; et sic convertitur cum specie differentia.” *In VII Metaphys.*, tract. IV, cap. 3, (*Vivès* ed., vol. 6, pp. 469-470), (my italics).

¹⁴ “. . . differentiam seu speciem (hae enim duae pro eadem reputantur, cum differentia speciem constituat) . . .” *D.M.*, d. 6, s. xi, n. 3.

¹⁵ “Semper autem id a quo sumitur differentia constituens speciem, se habet ad illud unde sumitur genus, sicut actus ad potentiam,” *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 3, a. 5, resp.: and “. . . ratio generis sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re: sicut ratio differentiae ab eo quod est formale.” *V Metaphys.*, lec. 7, n. 862.

¹⁶ “. . . nihil prohibet idem genus in se continere diversas differentias, sicut indeterminatum continet in se diversa determinata.” *VII Metaphys.*, lec. 12, n. 1550.

Now every proposition and every problem indicates either a genus or a peculiarity or an accident—for the differentia too, applying as is does to a class (or genus), should be ranked together with the genus. Since, however, of what is peculiar to anything, part signifies its essence, while part does not, let us divide the “peculiar” into both the aforesaid parts, and call that part which indicates the essence a “definition,” while of the remainder let us adopt the terminology which is generally current about these things, and speak of it as a “property.” What we have said, then, makes it clear that according to our present division, the elements turn out to be four, all told, namely, either property or definition or genus or accident.¹⁷

Here, then, we get the equation of the difference and the definition, so confirming our hypothesis. Ross says, *a propos* the above passage:

This is Aristotle's classification of predicables which Porphyry later muddled hopelessly by reckoning *species* as a fifth predicate. The place of species in Aristotle's account is not as one of the predicables but as the subject; for it is (with reservation in the case of judgments assigning accidental attributes) judgments about species, not with individuals, that he has throughout in view.¹⁸

The species, on this interpretation, would never appear as predicate but only as subject. Nevertheless, on the principle that the *definiendum* and *definiens* are convertible, one can merely convert the proposition and have the species as predicate. So the species would seem to function as a sort of predicable, even if only as a second-class one. And in *a posteriori* arguments when we argue from sensible properties, e. g., “All beings having such and such sensible properties are dogs,” to the essence, once more the species can function as a predicate: though it can be argued that the theory of the Predicables primarily concerns *a priori* propositions; but then it might very reasonably be asked which of the two, namely, species or difference, is prior, for they are, in fact, identical.

Specific terms are descriptive, and therefore capable of serv-

¹⁷ *Topics I*, ch. 4, 101b 16-25.

¹⁸ Aristotle, by W. D. Ross, 5th ed., p. 57.

ing as predicates, and differential terms, conversely, do correspond to some "differential" reality: for example, we do use specific terms like "cat" to describe types of being; and there is some reality referred to by differential terms like "feline." Thus we give the same description to a dog whether we call it a *dog* or whether we call it *canine*. The first description is by means of a specific term, the second by means of a differential one. Conversely the reality described in each case is the same, namely, a dog—or a *canine*, if you so wish. The specific reality, therefore, is the same as the "differential" one, just as the specific description means the same thing as does the differential one. We are thus reduced once more to Albertus Magnus' ". . . the difference is convertible with the species," and to Suarez' "these two are thought of as being the same . . .," which statements, summing up as they do the doctrine that Aristotle founded and that St. Thomas took up, are about the best commentary upon the situation.

We might, in passing, make some mention of Fonseca's interpretation of the theory that the ultimate difference is the definition of the thing. Fonseca, for his part, asserts that the ultimate difference contains the whole of the substance *apart from the ultimate genus*.¹⁹ It is difficult, however, to see how such a view can be maintained, for presumably a first difference of an ultimate genus implies its genus, and since the ultimate difference implies that first difference, so the ultimate difference will imply its ultimate genus; and that means that it contains it. For example, it is difficult to see how the first difference "corporeal" of the genus "substance" fails to imply its genus. If it does not do so, then presumably it will be possible for a thing to be corporeal without being a substance—which is logically impossible, just as it is impossible for something to

¹⁹ "Probat Aristoteles, ultimam differentiam esse substantiam rei, et definitionem illius. Et quantum licet ex ipsa probatione colligere, conclusio probanda hunc sensum habet: ultimam differentiam continere formaliter totum reliquum substantiae, sive essentiae rei, *praeter primum genus*; eamque solam esse primo generi adiungendam in definitione." In *VII Metaphys.*, c. 12 explanatio (Cologne, 1615), vol. 2, tome 3, p. 358, s.o. (my italics).

be canine without its being animal.²⁰ Furthermore, if the first difference is apart from the ultimate genus, then so are all the others; and then the question arises as to how the genus and its difference can both together indicate *one* substantial essence while having no connection with one another. And if the difference and the genus are completely distinct from one another, then how can the difference fail to become a predictable accident as something lying quite outside the generic essence of the thing? It only fails to do so if you maintain that there are two essences in the thing; and then one can reasonably ask why there should not be an essence corresponding to each difference, so that the number of essences in a thing would amount to the total of differential terms plus one for the ultimate genus. Furthermore one can raise the linguistic question of what difference in meaning it makes if you call a substance by its first difference, namely, "*corporeal*," (or "*spiritual*" as the case may be), or if you call it by its intermediate genus (or species, according to which end of the category-species chain that you start from), namely, *body* or *spirit*. If a thing is a body, it is corporeal: and if it is corporeal it is a body. The two predicates mean the same thing, yet on Fonseca's hypothesis, the one (i. e., "*corporeal*") would apparently not imply that it was in the genus of substance, whereas the other, (*body*) would carry that implication.

Duns Scotus reverses Fonseca's procedure, though in his case Scotus is talking about the univocal predication of being. Nevertheless, the same general principle is in operation, namely, that one end of the generic-differential chain is unhooked from the rest. With Fonseca, the ultimate genus is unhooked from the whole chain of differences. With Scotus, on the contrary, it is the ultimate difference which is unhooked from the rest of the chain of intermediate differences and ultimate genus. So, according to Scotus, *being* is predicated univocally of all the dif-

²⁰ One can, and does, of course, call accidents *corporeal*. But in the present context we are dealing with substantial differences, of which *corporeal* is one. In this latter sense of the word accidents can never be corporeal since, being accidents, they cannot belong to the essence. Even if they are proper accidents, they are still outside the essence.

ferences of being right up to the last one: but this last one is apart, and *being* is predicated only analogically of it.²¹ The difficulty for Scotus is the same as it is for Fonseca, namely, why unhook one end of the chain? In Scotus' case, why go to the opposite end from Fonseca and unhook the ultimate difference? As a difference, it is just like any other difference: it determines its predecessor to a more specific mode of being. It is unique only insofar as, with it, one finally arrives at the ultimate species of things beyond which there are no more diversities in the *kinds* of being. But this uniqueness in being the final difference in the series is no reason for saying that it is *not* in the series. The contrary is rather the case, as we see from the comments of Aristotle and St. Thomas.

When we inspect this second Aristotelian theory of the difference, we witness the revenge, as it were, that the difference takes over the genus of the first theory. But the story is not finished yet. The genus can regain supremacy by taking up another position. Its first victory was gained on what look like purely grammatical grounds but was lost as soon as the discussion was transferred to the grounds of Aristotelian metaphysics. For, there, the substance of a thing is *one* and is expressed by the ultimate difference. But if we go now to the field of Platonic metaphysics, then the genus once more becomes supreme; for whereas the Aristotelian genus is something imperfect and determinable by the difference, the Platonic genus by contrast is something more perfect, something which the differences imitate only imperfectly. Firstly, it possesses *in a unity* what is possessed *only by a multiplicity* of species, each species possessing a part of what the genus has, that is, participating in it. Secondly, it also possesses its being in a higher way than do its species; for, keeping to our old example, the latter possess the animal being in an imperfect diminished way, so that the species of a genus participate in the genus not only quantitatively, as having some aspect of

²¹ "Quantum ad primum dico quod ens non est univocum dictum in quid de omnibus per se intelligibilibus, quia non de differentiis ultimis nec propriis passionibus entis." *Op. Ox.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, n. 6.

animal being, but also qualitatively, as having the aspect of animal being in an inferior way to that in which the genus possesses it.

Evidently you can make short work of this view by ranging the whole artillery of Aristotelian criticism against it. But the criticism will fail, so think some commentators, when confronted with an existential interpretation of participation. Such an interpretation is to be found, we are told, in St. Thomas' doctrine that all things participate in existence and receive it from the Supreme Existent. The Supreme Existent contains in Himself, in a higher way, all the perfections of existence possessed partially by the various restricted modes of existence. The Thomistic doctrine of participation, then, although it accords with the Platonistic dialectic of participation in giving more ontological value to the object of the more general term than to that of the more specific, is not an ontology of Ideas. It is an ontology of *existents*. For the Unparticipated here is an existent: and the various limited modes of being participate in the Unparticipated precisely as being existents. And an existent is not a universal idea. Furthermore, this opposition to the Platonistic doctrine of participation is confirmed by St. Thomas' giving priority in being to *actual existence*. As he says: "existence is the most perfect of things . . . the perfection of perfections."²²

Under these conditions, then, so Geiger informs us:

the genus is no longer the matter to which a specific difference comes to be added from outside as a formal element and principle of determination. It is, on the contrary, the form which is charged with virtualities more diverse than those in a simpler unity. . . . If the species participates the genus, it is, and this is the sole hypothesis possible, because it does not express the whole of the richness of the genus. And if it does not express it, this is necessarily due to the specific difference . . . it is necessary to conclude that the specific element is itself nothing more than a determination of that which the genus contains more perfectly. We must conclude in other words that the difference participates in the genus

²² ". . . hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum . . . et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum . . ." *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.

and that the genus possesses all the specific differences in a superior unity.²³

Here, evidently, all virtue lies in the generic end of the genus-difference chain, just as in the Aristotelian view, all virtue lay in the differential end. In each case one end of the chain contains in a higher way all the remainder. Naturally enough, between these two theories, we can see, if not a direct conflict, at least a certain tension. And Geiger does not hesitate to say that the Aristotelian logic is irreconcilable with the Thomistic logic of participation. Yet he also says that they are both necessary for human knowledge; and it is in discussing this point that we have to go over into the field of analogy. For, as Geiger says about the conclusion he drew in the above-quoted passage:

Such a conclusion is the ruin of univocity. It goes directly against the most conscious efforts of Aristotle, who always refused to admit that the specific differences participate in the genus. For to admit this thesis would be to affirm in the same breath that the genus is more perfect than the species. This preference for genera with which Aristotle charged Plato, and his own preference for the most determined species, spring from the irreducible opposition between the two logical systems.²⁴

²³ "Le genre n'est plus la matière à quoi vient s'ajouter comme du dehors une différence spécifique, élément formel et principe de détermination. Il est au contraire la forme qui est chargée de virtualités plus diverses dans une unité plus simple. L'espèce n'en explicite qu'une partie . . . si l'espèce participe du genre c'est, seule hypothèse possible, parce qu'elle n'exprime pas toute la richesse du genre. Et si elle ne l'exprime pas, c'est nécessairement en raison de la différence *spécifique* . . . il faut conclure que l'élément spécifique n'est lui-même qu'une détermination de ce que le genre contient plus parfaitement. Il faut conclure en d'autres termes, et que la différence participe du genre, et que le genre possède toutes les différences spécifiques dans une unité supérieure." L.-B. Geiger O.P., "La Participation dans la Philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Bibliothèque Thomiste*, XXIII, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1953), 253-254.

²⁴ "Une telle conclusion est la ruine de l'univocité. Elle va directement à l'encontre de l'effort le plus conscient d'Aristote, qui a toujours refusé d'admettre que les différences spécifiques participent des genres. Car admettre cette thèse, ce serait affirmer du même coup que le genre est plus parfait que les espèces, donc qu'il est une réalité subsistante, autant et plus que les espèces. La préférence pour les genres, qu'Aristote a reprochée à Platon, sa propre préférence pour les espèces

So we are to conclude that Aristotle's logic involves a logic of the univocal genus, whereas the logic of participation, at least in its Thomistic interpretation, involves the analogy of the genus. Now there seems to be a certain ironic change of position here between the opposing sides. For one of the arguments used by Aristotle against the Platonic ontology of participation was that key terms like *being* and *good* were not univocal, as Plato took them to be, but analogical. Yet Geiger looks on Aristotle as an opponent of participation precisely because of the latter thinker's doctrine of the *univocal* genus; and by contrast he invokes *analogy* in the genus as a necessary ingredient in the Platonic-inspired logic of participation. It might be interesting to speculate on how Plato and Aristotle would have reacted to this development.

Yet there is a further twist to the story; for although these two logics are in "irreducible opposition," they are, nevertheless, according to Geiger, both necessary and both true. He tells us that: ". . . the univocal logic of Aristotle will be recognized as being better in reality . . .,"²⁵ and goes on to speak of ". . . recognizing with Aristotle the necessity for us of univocal logic. . . ."²⁶ Yet a few pages before this he says: "If in fact the modes of the real take up an order following a formal progression going from the inferior beings up to the Supreme Perfection, we will never be in possession of an idea rigorously and univocally common to several modes, unless one limits oneself to purely logical genera."²⁷ This assertion is perfectly clear: generic community among real beings cannot be uni-

les plus déterminées, tiennent à l'opposition irréductible des deux constructions logiques." *ibid.*, p. 254.

²⁵ ". . . la logique univoque d'Aristote sera reconnue comme mieux fondée en réalité." *ibid.*, p. 285, n. 1.

²⁶ ". . . tout en reconnaissant avec Aristote la nécessité pour nous de la logique univoque, il nous faudra montrer dans la logique de la participation une vue plus objective encore. . . ." *ibid.*

²⁷ "Si en effet les modes du réel s'échelonnent suivant une progression formelle depuis les êtres inférieurs jusqu'à la Perfection Première, jamais nous ne serons en possession d'une notion rigoureusement et univoquement commune à plusieurs modes, à moins qu'on ne s'en tienne à des genres purement logiques." *ibid.*, p. 278.

vocal. The only time that we can speak of univocal genera is when we are concerned with "purely logical" ones. This raises the question as to how Aristotle's logic can be "better in reality," especially since Geiger asserts that: "Far from being inferior to univocal definitions, real participation seems more objective and more true";²⁸ and in the sentence previous to this he refers to participation as being "the most profound view of the universe."²⁹ Now if these two logics are in fact both true, and if the one seems to be "more objective and more true" than the other, and if, furthermore, the one is "the most profound view," reconciliation between these two logics becomes very difficult. And if it is possible, then we may very well wonder why this same type of reconciliation cannot be applied in the Scotist-Thomist controversy over the univocity or analogy of being. Why, in fact, should Thomists, of whom Geiger is one, quarrel with Scotists—or with Ockhamists³⁰ for that matter—over the latter's *conceptual* univocity of being?³¹ Why not allow the Scotist theory of being to play a role analogous to that which the Aristotelian logic is given to play here?

There is, of course, little doubt that one can find passages in Aristotle's work supporting the view that the genus is predicated univocally,³² namely, by real univocity as opposed to the

²⁸ "Loin d'être inférieure aux définitions univoques, la participation réelle semble plus objective et plus vraie." *ibid.*, p. 428.

²⁹ "La vue la plus profonde de l'univers serait, nous l'avons dit, celle qui l'envisagerait dans son ensemble et dans chacun de ses degrés comme une participation de la Perfection Première." *ibid.*

³⁰ ". . . non est inconveniens Deum et creaturam parificari in aliquo conceptu univoco, quia ille conceptus univocus non est de essentia Dei nec creaturae." *Comm. in Sent.* (ed. Lug.) I, d. 2, q. 9, GG, by William of Ockham. See Matthew Menges O. F. M., *The Concept of Univocity Regarding the Predication of God and Creatures According to William of Ockham* (New York: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1952), especially pp. 72-113, for Ockham's theory of conceptual univocity.

³¹ "Omnis inquisitio de Deo supponit intellectum habere conceptum eundem univocum quem accipit ex creaturis." *Opus Ox.*, d. 1, q. 3, a. 2, n. 10, by Duns Scotus. Compare this with: "Deus et creatura non sunt primo diversa in conceptibus tamen sunt primo diversa in realitate: quia in nulla realitate convenient." *ibid.*, d. 8, q. 3, n. 11.

³² See the *Categories*, c. 5 3 a 33-3b 9.

logical univocity met with in the previous paragraph. Nevertheless—and as we saw with his views on the difference—he puts forward another theory of the genus; and in this latter theory it is predicated only analogically.³³ Once again it is this second theory which seems to fit in better with his metaphysical system. St. Thomas, in commenting on this latter view of Aristotle, also asserts that the genus is analogical, allowing also that it might be logically univocal.³⁴ But as regards this latter theory of the *logically* univocal genus, it is difficult to find any passage in Aristotle showing that he held it; whereas there is one passage which seems to indicate that he openly rejected it. This passage appears in a general inquiry into the problem whether all movements are commensurable, that is to say, are all terms which are predicated of movements in general, univocally predicable of them? Aristotle simplifies his problem by studying some terms used in everyday life. *Sharpness*, for example, is not univocally predicated of a pen, a wine, and the highest note in a scale. Then he asks whether this same lack of univocity holds for terms like "quick," "much," "double," and "equal." His answer is that it does; and in his own words: "In fact there are some terms of which even the definitions are equivocal . . ."³⁵ of which the above-mentioned terms are examples, since they do not carry exactly the same meaning for every one of their subjects. Confirmation of this answer is given shortly afterwards in a reply to the hypothesis that the incommensurability between two things might apply only to their real state of existence; perhaps you could nevertheless *think* of them or describe them as being exactly alike. If this were the case then the term "clearness," to take his own example, would have exactly the same meaning when predi-

³³ See the *Physics* H, c. 4 248a 10-249a 24.

³⁴ ". . . genus autem non est unum; quia secundum diversas formas in rerum natura existentes, diversas species generis praedicationem suscipiunt. Et sic genus est unum logice, sed non physice." VII *Physic.*, c. 4, lect. 8, n. 8. Cf. also: "Quia ergo genus quodammodo est unum, et non simpliciter, iuxta genus latent multa: idest, per similitudinem et propinquitatem ad unitatem generis, multorum aequivocatio latet." *ibid.*

³⁵ *Op. cit.*, 248b 17.

cated of water and of speech, even though the clearness of the one is, in reality, different from the clearness present in the other. His answer is in the negative:

It would seem, however, that we must reject this solution, since clearly we could thus make all equivocal attributes univocal and say merely that which contains each of them is different in different cases: thus "equality," "sweetness," and "whiteness" will severally always be the same, though that which contains them is different in different cases.³⁶

There is little room for doubt as to the interpretation of these passages; evidently Aristotle was not prepared to accept *logically* univocal genera, or conceptually univocal genera, as they are sometimes called. And, considering his insistence upon the analogical nature of the fundamental terms like "being," "one," and "good," this is hardly surprising. If he had admitted logically univocal terms, the force of some of his criticisms of Platonic participation, and of the theories of other philosophers might have been weakened. A logically univocal concept of goodness, or oneness, or beauty, would, in fact, have fitted in very well with the Platonic doctrine of participation, and would have saved it from some at least of Aristotle's criticisms.

A further conclusion we can arrive at from a study of the above-mentioned passages in Aristotle is that, for him, generic terms are not univocal: they are analogical. For, as he himself says: ". . . this discussion serves to show that the genus is not a unity but contains a plurality latent in it . . ."³⁷; and if we adopt the view that Aristotle's genera are analogical, then the "irreducible opposition" between Aristotle's logic and the Thomistic analogical logic of participation disappears. There remains, consequently, no problem of how the two mutually conflicting logics can both be true. Few people will doubt that these results make such an interpretation of Aristotle worth investigating. Furthermore, it fits in much better with the Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of the substance.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 248b 24-249a 2.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 249a 22-23.

On the latter point, we will recall that, in the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine, the difference is not outside the genus but is a determination of it.³⁸ Now if the genus were univocally the same for all its species, then the only way in which the difference could differentiate the genus would consist in being *outside* the nature of the genus. By contrast, if the genus is only analogically the same for all its species, then the differences can differentiate one species from another, while at the same time being no more than *intrinsic* determinations of the generic nature to one mode of being.

To illustrate the former theory, if men and dogs were exactly the same as regards animality—and this is what is required for the univocal predication of the genus “animal”—then, in order to differentiate the species *man* from the species *dog*, the specific differences would have to be outside the nature of the genus “animal”; and then the unity of the substance would be impaired, and we would be reduced once more to the plurality of forms. Furthermore, if the difference is outside the nature of the genus, then the difference *canine*, for example, will *not* be animal; and we will be left in a situation in which dogs, *to the extent that they are canine*, are not animals. But since dogs are totally canine, it will follow that dogs are not animals. Putting it in general terms, since the specific difference is of the essence of the species—identical with it in fact—if the difference is outside the genus, then no species will belong to its genus: no dogs, or cats, or horses, will be animals. Such absurd consequences make the theory impossible.

It may also be noted that impossible consequences will likewise follow from trying to keep the genus univocal while never-

³⁸ Cf. n. 16 and St. Thomas, *VII Metaphys.*, lect. 12, n. 1549: “. . . tota essentia definitionis, in differentia quodammodo comprehenditur. Ex hoc enim animal, quod est genus, non potest esse absque speciebus, quia formae specierum quae sunt differentiae, non sunt aliae formae a forma generis, sed sunt formae generis cum determinatione. Sicut patet quod animal est quod habet animam sensitivam. Homo autem est qui habet animam sensitivam “talem,” scilicet cum ratione. . . . Unde cum differentia additur generi, non additur quasi aliqua diversa essentia a genere, sed quasi in genere implicite contenta, sicut determinatum continetur in indeterminato, ut album in colorato.” Cf. also *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 95 *in medio*.

theless admitting that the differences are not outside the genus. Such an interpretation will annihilate all the species of the genus and will convert the genus into a unique species. For example, it is granted that all animals are univocally animal, i. e., animal in *exactly* the same way. It is also granted that all the specific differences of the genus "animal" are present in it. It follows, therefore, that *all* the differences belong to each animal, that no species differs in any way from any other, and that *animal* is converted into the unique *species* of all animals. Such a consequence is hardly less absurd than the other one. We need hardly say that St. Thomas rejects outright the doctrine of the plurality of substantial forms in one substance, and maintains that it is by one and the same form that a being is a substance, a body, an organism, an animal, and a lion,³⁹ and following logically from this, that "the difference constitutes the species."⁴⁰ Evidently, then, he will not admit that the difference is something external to the nature of the genus.

To illustrate the latter theory, namely, that the genus is analogical, if we admit that men and dogs are not exactly the same as regards animality, so that "animal" cannot be correctly predicated of them univocally, it will follow that the differentiating aspects which place them in diverse species can already be present in the generic nature. For it is a characteristic of analogical terms that they indicate diverse modes of being which are nevertheless similar in some way. Now such an interpretation of the genus, and therefore primarily of substance, amounts in fact to the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of the substance, since it is the *one* substance which is rational and animal or canine and animal. The animality of man is different from the animality of a dog precisely because it is *rational* animality, which is animality of a special sort, while being at the same time totally animal. And the same holds for the other species of animal, or of any other genus. As Aristotle says:

³⁹ "Patet etiam ex hoc, quod cuiuslibet speciei est una tantum forma substantialis; sicut leonis una est forma per quam est substantia, et corpus, et animatum corpus, et animal et leo." *VII Metaphys.*, lect. 12, n. 1564: and also *De spirit. creat.*, q. un., a. 1, ad 9.

⁴⁰ ". . . differentia est quae constituit speciem." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 1.

For not only must the common nature attach to the different things, e. g., not only must both be animals, but this very animality must also be different for each (e. g., in the one case equinity, in the other humanity), and so this common nature is specifically different for each from what it is for the other. One, then, will be in virtue of its own nature one sort of animal, and the other another, e. g., one a horse and the other a man.⁴¹

We could hardly wish for a clearer statement and explanation of the analogical nature of the genus. And St. Thomas says, commenting on this passage: ". . . he excludes the opinion of those who say that what pertains to the nature of the genus, does not differ in species in man and in a horse."⁴² In other words, he excludes the univocal genus.

So, with the interpretation of the genus as analogical, we seem to be expressing the true doctrines of both Aristotle and St. Thomas, thereby getting rid of an uncomfortable disagreement between two logics both of which are supposed to be correct. It may be maintained, however, that there is still a tension between the logic of genus and species and the logic of participation, since the former treats the genus as the inferior member of the alliance whereas the latter delegates this role to the difference. But maybe a reconciliation can be found even here, since, at least according to St. Thomas' interpretation of him,⁴³ Aristotle maintained that there is a gradation

⁴¹ *Metaphysics I*, c. 8, 1058a 1-9.

⁴² ". . . etiam excluditur opinio eorum qui dicunt quod illud quod pertinet ad naturam generis, non differt specie in speciebus diversis; sicut quod anima sensibilis non differt specie in homine et equo." *X Metaph.*, lect. 10, n. 2119. As Descoqs says: "La représentation de l'animal générique est en effet assez semblable—sans leur être identique—aux diverses réalisations spécifiques pour pouvoir leur être attribuée *sine addito*, pourvu que l'attribution se fasse seulement par analogie." *Institutiones Metaphysicae Generalis* (Paris, 1925), p. 246.

⁴³ ". . . propter quod Aristoteles dicit quod distinctiones rerum sunt sicut numerus, in quo unitas subtracta vel addita speciem numeri variat; per quem modum, in diffinitionibus, si una differentia subtrahatur vel addatur, diversa species invenitur." *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 95. Fabro says: "Per S. Tommaso il mondo intelligibile delle essenze non è un "hortus conclusus," risultante di elementi immobili che per un istante, che possiamo chiamare quello del pensiero categoriale o predicamentale, quello cioè della predicazione logico-formale del genere a riguardo delle sue specie, e della specie per gli individui. Ma nell'istante seguente della

between the species of a genus so that one species was more perfect an expression of the generic mode of being than was another.⁴⁴ Fr. Little tells us that:

Fr. Fabro argues that participation in St. Thomas is rather an Aristotelian than a Platonic derivative because it was the logical completion, illogically rejected by Aristotle, of the Aristotelian doctrines adopted by St. Thomas. But if both participation and those Aristotelian doctrines are true and if all truth is a connected whole it is undeniable that participation logically completes Aristotelianism.⁴⁵

Leaving aside the question of inconsistencies in Aristotle's own mind, there seems to be little reason for denying that the

riflessione metafisica tutto quel mondo di perfezioni pure e formalità astratte e indivisibili offre spontaneamente, anzi suscita lui stesso, il movimento dialettico del pensiero, che relaziona la varie formalità fra di loro e rispetto alla formalità suprema, l'essere che è soltanto "essere" . . . le varie formalità . . . si presentano secondo un intensificarsi progressivo di perfezione e secondo un piano che ascende a spirale *per gradi*, secondo una contiguità che possiamo chiamare metafisica. La penetrazione del pensiero dello Ps.-Dionigi ha reso meno rigide le barriere che Aristotele sembrava aver posto fra i vari elementi della *φύσις*: . . . S. Tommaso è costi preso da questa suggestiva visione metafisica, aperta dalla speculazione dello Stagirita, che la vuol gustare in tutta la sua profondità, quasi avesse trovato il miele nella bocca del leone, e parla di un *prius et posterius* anche nelle cause formali: ". . . Dicendum quod secundum Philosophum, *etiam in causis formalibus prius et posterius inveniuntur* . . . (De Pot., VI, 5 ad 6um (sic))." *La Nozione Metafisica Di Partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso D'Aquino* (2nd ed.; Torino: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1950), pp. 194-195.

⁴⁴ As regards the varying perfections exemplified by the diverse species of being, the following observations of Fabro are noteworthy: ". . . si può osservare che S. Tommaso applica quel principio (namely, that the higher contains all the perfections of the lower in a simpler and more perfect way) senza riserve soltanto quando si tratta dell'*eminenza divina*; per quanto riguarda gli altri esseri, la distinzione delle creature è come una 'divina discretio,' per la quale ciascuna formalità, essendo uscita immediatamente da Dio, possiede se stessa 'primo et per se.' Anche questa profonda osservazione mostrerà come fosse acuto in S. Tommaso il cosiddetto 'spirito del concreto': . . . quaelibet creatura habet esse finitum et determinatum. Unde essentia superioris creaturae, *etsi habeat quamdam similitudinem inferioris creaturae*, prout communicant in aliquo genere, *non tamen complete habet similitudinem illius*; quia determinatur ad aliquam speciem, praeter quam est species inferioris creaturae. Sed essentia Dei est perfecta similitudo omnium, quantum ad omnia quae in rebus inveniuntur sicut universale principium omnium" (Ia, q. 84, a. 2 ad 3um). *op. cit.*, pp. 169-170.

⁴⁵ Arthur Little S.J. *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism* (Dublin: Standard House, 1949), p. 22.

Aristotelian doctrine of analogy, with its reference to one primary analogate,⁴⁶ bears marked resemblances to Platonic participation; and the Aristotelian doctrine of the gradation of species is not excessively dissimilar from a Platonic hierarchy of forms.

If this is in fact the case, then the apparent conflict between the two doctrines would seem to disappear. In the logic of participation, the various species in their diverse ways participate in the generic perfection; in the Aristotelian logic, these species embody the generic nature at varying stages of perfection, one species of animal, for example, being animal in a higher way than other species, while no species realizes the perfections of animal being in all its forms. In the logic of participation the one supreme exemplar confers their varying partial perfections upon the participants; in the Aristotelian inspired logic of analogy, all the members of the analogy have reference to one primary member. In Thomistic thought, the supreme exemplar is the Necessary Existent;⁴⁷ and the primary member of the analogy of being is the Necessary Existent.⁴⁸ The various genera of being are analogous finally by analogy to the Supreme Being, just as the various modes of participation themselves participate in the Supreme Being. The Supreme Being possesses *eminentiori modo* what the secondary analogates possess only *inferiori modo*, and IS what the participants merely faintly imitate. So each species expresses a particular mode of the limited analogical perfection of its genus—a perfection expressed in a higher unlimited way by

⁴⁶ See especially the doctrine of the categories of being where accidents have being only by reference to substances. If we add to this the Aristotelian doctrine that each species possesses a certain perfection of being, we are well on the way to a hierarchy of being participating in the Supreme Being.

⁴⁷ ". . . Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum." *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 44, a. 3, resp.

⁴⁸ ". . . Deum autem supra ostendimus hujusmodi ens esse cui nihil sit causa essendi. Ab eo igitur est omne quod quocumque modo est. Si autem dicatur quod ens non est praedicatum univocum, nihilominus praedicta conclusio sequetur: non enim de multis auquivoce dicitur, sed per analogiam; et sic oportet fieri reductionem in unum." *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 15.

God—and, in so doing, occupies a certain grade in the hierarchy of being.

Summing up, then, we conclude that the difference is not outside the genus. It is rather the determination of the genus to one species of being: in fact the difference *is* the species. The only distinction that can ultimately be drawn between the difference and the species is apparently a purely linguistic one depending upon the rules of grammar. The genus contains the difference indeterminately, and is analogically common to its various species. These species form a gradation of perfections of the genus and are thus a hierarchy of being through participation in the Unparticipated Being, the One to Whom the whole analogy and hierarchy of being is referent.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Language: An Enquiry into its Meaning and Function. Planned and Edited by RUTH NANDA ANSHEN. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. Pp. 366.

The present book is the eighth volume of the Science and Culture Series. This series is aimed at an organic clarification of modern knowledge with an attempt to achieve something of an encyclopedic synthesis. Past volumes have dealt with such topics as Freedom, Science and Man, The Family, and Moral Principles of Action. The present volume, as the title indicates, seeks to draw, in the words of the editor, "attention to the mystery, the miracle, and the magic of language." A further twofold purpose is suggested, one positive and the other more negative. The positive aim is "to give a perspective on what language is, its variability in time and place, its permanence, and its relation to the thought and history of man." The negative aim is "to discuss both the errors and the ineptitude of the exclusively empirical approach in understanding the problem of language and the fallacy of the assumption that thought is the action of language mechanisms." These are the words of Ruth Nanda Anshen in the foreword to the book.

The volume divides into two main parts. Part One is "The Principle," pp. 3-152. Part Two is "The Application," pp. 155-355. The purpose of a review will best be served, I believe, by indicating at least briefly the content of each chapter (each chapter constituting an independent essay by a different author), with a slightly more extended comment on several of the contributions which seem to deserve special emphasis for the magazine in which this review appears.

I

In the opening chapter on "Language as Idea," Ruth Nanda Anshen's insistence is on the point that it is "by virtue of the procreative power of language, which grasps, shakes, and transforms, that man is man." In her anxiety to stress this point, the author identifies language and thought by maintaining that words themselves are ideas. God, in fact, created language and language exists *ab aeterno*. "The name is the person, the expression of the mysterious essence of things, revealing or controlling the inner reality." Throughout this essay, presumably designed to be a fundamental consideration of language itself, one has the impression that more attention should have been given to a literal analysis of language as human expression, particularly its distinction from and relation to human thought. The value of language and its role in human expression is not best

realized by an opening essay that tends to be more eulogistic and vaguely ontological than analytic and expository.

Dr. Kurt Goldstein in "The Nature of Language" approaches his subject from his experience in pathological treatment of patients. He notes that the use of pathological material to gain understanding of normal behavior is open to criticism, but his conviction is that the careful use of pathological material still has significance for understanding any human behavior and language in particular. His starting point is the frequently observed deviation of language which occurs in aphasic persons, the incapacity to name objects. What makes a patient incapable of naming objects? The patient can only assume a concrete approach; an abstract attitude fails him. In the abstract attitude, language plays a primary role, and the essence of human language is meaning. Goldstein thereupon arrives at the basic principle which exhibits the nature of language: human language is understandable only if "one considers it from the point of view that language is not a simple tool but an expression of the nature of man. . . ." The positive contribution of Goldstein is that, starting from particular facts and observations about abnormal speech activity of man, he can still arrive at a fundamental position with some reasoned assurance, namely, that language is an expression of man's very nature and that it is an expression of his symbolic power.

N. H. Tur-Sinai's essay is on "The Origin of Language." Generation after generation, he notes, has been baffled by the problem of trying to discover how language developed in a particular way. He decides, almost at the outset of his essay, that "the road followed by the development of language must have been a simple and primitive one, springing from the very nature of man's mind, from psychical properties common to all the human family." Two nineteenth-century theories on the origin of language will not hold. One was the agglutination theory of F. Bopp, that roots of words historically did not come first. The other was the adaptation theory of A. Ludwig: words have adapted themselves morphologically to the purpose of expressing such grammatical concepts as number, case, and tense. The approach, rather, must start from the fact that when man first spoke, categories and rules did not exist. Names originally denoted, not the concrete things nearest to man, but merely a quality of a thing (his examples suggest primarily sense qualities). Tur-Sinai also stresses error as the productive factor in language, consisting in a new use brought to the original short demonstrative words, occasioned by misunderstandings between speaker and hearer. Consequently, the noun did not arise from the verb nor the verb from the noun, but both arose from a different understanding of one and the same primitive word, which word was originally identified with a reality hinted at by a cry. The main line of the development of language is therefore the following: from ungrammatical cry to nouns and verbs which come to be governed by grammatical rules.

The linguistic categories are the final result of an evolution, not an origin.

Swami Nikhilananda in "Aum: The Word of Words" seeks to relate *Aum* (the Hindu symbol of Ultimate Reality) with the Word as given by St. John in the Fourth Gospel. According to Hindu thought, the relation between sounds and thoughts is a natural one, and *Aum* (rhyming with *home*) is the generalized symbol of all possible sounds. *Aum* is therefore the most effective symbol of reality, whereas a word like "God" has only a limited function. *Aum* was not invented by any man; it is the primordial and uncreated sound heard by mystics absorbed in contemplation. This essay is brief and ends abruptly. I found myself impressed more by the difference in thought behind "Aum" and "Word" than by any likeness or agreement.

Twenty years ago, Jacques Maritain wrote a general theory of signs in Volume I of the *Journal of the Warburg Institute*. His present essay is an application of that theory to some considerations on language, specifically three points: awareness of the relation of signification, the magic sign, and reverse or inverted signification. His essay comes as something of a relief insofar as he provides some helpful and pertinent distinctions with respect to the nature of language itself, and particularly with respect to the manner of signifying. The distinction he makes between logic and magic signs is, I think, a revealing and significant one, even if it should not classify as a fundamental and formal one. The logic sign is the sign of the intellect, any sign which speaks ultimately to the intellect. The magic sign speaks primarily to the imagination, even though it might require some intellectual grasping. It is the sign primarily for the primitive man as he is under the authority of the imagination. This sort of sign not only makes man know, but makes things be, much in the manner in which the sand castles of children are truly castles for them, or as certain natural forces are human or divine agencies for primitive man. Maritain sees this distinction as throwing light not only on different modes of signifying, and therefore revealing as to the nature of language itself, but as manifesting how language began (at least for primitive man) in the form of "magical" language. His other distinction between a direct sign (one denoting an object) and an inverted sign (one manifesting a subject) is clearly a psychological distinction relating, among other things, to the Freudian symbol.

In "Symbols and History," George Boas maintains that it is the symbol which provides the continuity of life and not the literal stuff which is being symbolized. If tradition retains the past, it is only in the sense that it is preserved there in symbolic form, and to this history must also be reduced. A symbol cannot name a genuine persisting identity, for there is none. Our desire for permanence is satisfied by our symbols, whereas our need for change is accounted for by what the symbols represent. The symbol

stands relatively unchanged from year to year, and history as dealing with symbols becomes an illusion enabling us to escape from our dread of change. This essay merely presents an assumed wholly nominalistic theory of language and proceeds to use it as a principle to make history illusory since history can only be found on the level of symbols.

Paul Tillich in "The Word of God" is initially concerned to remove literal misinterpretations of the term. The term, like everything else man says about God, has symbolic character. As a symbol, rather than a sign, it participates in the reality of that which it signifies. Tillich lists six different ways "Word of God" applies symbolically to divine self-manifestation. The first three ways symbolize the transcendent foundation of what is called "Word of God." The first is the inner word which God speaks to himself, the second is the Word of creation, and the third is the Word by which the world is created and appears in history, as inspiration and incarnation. The second set of three meanings of "Word of God" symbolize divine self-manifestation through the human word. The first of these is reception, e. g., of the content of the New Testament, the witness to the event Jesus the Christ. The second is the objective meaning to be attached to the doctrine given wholly and without deviation by the preacher, basing himself on scripture and tradition. The third meaning is the subjective interpretation of "Word of God preached," i. e., it is experienced as divine self-manifestation by one who actually experiences it. Tillich concludes: "If the 'Word of God' necessarily includes a word about God, its linguistic form must be the symbol; for every statement about God is unavoidably symbolic." In revealing himself, God creates symbols and myths through which he can be approached. The symbolic background never disappears; even the application of the category of causality to God is a symbolic way of speaking. Symbols are figurative and are therefore safe from criticism by nonsymbolic language. Discursive language (e. g., arguments for the existence of God) is unable to open up the ultimate reality, "the level of the holy." Hence, "the 'Word of God' is not a collection of propositions, but a symbol for the dynamic, ever-changing encounter between man and what concerns him ultimately." Tillich ably brings out the symbolic character that must attend to the term "Word of God," and to theological language generally, and shows well negatively the consequences of literal mistranslation. Yet he nowhere makes allowance for legitimate literal meaning. Scripture and theology abound in figurative and symbolic expression, and for many and good reasons. Nevertheless, the symbolic cut wholly adrift from the literal can only lead to ultimate unintelligibility or to wholly arbitrarily imposed meaning. Christian tradition has continually held that, along with the necessary symbolic character of much of scriptural and theological writing, everything necessary to faith is somewhere and always put forward clearly in a literal sense. Our Lord made it clear that at times it is necessary to speak

plainly and not only in symbols and parables, and in thus speaking He is not less the Word of God.

R. P. Blackmuir in "The Language of Silence" makes, as the title suggests, a plea for the silence that tries to speak. Indeed, it is the language of silence which we translate into words, for words are only one medium for expressing "our crying-out and our salutation, our discovery and our assent." Blackmuir suggests as a parody of what he means by the language of silence "the problematic image of a dozen Chinese understanding perfectly each other's written words but unable to converse aloud." If there were no language of silence, there could be no translation from Arabic or French into English. "Meaning is what silence does when it gets into words." Apart from some adaptions and applications to certain poetic structures, Blackmuir's point basically is that there is thought as well as language, a mental rhythm as well as a vocal one—in brief, understanding and impression without vocalization.

II

Roman Jakobson, like Kurt Goldstein, approaches language from the standpoint of linguistic disorder, specifically aphasia. Varieties of aphasia are numerous and diverse, but all of them oscillate between some impairment of the faculty for selection and substitution or that of combination and contexture. Hence, "The Cardinal Dictotomy of Language" shows how speech disturbances affect an individual's capacity for combination and selection of linguistic units. This dichotomy between these two operations, Jakobson holds, is more suggestive than the classical distinction between emissive and receptive aphasia.

In a series of brief paragraphs, in the manner of aphorisms, and under the title of "Squares and Oblongs," taken from Virginia Woolf's *The Waves*, W. H. Auden offers some remarks on poetry by way of contrasts and identities. As a verbal system, poetry is a natural, and not a historical object; as a natural object, poetry is organic and not inorganic. The order of a poem consists in the outcome of a dialectical struggle between feelings and the verbal system. The peculiarity of poetry as a verbal system is the identity of meaning and being. The Aristocratic (classical) principle regarding the poetic subject is: "No material shall be made the subject of a poem which poetry cannot transform into its own universe." The Democratic (romantic) principle is: "No material shall be excluded from becoming the subject of a poem which can be poetically transformed." The aphoristic style of writing in this essay tends to leave a reader with a helpless feeling of being talked to rather than participating in a process of communicated understanding. Notwithstanding the value of many of the observations, Auden writes prose as a poet.

The reputation of Charles W. Morris as a semanticist is well established.

In "Mysticism and Language," he wishes to extend the analysis of semantics to include the language of mysticism. He approaches the problem by noting that whereas a semanticist in the tradition of Korzybski would have all men talk in the same way, the stress of the Zen Buddhist is on a kind of experience wholly different from a scientific one, an experience which gives rise to a language of paradox and contradiction. This is the language of mysticism, and Morris wishes to explain it as a complex process amenable to analysis in terms of a theory of signs. Morris distinguishes between a pre-language sign, such as a buzzer which signifies food to a dog, and a post-language sign which, though not a language sign, requires the operation of language for its signification, e.g., one's perception of a star. Morris is convinced that "the notion of post-language sign is essential to the understanding of art, myths, magic, the totem, religion, prestige, race prejudice, and the complex types of perception." Now the mystic has a primary and a secondary language. The primary language arises in the words "wrung out" of the mystic by the experience he has had, and it is here the language of paradox and contradiction is employed. The secondary language arises from the mystic's attempt to explicate for himself and for others his experience and primary signs. Trouble arises at this level, for the secondary language must be made in terms of some conceptual system, and this language will vary according to different cultures and traditions. This relativity of conceptual systems expressed in the secondary language must be recognized, as it has been by Zen Buddhism, and hence Zen basically has no doctrine and no authoritative text. Still, the distinction between the primary and secondary languages must be preserved. There is not this relativity in the primary language. Such a language expresses accurately the experience of the mystic, even though it may be paradoxical and contradictory. The secondary language cannot "translate" the primary language, and hence the secondary language is characterized by the use of negations. Morris' conclusion from his brief exposition of mystical language is that "mystical experience is not an emotional frenzy or the simple confrontation of a unique object, but rather the undergoing of a complex and contradictory set of linguistic role-taking processes which finally eventuate in post-language symbols carrying the meaning of this set of symbols." This experience of the mystic is liberating. It is not incompatible with science and does not take the place of science. "Semantically it is clean. Humanly it is finely, and finally, satisfying." The attempt of an outstanding semanticist like Morris to account for mystical language is commendable, and it is gratifying to see linguistic analysis broadened from its original highly restrictive method and scope. That Morris' remarks touch only a small part of the important area of mystical language, and that he does not seem to be aware of the work on this matter in the Christian tradition, does not detract from the merit of this essay.

Erich Fromm writes in his professional capacity as a psychiatrist in

"Symbolic Language of Dreams." The language of dreams is constituted of accidental and universal symbols, but the meaning of symbols in dreams has been variously analyzed. A tradition from Plato to Freud holds that dreams express the lowest and most animal-like part of our nature. Another tradition, including men like Goethe and Jung, holds that dreams reveal our highest and most rational faculties. Fromm disassociates himself from either view in the sense that he thinks there is no kind of mental activity, feeling or thought not capable of being expressed in dreams in symbolic language. Fromm also thinks the difference between functions of sleeping and waking is more fundamental than any difference between other kinds of activity, which leads him to assert that there is also an incomparably greater difference between the conceptual system of the two states. Mental activity during sleep has a logic different from that of waking existence. Furthermore, we can be wiser, more intelligent, and capable of better judgment when we are asleep than when we are awake, even though the reverse can also occur. Hence, to be awake is not exclusively a blessing, but also a curse. In sleep, we are better able to feel and to think our truest and most valuable feelings and thoughts. Dreams represent a language with its own syntax and grammar, the one universal language which the human race possesses. No doubt, as Fromm maintains, a study of dream language cannot be omitted if we wish to understand language in its most general and universal aspects. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it is easy to exaggerate the significance of dreams and to attribute characteristics to them which do not properly apply. As a purely personal observation, I can only note that on the basis of a fairly rich dream experience, I am not at all impressed by its logic (in any apt sense of the term), nor do I discover that I am wiser, more intelligent, and capable of better judgment when asleep than awake. I yearn for a happier condition of these qualities in me, but on the basis of dreams to date, I have no hope of finding this happier state realized in my dreams. And when Fromm suggests that waking life is taken up with the function of action while sleep is taken up with the function of self-experience, it seems to me evident enough that just the opposite as frequently or even more frequently occurs. I do not wish to deny, of course, a certain importance of dreams, especially as the dream may be an important tool for psychotherapy or a means for understanding neurotic phenomena. But why is it necessary to parallel in importance the value of the dream state and the waking state? A dream life and a dream language, at best, can only be a "life" and a "language" in secondary meanings of the term.

Language, Leo Spitzer tells us in "Language of Poetry" is not satisfied with denoting factual contents, but forces the speaker to adopt certain metaphysical or religious interpretations of the world. Even when such underlying conceptions are obsolete, they can be used deliberately and with great aesthetic effect in poetry. Hence, while poetry does not step outside

of the realm of language, it can turn language to its own account, that is, poetry uses devices common to ordinary language, but it uses them so as to produce a poetic effect. The poetic examples Spitzer cites show prosody in service of a myth, and his point is that prosody in itself is able to suggest a poetic atmosphere more fittingly than myth alone can do. Spitzer's general conclusion is to show that language is by no means a banal means of communication or a means only to orienting us perfectly to this world, as language in the service of science seeks to achieve. Language offers us also a means of freeing us from this world thanks to its metaphysical and poetic implications. Such language is the proper raw material of poetry. Through poetry, language is able to transform itself "into the rainbow bridge which leads mankind toward other worlds where meaning rules absolute."

In "Language of Jurisprudence," Huntington Cairns sees the linguistic problem for legal theory in terms of the capacities of ordinary language to meet the tasks of law. Three general questions have been raised in legal thinking about language. The first concerns what the ideal forms of expression are for conveying legal meaning, with answers oscillating between the extremes of ornate and plain expression. Legal thinking has also considered what the nature of a professional language for law would be. Finally, legal thinking has dealt even with the general problem of the connection between words and things. Cairns notes, in passing, two tendencies presently at work toward an accurate and adequate terminology. One tendency is for scholars and scientists to confine themselves to a limited number of languages for expressing results of research, and thus a precise terminology might develop. The other tendency is a movement toward mathematical symbolization, which ideally seems a solution but which appears impossible of realization for law. The logically perfect language sacrifices communication for precision. Cairns goes into some detail to sketch various attempts to clarify language in general, and language for law in particular, and brings out fully the complexity of the problem. His general conclusion can be put in the following terms. The theory of symbolization is a newly developing subject, but so far it has uncovered more questions than answers. Modern linguistic studies have helped to show relations between a language and the scheme of things. We must take into account that no language fails wholly to distinguish between the noun and the verb. "All this suggests a reexamination of such matters as the Aristotelian logic and the Kantian Categories, which took their departure from linguistic forms. It also suggests that the subject-predicate logic may not be as outmoded as the proponents of the relational logic have urged." At the same time, symbolism as it increases the clarity of our thinking may be helpful. The universe of legal discourse is clearly marked, but the solution of many of its tasks lies beyond that realm.

In politics, language becomes the language of decision. Harold D.

Lasswell ("Language of Politics") classifies such decisions into those which are authorized but not controlling, those which are controlling and not authorized, and those which are both. We are only just beginning to comprehend the richness of the language of politics and law. We need to discern the unconscious as well as the conscious dimension of the problem. Language becomes refashioned when it is employed as an instrument of power. The role of myth is coming to be recognized, in particular as it can unify experience and inspire dedication to the goals of a community. The complex function of myth is revealed especially in litigation, and a recurring symbol in litigation is "law," a key symbol of the myth. Moreover, in a complex civilization the creative ambiguity of legal language when employed in litigation helps the harmonious development of the body politic to new circumstances. Through this and other means of enriching the language of politics and law, we can clarify the goals and institutions of a free commonwealth. Coming right after Cairns' essay on more or less the same topic, Lasswell's essay seems almost inconsequential, the impression perhaps arising from the much more restricted aim Lasswell appears to have and from his emphasis on the role and significance of myth to the exclusion of other relevant factors entering into the language of politics and law.

It is the experience of stage fright, Francis Fergusson notes in "Language of the Theater," which a performer goes through just before the curtains part that brings out most vividly the power of the language of the theater. Such public performance is an important and perilous means of communication. The stage invokes a kind of perception with a terrifying formality. "It bids us gather, pause, and look." Although the theater appears to have developed out of a primitive ritual which abstracted constant aspects of human nature and destiny, the developed theater of a Sophocles or a Shakespeare uses not merely the bodies or voices or concepts, but the beings of the performers: "the human himself in the eye of the audience." This, of course, is language of the theater at its best—the ideal language—and theater at its best uses the performer for the disinterested purpose of contemplation and "to share the perennially absorbing vision of man." It stands in sharp contrast to the restricted purpose of a Hollywood, Moscow, or Nazi theater. "The ideal object which the ideal language of the theater is fitted to indicate, or *mean*, is human nature and destiny, not rationalizing man, or economic man, or mass-man, but the mysterious creature, who may be viewed in many complementary perspectives." It is Fergusson's regret, and it is one we should all share, that we do not cultivate the language of the theater at its best and in its most fundamental uses.

The surrealists have brought attention to symbolic art along with their stress upon the unconscious as the basis of creative direction. As a consequence, Margaret Naumberg observes in "Art as Symbolic Speech," the

line between art and non-art became less certain. A new world became created by many artists based on personal response to inner experience. The contact with the unconscious gave added impetus to symbolic modes of expression. She quotes the analysis of the French psychologist, G. H. Luquet, who points out the way in which both the child and the primitive select some elements to draw which they consider essential, exclude others, and finally include aspects which are not visibly or objectively real but which belong to what he calls "mental realism." Margaret Naumberg thinks that this general observation is broadly applicable to much of what has developed in the greater sophistication of modern symbolic art. "Psychoanalysis has made both the artist and the general public increasingly aware of the fact that man's unconscious thinks and feels in symbolic images." After exhibiting some examples to illustrate this point, the author concludes that because man's unconscious speaks today as well as in ages past, the investigator of symbolism now has fresh psychological tools for deciphering many as yet little understood aspects of human behavior. Although this essay is revealing in exhibiting the connection between the unconscious and some symbolic modes of artistic expression, it is unfortunate that no hint is given that a symbolic mode of artistic expression has even more interesting connections with highly conscious and quite articulate artistic purposes.

Jean P. de Menasce is well aware of the difficulty of trying to translate poetry from one language to another, but in "A Philosophy of Translation," he is concerned to show that in poetic experience there is something so fundamentally human that even poetry can be translated. He is also aware that, apart from the problem of the meaning of words, the sounds of a given language are essential to poetry and its effect; and, further, that language sounds are bound up with meanings according to rules which are proper to each language. Poetry deals with language sounds and meanings in a creative manner, but still the translation of poetry from one language to another is not precluded. The author goes on to consider other dimensions of language than the poetic, e. g., the language of philosophy and the language of Revelation, thus extending his title to include translation of all knowledge from one language into another. His general view of language is broad and basically sound. Language has status in the natural law of human relations and is not subject merely to laws of technique and art. Language expresses the highest knowledge of man as well as the most obscure emotional experience; it reflects both the intellectual and the social nature of man. Presumably, this wide appreciation of language in all its aspects is a necessary prerequisite for understanding a "philosophy of translation."

III

The hope is expressed by the editor, Ruth Nanda Anshen, that through the Science and Culture Series "a new vision of man has been articulated,"

and that the Series "will manifest and cherish the spirit of *scientia*, which has not been emptied of *sapientia* and which therefore makes the science of culture possible in the conduct of human affairs." One can only applaud these and other aims announced for this Series and hope for their increasing realization. The editor is certainly to be congratulated for undertaking and persisting in a task of such magnitude, and she can take justified pride for a significant measure of success achieved.

The specific problem with which this volume has dealt is language, and no one could quarrel with the importance and relevance of such a topic for a series of this kind. It must also be acknowledged that an imposing list of contributors have participated in the writing of this volume. On the whole, they have contributed a great deal to the understanding of language as a basic human activity and have variously shown the indispensable role of language for human knowledge and culture.

Nevertheless, a few reservations about the over-all excellence of the book should be noted. Some important aspects of language are not covered which clearly deserve some attention in a book of this kind. The role and function of language in contemporary science is too important and too relevant for modern culture to omit almost entirely; the language of the contemporary scientist certainly deserved at least one essay. Related to this topic, but distinct enough for special treatment, is the language of mathematics and, in particular, the function of the symbol in mathematical discourse. There is no explicit treatment of language from the point of view of logic, nor is there sufficient recognition of the large part semanticists have played in the analysis of language. A possible answer to these omissions, (there are other omissions which might be noted, for example, there is no essay devoted to a strictly philosophical consideration of language) is that they might depart from the announced cultural aims of the series. Moreover, such an answer might continue, limitations of space necessarily involved selecting only some out of many important topics concerned with the problem of language.

A reply, I think, could be made effectively to both of these points. With regard to the first, essays on such omitted topics as are mentioned above surely fall within the limits of human culture; indeed, the language of mathematics, science and logic occupies a deservedly large place in human culture in contemporary times. Concerning the second point, I think that the problem of space limitation could be solved by eliminating several instances of duplication in the present volume. For example, Kurt Goldstein and Roman Jakobson both write on language from the point of view of speech disturbance. Huntington Cairns and Harold Lasswell both write on the language of law and politics. Four of the essays are on the poetic dimension of language. Even though these essays are quite worthwhile and have independent merit, nevertheless the book would benefit from the elimination of duplication of topics with a corresponding widening of subject matter.

One other difficulty about the book as a whole might be noted. Despite the announced aims for the book, there is no discernible underlying acknowledgment of them manifested. The book appears to be more a collection of wholly independent essays gathered together under a nominal heading. One would suppose that the editor's essays, opening and closing the book, would compare, contrast and relate the essays in some relation to the announced aims. Although there are some passages in Ruth Nanda Anshen's essays which suggest this approach, the fact of the matter is that her essays are actually two quite independent contributions to the problem of language, for the most part unrelated to the other essays except in a manner so general as not to be significant or revealing.

Despite some reservations of this kind, the book still achieves a considerable degree of success in showing "what language is, its variability in time and space, its permanence, and its relation to the thought and history of man."

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Aristotle on Art and Nature. By M. J. CHARLESWORTH. Auckland University College. Pp. 40.

In a short paper published at Auckland University College as part of the *Philosophy Series* M. J. Charlesworth adds a clear, rational voice to the many voices now attempting clarifications in the field of an Aristotelian or Thomistic Esthetic. His purpose is "to attempt to reconstruct a part of the general theory of art presupposed to Aristotle's *Poetics*." He indicates the possible sources of such a reconstruction in the other works of the Aristotelian corpus, especially in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, the *Politics*, the *De Anima*, etc. Using these sources, he sets up an argumentation that begins with the notion of art as a kind of knowledge, or, rather, the virtue that perfects a certain kind of knowledge, the knowledge of how-to-make. Art is a making or the virtue of making: this is his starting-point. He then discusses the metaphysics of making, "the bestowing of a new accidental and non-natural form on some matter which already exists in its own right informed with its natural form." This excellent chapter gives Mr. Charlesworth an opportunity to reprobate several misconceptions deriving from the Romantic school of esthetics: the idea that the work of art is primarily "the expression of the artist's personality"; the notion that the work of art necessarily expresses the "essence of things" or some "ideal type"; the idea that the artist is by definition the sensitive man who "suffers" experiences. He is "primarily a maker," Mr. Charlesworth insists, "all else is secondary."

Yet this insight, so useful in resisting a Romantic esthetics, so helpful in the work of connecting a general theory of art with the *Poetics*, is made to dominate the author's treatise in a way that ultimately weakens it. In Chapters IV and V Mr. Charlesworth takes up the matter of Imitation in Art and particularly in the Fine Arts, at the same time calling our attention to the fact that the theory of Imitation is "the heart and soul of Aristotle's philosophy of art." Appealing to his original insight on art-as-making, he maintains that the famous dictum "art imitates nature" should be read in this fashion: "the operation of art imitates the opération of nature." In other words, art imitates nature not in the sense of copying or representing the appearance of natural forms but in the sense of bringing-something-to-be after the manner of nature, i. e., causing matter to assume some form or, more specifically in the case of the Fine Arts, *judging* that certain natural things or natural occurrences are "matter potential to a certain artistic form." He insists that the theory of Imitation should be purified of its preoccupation with the object, the artifact as representation. "It is not a question of the work of art imitating natural things but of the artist, in his causative power of making, imitating nature in its causative power of bringing things into existence."

Yet it is precisely here that a general theory of art derived from the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* proves inadequate. When it is a question of an artisan "making" a chair or a hammer, then the imitation of nature is in terms of efficient causality, the action of the maker causing a new accidental form to be united to matter for some useful purpose. When it is a question of a doctor "making" health to be in a patient through medicinal art, the doctor tries to "imitate" the operation of nature from without, strengthening natural operation with medicine, diet, exercise, etc. In neither case is there "imitation" in terms of formal extrinsic causality, except remotely in the case of the hammer which is a kind of extension of the human hand or fist. But when we come to the "making" of a play or a poem or a statue, the dictum "art imitates nature" most assuredly signifies more than the conjunction of a new accidental form with matter through the efficiency of the maker. The theory of imitation in the *Poetics* is centered around the notion of formal extrinsic causality: the work of art as an imitation or representation of human action, passion, character, thought. In this connection Mortimer Adler makes a valuable distinction between the *practical* arts and the *productive* arts. In the former, arts like navigation and medicine, the artist works by *co-operating with nature*, effecting an accidental change in a substance, but a change that could occur naturally, as natural healing powers could restore a body to health without the intervention of the art of healing. The productive arts, on the other hand, such as ship-building, shoemaking, work by *operating on nature*, imposing an artificial form on matter capable of receiving that form. Furthermore, the Fine Arts (as productive arts rather than practical arts)

have a distinct relationship to nature in that the artificial forms they impose on matter imitate natural forms. As Adler concludes: "The practical arts imitate nature in the manner of their operation. The productive arts imitate nature by making objects which are like natural things either in form or function." The mode of imitation proper to the Fine Arts is "to imitate *in form*."

Mr. Charlesworth himself reads Aristotle in just this way. "Aristotle also uses 'imitation' to mean the direct representation of one thing by another thing, and this is the sense in which the word is used, for the most part, in the *Poetics*." He draws the obvious inference from this—that his own theory may be inconsistent with that advanced in the *Poetics*—but resolves the dubium by maintaining that "imitation in the sense of representation presupposes and is subordinate to imitation in the sense in which the causative action of the artist imitates the causative action of nature." But how can the *representative* character of the artifact be subordinate to the *factive* action of the artist when this action is directed precisely toward the making of a representation? The work of art is not merely a *made thing*, the purpose of which is to be made and to be beautiful; it is a *made image or sign* which delights the mind by the skill and harmony with which it signifies. Any work of art above the level of mere decoration is in the genus of imitation or image-sign and is to be judged according to its dignity and efficacy as a signifier. This is Mr. Charlesworth's own conclusion. "It is possible to show that some of the fine arts are better or more noble than others in that the signs which they use are better 'signifiers' than the signs used by others."

What accounts, then, for the continued emphasis in this paper on the operative rather than the representational interpretation of the dictum: "art imitates nature"? For one thing, it seems to derive from an attempt to make use of a general theory of art (any kind of making or causing-to-be) in a way that does not account for the unique character of the Fine Arts (the making of a delightful image-sign). Further, the otherwise perceptive discussion of the artifact as an image-sign does not reveal the analytical deficiency, because the work of signification is made to end when the immaterial story has been signified by the selected material signs in the medium. But the truth is that the immaterial story in the mind is itself a sign, a sign of things: human action, passion, character, thought. And so the material sign (the artifact) is related by way of signification not only to the immaterial story in the mind of the artist but to that story as itself significant of things. As John of St. Thomas puts it: "Because it happens that the intellect forms an idea by receiving something from an object outside itself in order that something may be made from it, the *ratio* of exemplar and idea is sometimes, therefore, attributed also to the *thing ad extra*, and so the blessed Thomas attributes the *ratio* of exemplar both to the form which is in the mind of the artist and to the *extrinsic object* from which he draws that form."

When Aristotle, in the first book of the *Poetics*, speaks of the objects of imitation, he is evidently speaking of the objects outside the maker from which he derives his productive (and imitative) idea.

The fear that imitation in this representational sense would mean a mere "copying" or a "crude mimicry" of reality (and so not "art" at all) need not seriously concern us, for Aristotle never fails to emphasize those elements of artistic construction which take the artifact out of the field of history or photography and into the realm of art and pleasing probability. We need only remember his willingness to admit "the wonderful" in Tragedy (more than that—"the element of the wonderful is *required* in Tragedy") and "the irrational" in Epic poetry. Nor can we forget his classic dictum that the poet imitates "things as they were or are, things as they are said or thought to be, or things as they ought to be."

There is no real ambiguity on this point in the *Poetics* and it is a pity to find so many scholastics forced into some species of conventionalism in order to avoid an interpretation of "imitation" which no sound theory of poetics could maintain. Mr. Charlesworth's conventionalism is a very scholarly sort that begins with a perfectly valid reading of "art imitates nature" as it is found in the context of the *Physics*. In the context of the *Poetics*, however, the dictum is clearly set in the area of formal extrinsic causality and of a final causality *in the cognitive order*. In this context the conventions of plot-making, word-making, song-making are directed toward constructing a new and more intelligible presence for reality in the image-sign, i. e., a new significant presence for human action, passion, character, thought. Everything in the artistic process—the techniques employed in making the secondary judgment as well as the work of story-making in the primary judgment—everything looks to reality in its new significant presence.

"Partly from nature, partly from convention"—this dictum, too, has to be understood. Great art is dominated by nature, that is to say, by reality. The work of the artist is to manifest nature by selecting its most significant and revealing traits and embodying them in an appropriate medium of imitation. The making of a work of art is not primarily the making of a new being—to which "making" every other aspect of the work is subordinate; it is primarily the making of a new image-sign which then serves to make reality present in a new way to the contemplator—and to this function of signifying all else in the work is subordinate. Not the least excellence of Mr. Charlesworth's paper is that its rigorous argumentation brings us very close to the great issue in contemporary esthetics: the proper genus of the artifact. His discussion *around* this center has great relevance and wit; it is merely unfortunate that his admirable knowledge of Aristotle does not permit him to go one step further, one step only, and to give his complete assent to the chief insight of the *Poetics*.

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Order and History. Volume II: *The World of the Polis.* By ERIC VOEGELIN.
Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1958. Pp. 407.
\$6.00.

This book is the second volume of a proposed six volume series, entitled generally, *Order and History*, and given the specific divisions of *Israel and Revelation*, *the World of the Polis*, *Plato and Aristotle*, *Empire and Christianity*, *The Protestant Centuries*, and *The Crises of Western Civilizations*. Since the present reviewer has read neither volume one nor volume three, he might be at a serious disadvantage in discussing volume two. Presumably volume one might have enabled him to gain a more adequate grasp of the basic theme or scheme underlying Professor Voegelin's gigantic and erudite *Order and History*. But even if the present volume were seen in relation to its predecessor and planned successors, *The World of the Polis* would still remain in part a bewildering and even annoying book. It is bewildering because it encompasses a vast range of controversial detail; and it is annoying not only because of its (planned?) omissions or distortions, but also because the reader cannot always be sure of the author's real intention, unless it be the unwarranted and uncompromising exaltation of "order" above all else.

In his introductory observations—Mankind and History—which are somewhat under the spell of Toynbee's (as well as Spengler's and Hegel's) scheme of history or "historicism," Professor Voegelin insists that "the struggle for the truth of order is the very circumstance of history." (p. 2) Aside from its obscure meaning, this statement in its dogmatic-doctrinaire content is open to challenge. The reviewer also has some difficulty in understanding Voegelin's "leap in being"—a term with which the author seems to be enamored—and especially in grasping the significance of "[t]he initial leap in being, the break with the order of the myth." (pp. 3 ff.) The elaborations of this "leap in being," which allegedly constitutes the "break with the order of myth," appear to be somewhat labored without, however, succeeding in clarifying its significance. One may raise the question here whether in the continuity of the various "leaps in being" every subsequent "leap" is not a "break with a myth." If this be so, then everything preceding the "latest leap" would be "myth": the "old order" would always be "myth," and the new order always "truth," but "truth" destined to suffer the fate of being relegated to the realm of "myths" as soon as a newer "order" has been achieved by some "new leap."

Voegelin's discussion of the transition "from myth to philosophy" (pp. 111-240) is simply confusing. During its various stages, Greek philosophy, in the main, was a combination of two opposite theories about the sources of human knowledge: the senses and what may be called a "projection" of the mind "outside" the body and "beyond the senses." This

"projection" is something like an "apprehension" of that type of "wisdom" or "truth" which can never be attained through the medium of the senses alone. The pioneering work of the "sense perceptionalists" presumably was done by the "School of Cos" (Hippocrates and his disciples). As a matter of fact, it could be argued that this School of Cos marks the real beginning of the "scientific method" and, hence, the break-away from "myth." However, the problem is not that simple. Plato, for instance, did not seek the basis for science or knowledge in the sensible world. (In Plato's time not one of the present-day specialized sciences, such as physics, chemistry, astronomy, etc., had any "scientific" status or even any existence.) Hence, it cannot have been the purpose of his theory of Ideas to provide science with a "methodology." Plato was, in the first instance, attempting to give an account of that knowledge which in his opinion must direct the conduct of human life. It was thus that his theory of Ideas grew into a doctrine of the "intelligible nature of things," consciously opposed to "materialism." How, then, can man attain to the proper knowledge of the "good" or the "true," especially since, according to the Platonic *Meno*, knowledge of this kind can never be accounted for by sense experience? ("Goodness" belongs to a "super-sensible world," accessible to our intelligence but not to our senses.) Plato argues that such knowledge must come out of the mind itself. In other words, the mind is raised into consciousness by some processes analogous to that procedure whereby we recall certain objects with which we have formerly been acquainted, but have forgotten. This is the basis of the Platonic doctrine that "learning" is essentially "recollection" (*anamnesis*). But such "recollection" is a power also ascribed to "men and women wise in divine matters," that is, to prophets, seers and hierophants, as well as to the inspired poets of old. It is, so to speak, a kind of "projection" of the mind which provides for a type of knowledge inaccessible to the senses. (As a matter of fact, according to Plato the senses are frequently a hindrance to true thought.) The soul that loves wisdom takes flight from all fellowship with the senses (and the body). This flight or, perhaps, "withdrawal" is also "purification of the soul" (of which Empodocles wrote so eloquently), followed by a vision of truth. In the further elaboration of this argument Plato insists that the good statesmen are guided not by some kind of knowledge or wisdom (*φρόνησις*), but by a sort of inspiration—the inspiration of the prophets, seers or poets, who in their rapt condition say many true things, but do not really know what they mean. These statesmen have no intelligence (*νοῦς*), but are possessed by divine inspiration. They are acting on true beliefs which arise in their minds, but have not been coordinated and justified by reflection of the reason.

What Plato advances here is essentially a sophisticated version of the "mystical" foundation of all true knowledge through "projection" beyond the sensible world. The mystagogues, hierophants, "wise men," seers or

poets, no less than, the "philosophers" of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. had felt no doubts about their "apprehension" of absolute truth. Lucretius, for instance, is quite correct when centuries later he compared the utterances of pre-Socratic philosophers to the oracles of Apollo, or when he saw in the statements of Empedocles the voice of an inspired genius. (Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, I. 731 ff.) This analogy of the "philosopher" with the inspired prophet or poet also seems to apply to Plato. According to Democritus the gods and the *σοφοί* have an extra sense, over and above the five ordinary senses. (Aetius 4.10.4) But traditionally the *σοφοί* include poets, seers and philosophers. Σοφὸς is the inspired seer, the "raving" poet and the thinker endowed with philosophical intuition. All this should indicate that originally the prophet (seer), poet and philosopher were one and the same person. Hence, the "tradition" from myth to philosophy is by no means as clear-cut an "event" as Voegelin would have us believe. The innermost core of so late a philosophy as that of Plato is still myth; it is wisdom "projected" beyond the senses. Such "projection" can assume a great variety of forms: divine inspiration, revelation, direct conversation with the gods, etc. The Platonic *anamnesis* is but a sophisticated form of "projection," as is, for instance, the "contemplation of the heavens" by the Platonic statesmen. Hence, in contradistinction to Voegelin's theory, we must conclude that Plato merely rejects the older myths concerning the acquisition of true knowledge with a myth of his own: the *anamnesis*.

The author states that "the Hesiodian poems [present] . . . certain difficulties. At first reading they seem to be neither well constructed stories nor closely-knit phases of reasoning, but rather loosely jointed sequences of myths, fables, philosophical excursions, apocalyptic visions. . . ." (p. 131) Then the author observes that "[t]he history of the *Theogony* is a cardinal problem in the philosophy of history and order." (p. 132) Voegelin completely overlooks here the fact that Hesiod's *Theogony*, which is really a "*Hymn to Zeus*" prefaced by a relatively short cosmogony, is strongly dependent upon the much older Babylonian (or perhaps Sumerian) *Hymn to Marduk* (*Enuma elīs*). There naturally exist some discrepancies between the Hesiodian and the Babylonian *Hymn*, but these discrepancies are less important than the obvious, not to say compelling, similarities, and even less significant than might be expected if one realizes that the Babylonian *Hymn* reached Hesiod probably in fragmentary form through several intermediaries and wholly detached from the original symbolic ritual which gave it coherence as well as meaning. The preserved form of the *Hymn to Marduk* is only one of the many versions of this particular Babylonian myth and, incidentally, a fairly late version of a still earlier Sumerian version. The recent discovery of the Hittite-Hurrian *Epic of Kumarbi*, which is really nothing more than a Hittite-Hurrian version of the earlier Babylonian-Sumerian *Hymn to Marduk*, seems to provide the

much needed link between the original Babylonian-Sumerian myth and the Hesiodian adaptation. Minoan or perhaps Mycaenean travelers or traders, who, as we know today, were in frequent contact with the Hittites at Ugarit and later at al-Mina, probably carried the Hittite-Hurrian version of the Babylonian-Sumerian *Hymn to Marduk* to Crete (where it went through a "Minoan phase," as indeed the Cretan legend of the birth of Zeus or the Paliokastro *Hymn to the Greatest Lord* seems to suggest), and from Crete to the Greek mainland where it became the model for Hesiod's *Theogony* or *Hymn to Zeus*. In the light of these established facts many of Voegelin's statements concerning the meaning and origin of Hesiod's *Theogony* are irrelevant and even misleading.

Likewise obscure and somewhat incomplete are Voegelin's discourses on the Greek meaning of history. The early accounts of historic deeds made in the language of the poets according to tradition were a sort of "madness" induced by the Muses which aroused the soul to ecstasy in song and poetry, marshalling the countless deeds of heroes of old for the instruction of posterity. In "historical poetry" the vision of the Muses is turned to the past and not, as in the case of prophetic inspiration, to the sources of present calamities or, perhaps, to the future. The Muses, it should be remembered, are the daughters of Memory. With this in mind the poet of the *Catalogue of Ships* (Homer, *Iliad* 2. 484 ff.) calls on the Muses in their Olympian abode to "put him in mind" of all who sailed for Troy. For the Muses "are goddesses, and are present and know all things, while we only hear the report of fame and know nothing." As a man among men the early poet-historian knows nothing, and, hence, has to rely on hearsay. But as a divinely inspired person, he has access to the knowledge of eye-witnesses—the Muses—who were present when the feats were performed which the poet-historian illustrates. Hesiod, for instance, begins with the Muses who tell of things present, past and future. (*Theogony*, 31; 38) But these are also the words by which Homer describes the mantic gifts of the seer Calchas. (*Iliad*, 1. 69) Hence, it is no mere poetic ornament when Homer begins his epic poems with an invocation of the Muses: the poet-historian calls upon his traditional "authorities" or "sources of information." Homer no less than Hesiod is deadly serious when he implores the Muses to tell him what he, as an ordinary mortal, could not possibly know. He feels like Ion, the rhapsode in Plato's *Ion*, (534C ff.; 535B) who thought that "his soul, wrapt out of himself by inspiration," was present at the events in Troy or Ithica. Homer and Hesiod would fully have accepted the story of inspiration which Socrates suggests to Ion: "The god deprives men of their sober senses and uses them as instruments, like singers of oracles and inspired seers, in order that we who hear them may know that it is not they who speak things of such high worth, but the god himself who speaks to us through them." This, then, is the original meaning of "historical knowledge" during the early Greek period, a meaning which

seems to have escaped the author. Here, as elsewhere, Voegelin, in order to support his sweeping thesis about "order and history," greatly oversimplifies the problem.

Voegelin maintains (p. 171 ff.) that Xenophanes attacked the myths of old, and that his attack "was directed, not against poetry . . . , but against the form of the myth as an obstacle to the adequate understanding of the order of the soul." Xenophanes, to be sure, rejected a purely anthropomorphic presentation of the gods, (Aristotle, *Rheticus* 1399 b 6) complaining that Homer and Hesiod had attributed to the gods actions and characteristics which even man regarded as shameful. What, then, are the attributes of the one god or the one "divine universe" which Xenophanes puts in the place of the Homeric pantheon? Xenophanes maintains that his god is eternal, one, everywhere alike, limited, spherical in shape, and capable of perception in every one of its parts. (*Hippolytus, Refutatio* 1. 14. 2) In other words, the world is a living being, divine and endowed with consciousness; it is a finite body animated by a soul coextensive with it. Since this eternal god is also the world, there can be no room for a cosmogony or theogony. But because Xenophanes attacks the Homeric gods for their immorality and unreasonableness, it does not follow that his "divine world" or single cosmic god is moral or even reasonable. What Voegelin fails to perceive is the fact that the god of Xenophanes, which does not differ much from the world-stuff of the Milesians, is not an object of religious worship or cult. Xenophanes merely wishes to convey the notion that the world is alive, and that life implies some kind of awareness as well as some power of motion. Thus, when he condemns the myths of Homer and Hesiod he merely rejects a particular type of myth by setting up his own claim to some visionary but equally mythological insights which happen to be in opposition to theirs.

Voegelin apparently does not grasp the true significance of the "Prologue" in Parmenides' *Way of Truth*, which contains a profession that the whole of his didactic poem is actually a revelation accorded to him by an unnamed goddess. Parmenides travels on a chariot, attended by companions, the "daughters of the sun." He is on the way to the deity which guides (or instructs?) the man who knows, and leads him away from the beaten track of ordinary man. Beyond the gates of Night and Day he meets the goddess who is willing to instruct him. This introductory "episode" contains a theme of great antiquity reaching far beyond the penumbra of recorded history: Abaris, Salmoxis, Orphaeus, Epimenides, Aristea, no less than Democritus, according to tradition, were miraculously transported from one place to another. The same feat allegedly was repeated by the great Mongol *shaman* of the times of Jenghiz Khan, who is said to have ascended to heaven on his steed. Such journeys were frequently undertaken to consult a deity. Even in our own time the Siberian *shaman* still claims that he undertakes spiritual journeys to the gods. He rides on a black bird, a

goose or a horse attended by one or several companions who assist him in his long and perilous travels. When he reaches his goal, namely, the seat of the deity, he receives some "revelations" which upon his return he communicates to his followers. But this is exactly the "journey" of Parmenides: it does not, as Voegelin maintains, (p. 205) stem from the Orphism or Pythagoreanism of the sixth century, but is the restatement of a theme quite common among Eurasian peoples.

Equally misleading at times are some of Voegelin's statements concerning Heraclitus of Ephesus. Judging from the content of the preserved fragments ascribed to Heraclitus, it should soon become apparent that he, who like the sybil "with raving mouth utters things mirthless," (Frag. 92) considers himself to be primarily an inspired hierophant. Hence, one may also question the author's assertion that "[t]he line that is running from Anaximander to Heraclitus is unmistakable." (p. 234) The first prerequisite for a more accurate understanding of such men as Xenophanes, Parmenides, or Heraclitus is the realization that they speak as prophets-poets-philosophers who do not, and cannot, accept the modern gulf between religion, poetry and philosophy (or "true wisdom"). Their true spiritual ancestors are not perchance the "Milesian physicists" or perhaps the relatively late Homer, Hesiod or Pindar—the "philosophers of nature" or the "poets of entertainment" elicit from them only words of scorn—but are Orpheus, Musaeus, Melampus, Abaris and Salmoxis, the prehistoric representatives of the original prototype of the prophet-poet-sage combination that seems to live on in the Asiatic or Siberian *shaman*.

Voegelin, in a way, eschews the startling—at least to modern man—but nevertheless basis dichotomy of Themis and Dike. The notion that "order" is of divine origin seems to have been deeply ingrained in the Helladic as well as Hellenic mind. It was still repeated, for instance, by Plato: Zeus gave men and men alone the Dike which prevents them from destroying one another through "disorder." (Plato, *Protagoras* 322A ff.) Naturally, this Platonic "myth," recounted in the *Protagoras*, is of a relatively late date, but its original idea goes back beyond recorded history. The Olympian Zeus, as the guardian of a specific order, is a relative late-comer in the Greek pantheon. Zeus worship, it should also be borne in mind, among other things suggests that the primeval matriarchal kinship orders or organizations had partially been superseded by new "political" or "polis" orders. Zeus Poleos, the "new political deity," in a way is the guarantor of a new societal order which apparently came with the institution of the Polis. But the old myths no less than the relatively late Homeric epics or the even later great tragedies of fifth century Greece also refer to a pre-Olympian order, an ancient and sacred order which was observed long before Zeus and the Olympian gods had been accepted. This more ancient order is "Themis." But Themis is not merely a pre-Olympian concept of order; it is also a personal goddess or, better, a

Titanic deity, a sort of "cosmic force" which watches over what is "right." Themis, also called Aisa, Metis or Mnemosyne, is at the same time Moira or Fate, and, incidentally, personifies the belief in a pre-ordained and inextricable destiny. The newer Olympian or Zeus religion both adopted and adapted the Themis-idea. But despite this assimilation, a conflict between Themis-order and Zeus-order developed. Perhaps the classical example of this conflict can be seen in the Orestes tragedy of Aeschylus where finally the Zeus (Polis)-order triumphs through the intermediary or intercession of "Polis-institutions." Zeus, the new male god who also represents the principle of the patriarchate, is the lord of the Polis and of the "new order"; Themis, the female symbol of matriarchate, remains the governing notion of order in the older kin society.

Like the Themis, the Dike is both a "principle" and a personal goddess who watches over "justice," or, better, sees to it that "order" is observed. This Dike is one of the newer or Olympian deities: she is often called the daughter of Zeus and Themis and as such she gradually replaces but never fully eliminates her "mother," Themis. The Dike insists that everyone, including the Themis, receives his or her due. (The notion of giving everyone his due was subsequently taken over by the Stoics and ultimately incorporated into the Justinian *Corpus: suum cuique tribuere*.) She also enforces what either Zeus or Themis has ordained. Thus it is quite possible that Dike might conflict with Dike, or for Dike to become the perdition of what otherwise seems to be an "innocent" or even "righteous" person. This is brought out eloquently in Sophocles' *Antigone*: Antigone observes the Themis-order when she buries her brother, Polyneices. In doing so she "does Dike" from the point of view of the Themis or the Themis-order, but at the same time she defies the Zeus-Dike or Polis-Dike represented by King Creon. In this instance the Titanic Themis-Dike collides with the Olympian Zeus-Dike. In this conflict, which is actually the "result" of two clashing "orders," Antigone, who is but the tragic pawn of mightier forces, is crushed—a fate to which she submits without flinching. Creon, on the other hand, is by no means a "villain" or, perhaps, the representative of a vicious or immoral "positive law," while Antigone upholds an alleged "natural law." Creon, too, "does Dike," namely, Zeus-Dike, which in this case insists that, like any patricide, no citizen who had turned against his native Polis may honorably be buried. Greek polytheism, especially the "dualism" of Themis-Dike and Zeus-Dike, not only permits but actually necessitates "disorder" in that it makes possible opposing or irreconcilable forms of Dike. This conflict, incomprehensible to the Christian mind, is at the basis of many Greek tragedies. In the final analysis, the truly tragic element, therefore, is to be found in the "disorder of Dikai." Somehow, in the opinion of the present reviewer, Professor Voegelin fails to make this fully clear. He apparently prefers to dwell upon a host of interesting but somehow irrelevant illustrative details (pp. 243-266) rather than to deal

with this fundamental problem, which, incidentally, would have lent some indirect support to his major thesis.

Barring a few short references, Voegelin does not concern himself too much with fifth century Greek speculations about law and the "positive legal order," although "law," it may be presumed, is a much more tangible and certainly a more effective instrumentality of "order" or of achieving "order" than perhaps philosophical or politico-social theory. Like so many political theorists or philosophers, he seems to have a congenital aversion to paying any attention to the "law in action" which, perhaps from the lofty position of his philosophy of history, is too pedestrian a subject to merit consideration. On the other hand, the author seems to be acquainted with some of the lego-philosophical or jurisprudential notions that were advanced by certain Greek philosophers or "sophists." Nevertheless, he apparently does no more here than ransack at random Diels-Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, in order to find illustrations for his main thesis. Protagoras had already announced that mutual protection and preservation of man constitute the first principle of every *social order*. In keeping with this premise he insisted that the two terms, justice or injustice, "have no existence of their own, but their truth rests on agreement and is valid only as long as the agreement lasts." (Plato, *Theaetetus* 172B) Protagoras' suggestion that in the struggle of life the various individuals, through reciprocal agreements, should enter and actually do enter into permanent associations or "orders" for their convenience and preservation, (cf. Plato, *Protagoras* 322A ff.) is definitely in line with that type of Greek lego-philosophical (or political) thought which came much to the fore during the latter part of the fifth century B. C. The role of the social order is actually limited to the safeguarding of certain individual interests. Not perhaps an innate "social urge," "the social nature" of man, or, as in Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, the assumption that only in and through "order" (or the Polis) man may achieve a truly moral stature, but simply man's inability to defend, secure or enjoy his individual interests "induces" man to form "associations" or "forms of order" which are merely "associations of convenience." Hence, "order" is the result of distress, rather than the product of an inherent "law of history" or perhaps that of a "moral urge." But while man's *entrance* into associations with others is necessitated by the actual need of protecting and promoting the essentially selfish interests of individual man, the successful *maintenance* of such associations and, hence, the guarantee of a continued full assertion of man's individual interests, require certain social or political "virtues." Protagoras' attempt to balance the selfish interests or instincts of individual man and the "social" interests of societal man marks the beginning of a social or legal philosophy of great and lasting importance. By superimposing a "collectivist" sense of social justice and social restraint on the primary egotistical aspirations of individual man, Protagoras initiated a

definite trend of socio-political thought characteristic of an essentially democratic form of life. The *όμοροια* of Antiphon, for instance, is basically but an elaboration of this theme: the active support of law and justice and, hence, of "solidarity" even in an "open society" by one's personal conduct is not only the very factor on which any well-functioning society depends for its existence and flowering, but also that fundamental attitude which promotes, more than anything else, individual prosperity as well as the personal interests of every man. The most pernicious foe of individual man and his personal well-being is the *ἀνομία*; and the greatest danger threatening man is an individual seeking advantages at the expense of all others. Thus *Anonymous Jamblichī* 7.14 concedes in a Benthamian flair that the greatest happiness to the greatest number must be achieved by society through *economics*. Nevertheless, society or "order" does not in itself constitute the ultimate goal of social behavior. For even social behavior or "social adjustment," in the final analysis, is merely a means to promote more tellingly the personal interests of the various individuals who in their sum total make up "society." Any "a-social" conduct is not so much to be condemned because it endangers "society," but because it may become the source of danger or discomfort to the perpetrator insofar as he will, sooner or later, have to face an outraged majority against which he will prove to be powerless. (6.1 ff) Similar ideas can be detected in the writings of Democritus when he maintains that the "laws do not object to anyone living in accordance with his personal or natural inclinations or fancies, as long as no one injures another, because selfishness (or greed) are the source of all civil discord." Aside from the fact that this is but another way of advancing the notion that the *όμοροια* constitutes the basis of every successful social order, Democritus does not acknowledge any autonomous social or trans-personal ends or interests of society above the particular interests of individual man. The "social order" or, perhaps better, the true "legal order," merely guarantees the individual a more dignified life as an individual, without, however, creating a "trans-personal order." Order, then, is the result of man's intelligence seeking after what is useful and beneficial to him; and this instinctive striving after what is useful and beneficial to man as an individual constitutes the key-note of Democritus' social or *lego-political* theory. The *όμοροια*, a term which he might have borrowed from Protagoras (or perhaps from the author of *Anonymous Jamblichī*, provided the latter could be dated around the year 425 B. C.), on the other hand, is but that pragmatic notion which teaches man that "social behavior" based on mutual agreement more than anything else guarantees the fullest attainment of man's eternal quest of things useful to him.

Perhaps the most concise early formulation of this individualistic notion of society can be found in Aristotle's report of Lycophron's statement that "the law is . . . a reciprocal assurance (or guarantee) of what is just."

(Aristotle, *Politics* 1280 b.11.) In Lycophron the relationship of law (*vómos*) to "what is just" (*τὰ δίκαια*) is actually based on the primacy of "what is just" or, as we would say today, on the primacy of individual rights or interests. The *vómos* merely guarantees these rights; it is an instrument to secure these individual rights, and does so on the basis of mutual agreement or consent. In this fashion Lycophron stresses the fact that the real function of law or of the "legal order" consists in the reciprocity or correlativity of the various rights and duties enjoyed by or imposed on different individuals through reciprocal agreements. This more progressive notion about law and its social function, which is at the basis of any "open democratic society," is a far cry from Voegelin's philosophical conception of "order" which, in the final analysis, is a thoroughly "closed order." It is, one may suggest here, an attempt to establish the greatest possible harmony through intelligent "adjustment" within the greatest possible dynamic diversity of individual interests and aspirations.

The main difficulty with Professor Voegelin's book, at least in the opinion of the present reviewer, is simply this: The author starts out with a preconceived "philosophy of history" (pp. 2, 7)—with a rigid ideological frame of abstract reference obviously devised without too much concern over historical fact—and then ransacks (not always successfully) a number of historical sources in order to substantiate or illustrate his initial thesis or hypothesis. Such a procedure, needless to say, is open to serious challenge. Of necessity, important materials or facts of detail, and even larger contexts, are at times distorted, misinterpreted or simply ignored. Although on the whole Voegelin's is without doubt an important book, in the final analysis it merely proves that, despite the author's erudite efforts, an essentially Hegelian approach to history can no longer satisfy the critical scholar. Professor Voegelin will probably reject the reviewer's objections with the remark that "even a defective construction which had at least a grip on the problem [presumably the author has this 'grip on the problem,' *note by the reviewer*], was better than the dilettante smartness of phenomenal argument." (p. 15) The present reviewer, however, emphatically denies the truth of this broad statement, and this for the obvious reason that it might easily lend itself to an eminent degree to proselytizing, propaganda, and ultimately to the distortion and even suppression of all truth. Concomitantly, the abstract obsession with "order" for its own alleged "truth value," especially if divorced from other important factors or "values," or if given an unwarranted preferred position, might lead to the total abolition not only of human freedom but of human dignity as well for the sake of "order." Let us remember here that it was one of the greatest "prophets" of the "supremacy of order," namely, Plato who stated: "The greatest principle of all is that nobody, whether male or female, should be without a leader. Nor should the mind of anybody be habituated to letting him do anything at all on his own initiative; neither out of zeal, nor even

playfully. But in war as well as in the midst of peace he shall look to his leader and follow him faithfully. And even in the smallest matter he should be under this leadership. For example, he should get up, or move, or wash, or take his meals . . . only if he has been told to do so. . . . In a word, he should teach his soul, by long habit, never to dream of acting independently, and, in fact, should become utterly incapable of such independent action." (*Laws* 942A ff., cf. 739C ff.)

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The Transformations of Man. By LEWIS MUMFORD. Volume Seven of *World Perspectives*, planned and edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. Pp. 249. \$3.50.

The series *World Perspectives*, of which this is one volume, is intended to gain insight into the meaning of man, who, in the words of Ruth Nanda Anshen, "not only is determined by history but who also determines history," "to help quicken the 'unshaken heart of well-rounded truth' and interpret the significant elements of the World Age now taking shape out of the core of that undimmed continuity of the creative process which restores man to mankind while deepening and enhancing his communion with the universe." (xii, xviii)

After noting that "almost every people has fashioned a myth about its origin, nature and destiny," Lewis Mumford purposed "to fashion a myth that will be more in keeping with the science of our time, yet more ready to venture into factual quicksand than the scientist, if true to his prudent code, can let himself be." (p. 1) He states that we no longer ask for some dramatic moment of creation that calls for an external and all-powerful creator, that man seems to have descended from a group of apelike primates that lived in trees, and that the undifferentiated material for symbols and fabrications which constitute thought rises out of man's "not waiting for any external challenge, but prompted by his own maturation." (p. 3) After describing what he considers the evolution of the human from the animal, Mumford warns that sophisticated modern man is in danger of succumbing to a degradation that primitive man must have learned, after many lapses, to guard against: "the threat of losing his own humanity by giving precedence to his animal self and his nonhuman characteristics over the social ego and the ideal superego that have transmuted this original inheritance." (p. 22)

To implement the myth calculated to guard against modern man's loss of humanity, the author traces the evolution of humanity in terms of the

"archaic man," "civilized man," "axial man," "Old World man," and "New World man," which presently exists; then he sketches the nature of "post-historic man" and the prospects of a world culture.

Archaic man took form in the neolithic village; his communal life is earthbound, with the family the social nucleus. Custom and law, education and work, government and morality are all part of a carefully ordered collective ritual that punctuates not merely man's works and days, but the stages of life; the very restrictions of this environment increased man's sense of adequacy. The archaic tradition, Mumford avers, has maintained its hold, with varying degrees of tenacity, in every part of the world right down to our own time, "least perhaps in North America, and most, it seems likely, in India and China." (p. 39)

At a late moment in man's emergence, "an audacious minority, in a handful of specially situated communities, made a daring thrust in a new direction: the experiment of civilization." (p. 42) Again stating "we must fashion a myth to make the whole process a little more intelligible," (*ibid.*) the author shows how civilization brought a new kind of unity based on division and specialization, a new uniformity imposed by deliberate repression, a new agreement that sprang out of a partial reconciliation of opposites. "For civilization brought about the equation of human life with property and power; indeed property and power became more dear than life"; (p. 46) the other transformation of civilized man "moved precisely in the opposite direction: toward the elevation of a unique personality, possessing powers uncircumscribed by the usages of society." (p. 49)

Since civilized man, if more law-abiding, is likewise more calculating, if more skillful and intelligent also more selfish, a further transformation was necessary. This was brought about by the axial religions which redefined the human personality. "The axial prophet both remakes the concept of God and remints the human image. The personal takes precedence over the social." (p. 74) A new self, purified from the close attachment to man's animal nature, emerges. Axial religions appeal to those who are disoriented or depressed by the hollowness of civilization's achievements to effect also an emancipation from social attachments. "Through axial man there rise to consciousness perceptions, feelings and aspirations, of a transcendent order, probably long buried in the unconscious." (p. 79) Mumford contends that axial religion, including Christianity, by treating the soul alone, failed to do justice to man's whole nature; furthermore, the new Church leaders "brought back into the heart of their religion, in an effort to ensure its survival, the very elements from which they had sought sudden deliverance: the routines of civilization." (p. 96) Here the author repeats his fascinating theory of ideas and institutions in four stages: Formulation, Incarnation, Incorporation, and Embodiment. He sees in the Church of Rome the "oldest effective transnational political organization so far recorded," only to note that the very superiority of the axial self produced

a new danger: "axial man took on the vices of the civilization he had become so adept at controlling and extending, and in that very triumph forfeited axial culture's chief reason for existence." (p. 101)

Old World man possesses a culture comprised of the three layers: archaic, civilized and axial. The core of Old World culture was dedication to the gods. "The discovery of the gods, the increasing clarification of these possessive images, with their commanding visions of perfection, was perhaps the central contribution of Old World culture." (p. 117) Civilization in itself, Old World man maintained, was not good enough to justify the sacrifices it exacts: there must be a "beyond." "That beyond was presented by religion as Heaven: at first only an image and a myth that carried no viable promise of realization, except in so far as its illusory presence made itself felt in every daily act." (p. 120)

The first radical breakthrough in this culture was achieved by New World culture, which "has already displaced the archaic and axial components of Old World culture as ruthlessly as the cities of the ancient river civilizations displaced the village culture of the neolithic period." (p. 122) By New World culture Mumford refers to two radically different ideologies, the "romantic" and the "mechanical." The first accompanied a general resurgence of vitality and sexuality in Europe; the second traded vitality for power. The New World was a product of rationalism, utilitarianism, scientific positivism; subjectivity and teleology had no place in this new framework of ideas; organization, standardization, regularity, control applied to every manifestation of life. "Knowledge no longer merely served power; it produced power." (p. 129) Wherever it penetrated, it created an environment which was dehumanized, depersonalized, mechanically ordered, uniform. Two traits which account for the continuous expansion and ascendancy of New World man, and which are a necessary contribution to the next phase of human development are: 1) the concept of human equality, not as a promise for the axial afterworld, but as a necessary demand of justice in every earthly society; 2) a fuller dedication to the future.

Summing up the New World transformation, the author holds that its technics brought the human race for the first time into a working unity, a common law and order and often a common language; and it awakened a new confidence in human powers. However, "this New World was only a half-world, for the subjective side of the personality was not represented, or rather, only so much admitted as entered into the processes of systematic reasoning, experimental observation, mathematical symbolism, and technical invention."

Mankind, Mumford avers, now lives under the threat of self-destruction, facing the dark future of "post-historic man." Should New World tendencies not be halted, post-historic man's existence will be focused on the external world and its incessant manipulation; both man's aboriginal

propensities and his historic self will be finally eliminated as "unthinkable." "The post-historic process began innocently by eliminating fallible human impulses from science: it will end by eliminating human nature itself from the whole world of reality." (p. 160)

Lest the reader be engulfed in a wave of pessimism, the author confides that post-historic man is a theoretic possibility, not a historic probability. "*Let us make one basic assumption:* the destiny of mankind, after its long preparatory period of separation and differentiation, is at last to become one." (p. 184) But no part of the past can enter "world culture" in the form that it took independently in an earlier situation; all man's past knowledge seems petty and his best achievements circumscribed, compared to the world that now opens up.

The transformation will involve a leap from one plane to another, a true emergent whose results cannot be predicted. The immediate object of world culture is to break through the premature closures, the corrosive conflicts, and the cyclical frustrations of history. "If 'Be yourself,' is nature's first injunction to man, 'Transform yourself,' seems, at least up to now, to be her final imperative." (p. 222) The sciences will have to overcome the naive bias against teleology if they are to be at the service of man's further transformation. Anent finality, Mumford states that theological dogma, which presumed to know the mind of God and the ultimate destination of man, on the basis of "revelation," had (by the seventeenth century) discredited itself by its very presumption." (p. 233) The philosophy of the person is "the polarizing idea that will presently radiate into every department of thought." (p. 237) "In his very completeness, One World man will seem ideologically and culturally naked, almost unidentifiable. He will be like the Jain saints of old, 'clothed in space,' his nakedness a sign that he does not belong exclusively to any nation, group, trade, sect, school, or community. . . . Everything that he does or feels or makes will bear the imprint of the larger self he has made his own." (p. 248)

Those who have kept in touch with Mumford's writings will recognize many familiar themes in this work. It has been his particular penchant to survey huge eras of history, to note what he considers the underlying principle or ethos of these periods and to weave the resultant elements into a pattern which generally recommends cutting away from the past (albeit preserving some of its gains), eschewing the rationalistic, mechanistic and depersonalized culture of the present, and by a transformation of universal proportions enter into a new world in which the person will be supreme, the machine properly subservient, and a natural felicity achieved through the ideals of wholeness and love.

The author's use of the word "myth" in this book is not perhaps related to the above theory. That the "myth" is more a product of Mumford's imagination than the *élan* of the respective cultures he studies

seems indicated by his too facile handling of historical periods. Much as we may need more theoretic analysis and penetrating insights to counteract the sterility of scientism, sweeping generalizations such as abound in this volume hardly seem the answer. This is not to deny the value of Mumford's heartening emphasis on the recapture of human personality, his critique of the deadening effects of mechanization and institutionalization, and the dangers of science without a soul. The facile rejection, apparently, of a definite creative act of God, the insufficiently qualified acceptance of evolutionary theory, a negative concept of grace, the peremptory dismissal of theology and institutionalized Catholicism as civilizing agents, among other positions, becloud and weaken the brilliant insights which one often finds in Mumford's writings. His more realistic observations on the stages of civilization would have everything to gain from a literary setting which exemplified clarity of concepts, adequate documentation, and reasoning unencumbered by specious assumptions, ultra-Freudian and otherwise.

A number of years ago the writer, in reviewing Mumford's *The Condition of Man* (*The Thomist* VII, July 1944, pp. 544-552), called attention to his concept of progress phrased in the words "we must create a new super-ego." In correspondence which followed upon this review, Mr. Mumford promised that a subsequent work would present a more conclusive statement of orientation for modern man. It is not at all evident, from his subsequent *The Conduct of Life* and this book at least, that he has moved much closer to a solution of the problem.

It is reprehensible enough for an author to quote himself, and perhaps worse for a reviewer to quote an earlier review. Yet the wish is again expressed, as in the comments on *The Condition of Man*, that Mr. Mumford, for whom this reviewer holds a special affection, "will find the true super-ego, not a Freudian projection which man creates, but God, Who created man." Should this eventuate, his subsequent books will be his best—and most lasting.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Exposition of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. By ST. THOMAS AQUINAS.

Translated by Pierre Conway, O. P., revised by William H. Kane, O. P.

Quebec: Librairie Philosophique M. Doyon, 1956. Pp. 465. \$6.00.

This competent and complete translation from the Latin of Aquinas' commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* is done in mimeograph form, and comprises, in order, a historical note, a translator's note, table of contents and outline, the prologue and exposition or commentary proper—forty-four lectures on Book I and twenty lectures on Book II, and an index of terms. The translation is based on the Leonine text of St. Thomas. Though the Leonine also gives the text of Aristotle, divided into sections appearing at the head of the corresponding lectures of Aquinas, this practice has not been followed by Father Conway. No doubt practical considerations necessitated its omission. But if, in the spirit of the close translation of the commentary, a similar rendering of the Latin of Aristotle on which St. Thomas was directly working could be provided, perhaps in a future printed edition, the general utility of the volume would be greatly enhanced, as in the Yale translation of the text and commentary on the *De Anima*. But in lieu of this, numerical references to the text of Aristotle are given throughout, and St. Thomas' brief lead-in quotations from Aristotle are given in the Oxford version. The format and job of typing are good and clear, except that the hyphen at the margin, to show that a word has been divided, is sometimes invisible. It is a pity that such a generally competent translation of a work so important should not have the benefit of a regular printing.

The historical note serves to bring out that importance. St. Thomas wrote his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* around 1269, when he was about forty-four, at the height of his matured faculties as theologian and philosopher, and during the most critical intellectual struggle of his career, his contest with latin Averroism. During these central years at Paris he was, as theologian, writing his chief *Summa*, facing the dark problem of evil in Job, and the mysterious light of the Word Incarnate in John; simultaneously, as philosopher, he was composing his greatest commentaries on the Stagyrite, on the *De Anima*, the *Metaphysics*, etc., including this one on the *Posterior Analytics*. In less philosophical times and places than Paris in the mid-thirteenth century and against adversaries less keenly trained than the Averroists, the inferior and more popular modes of communication, dialectic, rhetoric, poetic (discussed by St. Thomas in the prologue to this work, as well as in his prologue to the commentary on

the *Peri Hermeneias*) might avail and might attract more study and commentary. But, for those who know or who wish to know, the *Posterior Analytics* is the central work on scientific knowledge and demonstrative communication. Today, though philosophy be popularly the work of dialecticians, rhetoricians, misplaced poets, not to mention power-conscious sophists, there is also a gradual resurgence of competent, non-Christian, scientific philosophy of Greek inspiration, more diffuse, but in quality such as was concentrated at Paris in mid-thirteenth century. One might call it a neo-Averroism, and its main task is to "rescue" Plato and especially Aristotle from their Christian, Augustinian or Thomistic interpretations, first of all in practical areas such as the question of natural right, but eventually in theory itself. Thus not only among Thomists proper, but for all Aristotelians of whatever stamp, the present appearance in English of this commentary on the theory of science and demonstration is of timely significance for genuinely philosophical communication.

Father Conway's historical note confines itself to locating St. Thomas' commentary in the context of his life. Since this *Exposition* by St. Thomas is, after all, a commentary on another great work, something could have been said about the latter. The translator here, as in several other respects, seems to take the view that he is addressing only the initiate. A little more effort to contact those who are "without the law" might be in order. It is a well-known fact that even in studies for the doctorate in most American universities the *Posterior Analytics* itself, let alone any commentary on it, goes completely unread. All that is known in most instances is a corrupt version of the formal syllogistic. Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* is one of the profoundest works in any field that has ever been brought forth by man. Unlike the *Metaphysics* or the *Categories*, it is also very well written, its order is certain, and (only unproved statements to the contrary, cf. I. M. Bochenski, O. P., *Ancient Formal Logic*, Amsterdam, 1951, p. 21) it clearly bears in every part the stamp of the master. Yet because of the rare and abstract rigor of the subject matter, an equally masterful commentary such as Thomas' will in all ages be of great service to the student. This commentary of St. Thomas on the *Posterior Analytics* and the one by his teacher, St. Albert, on the *Prior Analytics*, are, perhaps, the two greatest works of logical exposition of the Latin Middle Ages.

The translator's note attempts to take a balanced view, emphasizing first the importance of Latin and the need for deliberate closeness to the scholastic Latin terminology, and, secondly, the independence of the thought of St. Thomas from the language he used. On the whole, however, the translator leans toward the former and even sets as his ideal the sort of translation for which his predecessor and confrere, the great Hellenist William of Moerbeke, was justly famous. Now at this point the difficulty will be raised that the genius of the English language is quite other than that of the twin classical languages,—the great difference being the plasticity

of the word order in the latter, owing to their inflected character. Thus the feat of Moerbeke's rendering, whose "accuracy was such that if independently retranslated into Greek, it would match the original Aristotle," (p. iii), will, it may be charged, just not be repeatable in twentieth-century English. The test is to take the present translation and examine it closely. The wonder is, considering the difficulty of the feat, that it has come off so well. Upon a rare occasion one finds a clumsy sentence such as this, in the title to Book I, lecture 27: "First how concerning first and immediate principles that ignorance is caused by virtue of which that is thought to be which is not." Similarly, one finds unhappy phrases whose closeness to the Latin makes them indeed retranslatable in their very word order. But the question is, "have they ever really gotten out of latinity and into English?" In Book I, lecture 1, no. 7, where St. Thomas is dividing the contents of the two books of the *Posterior Analytics*, he is made to say in English that "in the first, Aristotle shows the necessity of the demonstrative syllogism, *concerning which is this book*." This, no doubt, is "*de quo est iste liber*," but is it twentieth-century English? Why not the unbookish, perfectly idiomatic "which this book is about"? Being able to retranslate such renderings verbatim into Latin would seem to be a curious exercise anyway, reserved exclusively for those who already know scholastic Latin. And in nine cases out of ten, by conservative estimate, such an attempt to plaster English word order to that of the Latin model tells us nothing of the logic of either Aristotle or St. Thomas. Most of these difficulties could have been avoided by having had an intelligent reader who knew no Latin and therefore could not mentally supply a stylistic justification for such phrasing. Besides such a control the next best thing is for the translator to break his work from time to time with readings from strictly modern logicians of good English style like Mill and Russell.

However, it may be rejoined, the merit of this method as employed in this translation is that it has, so far as I can see, nowhere distorted the meaning of St. Thomas. This, in the last analysis and from a philosophical point of view, is the supreme test of any translation of such works. In short, the substance of this translation has a splendid solidity. But if accidents are real enhancements, they also require attention.

As to technical terminology, some of the chief expressions have been kept in their original dress. Among them are *per se*, *propter quid*, *quia*, *dici de omni*, *dici per se*, and *quod quid est*. These are simply reprinted where they occur in the original, without benefit of notes. In the translator's preface an argument is advanced against the need of any notes. Since, if granted, it would hold for all translations of similar materials, it must be examined: "In view of St. Thomas' deliberateness, one hesitates to 'clarify' obscurities which, on a more perspicacious reading, often emerge as opaqueness on the part of the reader rather than the author. In view of that same deliberateness, it is considered that if St. Thomas sets out to expound a

passage of Aristotle, he must do so adequately, and that, consequently, footnotes of this translator to that end are somewhat presumptuous." (p. iii) This argument seems to hold perfectly well against philosophic notes to supplement the commentary, but terminological notes may still be in order, at least to meet the pet inadequacies of the moderns. And especially if one is to keep certain technical Latin terms no longer recognizable in America outside a very select circle, they, at least, must be given some provisional renderings in a footnote.

One word which was not kept in its latin form and perhaps should have been, is *habitus*. It is translated by the false friend "habit," e. g., Book I, lesson 41, no. 11. The rendering of $\xi\epsilon\varsigma$ and *habitus* by the now English word "habitus," is becoming standard practice throughout the whole range of classical and mediaeval scholastic studies, not only in works on the Latins but even on the Jewish and Arabian scholastics, e. g., Professor M. Mahdi's *Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History*, London, 1957, pp. 90-91. See especially p. 180 where "habit" and "habitus" are used to translate two different Arabic words.

However, the translator does give (*ibid.*) a substitute for notes: "In lieu of this [notes], an Index has been appended in order that the reader may consult parallel passages in the text and derive enlightenment from St. Thomas himself rather than from one of his less apt followers." This, so humbly expressed, is the excellent motif of *Sanctus Thomas commentator sui ipsius*. The index is quite adequate to nearly all the main ideas. *Dici de omni*, however, seems not to be listed. And a few terminological notes might, still in all, be helpful.

As to the content of the work itself, among its many treasures it may be stimulating to call special attention to the rigorous analysis of Book I, lectures 33-35 showing that there is no regress or progress *ad infinitum* in the principles or conclusions of a demonstration, i. e., that the process of reason must be *terminated* at both ends by understanding or intellection proper; the beautifully subtle lecture 41 of the same book, on the specification of the sciences; and the elusive, challenging, and all-important question of the 20th lesson of Book II, "How the first principles of demonstration are known to us."

Let us choose one of the above, for brevity and suggestiveness the forty-first lecture of Book I. St. Thomas explains in no. 7 how a science, like a motion, derives its unity from its term. For a science its term is its subject genus; thus a science terminates in its subject genus: the genus taken, of course, extensively in all its specific subjective parts as subjects or minor terms of all the intrinsic subalternate demonstrations of the science. In no. 10 he states what appears to be a paradox: that a science derives its unity from the unity of the subject genus, whereas its diversity from the other sciences is derived from the diversity of the [types of] principles they severally employ. If the factors whereby a science is *one*

in itself and *something other* than other sciences are not formally the same factor, how can we be sure that we will not have the anomaly of a science being one in itself because of the presence of the one factor, and not distinct from another science because of the absence of the other factor? After explaining in no. 11 that the material diversity of object does not diversify the habit [habitus] but that only the formal diversity does [i. e., diverse formal objects, diverse types of formal principles], St. Thomas goes on in no. 13 to explain: "That the indemonstrable principles are of one genus is had by the sign that when those things which are demonstrated through them are in the same genus and cogenious, i. e., connatural or proximate to each other according to genus, they have the same principles. Thus it is evident that the unity of the scientifically knowable genus, as scientifically knowable, from which the unity of a science is taken, and the unity of principles from which the diversity of [one] science [from others] is taken, mutually correspond."

The unity of type of formal principles, which is the uniform way of defining or type of middle term employed, being a form, as such is in opposition to other forms, as all formal, limiting *potencies* are: but such an intentional and explanatory form is also the form of the material object or subject genus as the latter is attained by the demonstrating mind. Thus two object-terms, the formal or middle, and the material or subject genus, are brought together again in the process of demonstration. Granted that the former does *secondarily* give formal unity to the science, it must be insisted that the latter, despite its being in a way logically material, is something more: ontologically it is the *actual*, because it is the extensively existent in its subjective parts. The latter *are*, by the wholeness of essential being, in the case of the species; and by the act of existence, in the case of the ultimate subjective parts, the individuals. And their being makes the type of definition of the middle, when applied to them, a type of real definition instead of just a nominal definition. (We see here one of the facets of the strange concurrence of material causality and existence throughout philosophical history.) Taken in this way, the subject genus *primarily* gives the positive oneness of act to the science itself and makes it one science, because all the things that *are* (or can *be*) in the subject genus already have, each of them, its positive unity, of which the formal unity expressed by the explanatory middle term has been all along ontologically true in a superior, more unified way, even before it was abstractively envisioned by us. Thus they are, each one itself, the true source and cause of the positive unity of the science.

To express this more fully: the actual existence and actual unity of the specific subjective parts, and ultimately the unity of each of the individuals, of the scientific genus, has all along been exercising or fulfilling, and more than fulfilling, in actuality, but in a state of negative unity or negative community (lack of division by formal principles), the formal and diversify-

ing principles of the science. The generic unity was already present in a negative state (lack of division by generic principles) in the specific unity, and the specific unity was already present, also negatively (lack of division by any formal principles), in the positive unity of the individual. This formal principle was made formally one (by positive community) only later, and in the intentional order, by virtue of the mind's abstractive act. As so conceived, the potentiality of the form was made a positive unity only by the mind and only for the sake of the mind's range of vision, by crosscutting all the individuals and leaving out of focus the only unities that are *actually* in being, i. e., by leaving out the factors that make each one in itself, matter and existence. But the potentiality of the form is still only a potentiality. Now the scientific task is to redeem that potentiality by the demonstrative return or termination: to make good and fast that formal principle (positively one only in the intentional order), by seeing it fulfilled in the members of the subject genus. Thus it is seen to be in them all, but in the higher, indeed the only, unpotentialized, unabstracted, actual unity of each concrete one of them.

What is interesting in St. Thomas' treatment of all this is that in addition to the analogy of the formally diversifying factor and the unifying factor of a science to the principle and term, respectively, of motion in physical philosophy, which analogy is, of course, explicit in the natural Philosopher, the Parisian doctor subtly goes beyond commenting and furthers the cause of the philosophy of logic, by the very vocabulary he uses, in suggesting two other analogies: one, to syllogistic proper, where the formal and distinctive principle is to the middle term as the material and unifying principle is to the minor terms or subjects of the conclusions, the subjective parts of the subject genus; and another, to the metaphysics of the transcendentals, where the formal principle of a science is to *aliquid* as the material principle is to *unum*. And as *unum* is ontologically prior to *aliquid* and closer, so to speak, to being itself, as actual, we owe to it (i. e., to the unity of each species in the scientific genus, ultimately to the individual unity of each thing in itself that is reached by a science) the unity of that science. Were this better understood, the formalist difficulties of Scotus, Ockham, and Hegel, would all be resolved.

The treasures of the *Exposition of the Posterior Analytics* are beyond reckoning. Fr. Conway, with the diligent concurrence of Fr. Kane, has faithfully brought them all to us in readable English.

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God and the Ways of Knowing. By JEAN DANIELOU, S. J. Translated by Walter Roberts. New York: Meridian Books, 1957. Pp. 249 with notes. \$3.75.

With Origen's statement that it is always dangerous to speak about God, the foreword of this work begins; its ensuing chapters make it frequently clear that it is perennially advantageous to do so, as well. Fr. Danielou sets as his primary aim: "to place religions and philosophies, the Old Testament and the New, theology and mysticism, in their proper relationship with the knowledge of God." (p. 8) Through six chapters dealing in turn with the God of the religions, of philosophers, of the Faith, of Jesus Christ, of the Church and of the mystics, he pursues this aim. Obviously it is a process of enormous range, touching upon the capital themes of all of theology. For the virtuosity of the author there is provided a vehicle which he employs to advantage in considerations valuable for their appraisal of theological questions, and in reflections penetrating in their insights and criticisms. His renowned advocacy of the necessity of the Biblical orientation of theological questions resounds throughout the present work. His erudition puts at the service of his task scriptural exegesis, the writings of the Fathers, as well as a cross-current of contemporary literature, Catholic and non-Catholic, pertinent to the divergent topics confronted. There are many evidences of the author's profundity of comprehension, such as his contrast of the transcendence of God as He reveals Himself with anything reason could anticipate (p. 124); the apologetic appraisal of the notion of Tradition, against the thesis of the Protestant theologian, Cullman (pp. 176 ff.); the exploration of the fidelity of God in His covenants. (p. 105) A book about God that is the product of a mind so imbued with the Revealed Word of God, of so broad an acquaintance with the perennial and contemporary literature bearing on its subject matter, warrants by its value braving any of the hazards attendant upon the amplitude of its argument, and the ineffability of its subject.

By its title and in the structure formed by its chapters, this work assumes the task of reflection upon the proportions of the human mind, on the indicated levels, to the Divine Reality. Such a function belongs by right to the wisdom that is Sacred Theology. It is, first of all, unfortunate that the translation frequently falls short of the *proprietas verborum* indispensable to theological expression. A few such inept phrases may be noted: On created being: "The existence of a reality *before* God which yet has its own existence." (p. 92) On the Eucharist: "the cup full of wine transubstantiated *in* His blood." (p. 100) The love of friendship is said to have "a person as its object and compels him to *will for himself* the good." (p. 118) The Church as the recipient of the Apostolic communication of Tradition, is called its "*subject-matter*." (p. 189) On the Trinity: "The Word of God is a Person, i. e., *possesses a substance* distinct from that of

the Father. (p. 198; cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 30, a. 1, ad 1) Perhaps it is a typographical error that is responsible for the substitution of the word "possession" for "procession" in the following: "This order of mission is a reflection of that of possession." (p. 173)

A certain want of precision of language is, however, not wholly attributable to the hazards of translation. It is not, for example, a happy phrase that is applied to created being as "entirely gratuitous, or rather *entirely under grace*." (p. 91) Nor is it accurate to state that "my existence is in its very essence a relationship." (p. 91) Notwithstanding the primatial role of charity in the supernatural order, it is still untrue to claim that justice is no longer to be defined by reference to the claims of man, but to the will of God; that Christian justice surpasses that of the Scribes and Pharisees "in that it is identified with charity." (p. 117) Discussing the Blessed Trinity, it is regrettable to speak of "dependence," (p. 171) the possession of divinity by the Son and the Holy Spirit in a "secondary and derivative manner." (p. 205); or to say "they are not three identical persons, if each has a unique nature," (p. 209) or to refer to "the divine processions like unity and divinity." (p. 211)

To decry such ambiguities of language is not to engage in word-splitting. From their character it is clear that they touch upon fundamentals. The very dignity of Theology imposes upon it the obligation of a precision that must be carried over even into non-systematic expositions of theological matters. As the author himself so clearly puts the case: "To despise theology is only to introduce a poor theology." (p. 195) Certainly it would be totally unfounded to suggest that Fr. Danielou, because of a few isolated phrases, despises theology. But the very nature of this work does point to a deeper area, since it inevitably brings into play the author's attitude towards the nature of theology. Specifically with regard to what may be designated as theology's "epistemological canons," this book raises questions.

The author from the outset proposes to foster love of the Bible without depreciating theology, the study of theology, the study of theology without neglecting mysticism. The rationalistic excesses of speculative theologians, the consequent dislocation of theological questions from the cast their Scriptural fonts demand, the interested promotion of "systems" to the detriment of the pursuit of sanctity through theology, afford the occasion for seeing as a danger the divorce of the three levels noted. The author admirably serves the cause of their unification, the need for the scriptural orientation of theological thought, the kerygmatic character of theology. But it is to be pointed out that it is the one theology in its total dignity as Sacred Doctrine, Wisdom, to which it belongs to reflect upon its revealed principles as such; to maintain its own relevance to sanctity, as a science that is practical; and as speculative, to seek to deepen the understanding of mystery, with all the powers of reason that it can command as its

ministers. Apparently for the author, theology, as it has been, means primarily speculative theology. To it he pays the highest homage of recognizing the service made of it even by the *magisterium* of the Church. Yet because of the excesses mentioned, it is apparent that he sees theology, as it ought to be, as something quite different, indifferent indeed to "conceptual instruments" distinctive of different theologians and their "system." (p. 210)

Instead of being taken as the "sum total of speculation on the datum of Revelation," theology is to be taken in its strictest sense, concerned solely with God, in Nature and Persons. (p. 203) Developing its mode of procedure regarding the Trinity, Fr. Danielou would have it be a faithful repetition of the history of the revelation of the mystery, and an echo of the tentative formulations concerning the Divine Persons that are afforded in the history of dogma. Subsequently, the various analogies, as conceptual instruments, would be employed. In discussing these analogies, it would seem that he assigns their inadequacy to express the mystery to this, that they are arbitrary, subjectively significant, but rather irrelevant to the divine reality to which they are referred. In the tensions that the author has seen among the various levels of knowing God, it is apparent that it is speculative theology that is expendable to the search for harmony and the achievement of sanctity. And speculative theology is largely identified with "systems."

Currently the depreciation of systems both in theology and philosophy finds widespread, vocal support among Christians. Many will echo Fr. Danielou's sentiments, defending the legitimacy of expressing Revelation in terms of Greek philosophy, while yet hoping that the same thing will be done in terms of other cultures; (p. 197) echoing his hope that the *theologia perennis* will give rise to new syntheses. (p. 211) But is it a question of "legitimacy"? Are the intelligible values of Revelation utterly indifferent in their expression to any so-called system of human thought whatsoever? Are these expressions no more than "conceptual" instruments? Is it a question of systems at all?

Sacred Theology is one intellectual habit; rightly exercised, the Vatican Council attests, it yields a fruitful understanding of revealed mysteries. In its search, in all its functions, it uses the resources of human reason; in its speculative phase, it will be fruitful in its analogies to the extent that it uses the best that reason can administer to this service. Neither seeking, nor intending to dispel the essential obscurity of Faith, Theology has a right and an obligation to recognize the evidence, the certitude of the truths, the principles that reason provides, the validity of the canons of thought and method that reason must follow. It is precisely such certitude that constitutes the aptitude of natural truths to serve speculative theology fruitfully, not only in its purely deductive, strictly scientific role, but also in its reflection upon revealed principles, in examining the harmony and

meaning within and among mysteries, which if incomprehensible are not unintelligible. While recognizing the ineffability of the mystery of the Trinity, for example, theology can and should be certain that the exposition of the Divine Processions cannot be expressed in any save in terms of the immanent operations of intelligence and love. Such analogies are fruitful in what they affirm; they are inadequate, not because they are arbitrary, but because the divine reality exceeds their mode of signifying. While recognizing in all its analogous considerations of divine things the infinite distance between the analogates, theology has a right and an obligation to be aware that analogy is not pure equivocation. When it indicates the intelligible order in the elements of mystery, or affirms that a mystery involves non-contradiction because it is not unintelligible, it must be aware of its own justification. A first step towards such an awareness is a recognition of the absolute values to which the native power of the human intelligence is oriented; to employ philosophical truths and above all first principles, not as slogans of systems, but as founded and grounded in being itself, and ultimately in Divine Being. The order which St. Thomas' *Summa* places in the consideration of Divine Truth is not to be adhered to out of loyalty to a system, but out of conviction that the intelligibility of the Truth itself demands such as order.

Theology is a habit, distinct from Faith, distinct from mystical knowledge. It is Wisdom to which it pertains to judge concerning Divine Realities, not by way of connaturality as does the Gift of the Holy Spirit, but by way of knowledge, acquired by study and discipline. (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3) The judgment proper to such wisdom is not intended as a subjection of divine things to the dominance of reason, but it is the subjection of human reason to the service of Faith. That subjection demands, as one element at least, a domination of reason over its own resources and powers. This it can do, not in the name of any system, but in the name of truth to which the One God of Truth has ordered it. Neither God nor Revelation needs theology, but man does. That need will be fully served to the degree that man comes to a deeper understanding not only that certain truths are revealed, or how they have been revealed, but also how they are true. (Cf. *IV Quodl.*, q. 9, a. 3) The role that natural truths can serve in this task will never be complete if such truths are considered as mere conceptual instruments; if the order and intelligiblity that can be perceived in the realm of dogma is adjudged arbitrary, and less desirable than an historico-positivist cataloging of dogmatic truth.

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Dogmatic Theology. Vol. II. *Christ's Church.* By G. VAN NOORT. Translated by John J. Castelot, S.S. and William R. Murphy, S.S. Westminster: Newman, 1957. Pp. 456. \$7.00.

This second volume of a projected ten volume translation and revision of Msgr. Van Noort's work is divided into two main sections. The Church viewed from outside, apologetics, is the first part. It deals with the founding of the Church, its nature, the properties of the Church and the marks. Section two treats the Church viewed from inside, dogma, and deals with the Mystical Body, members of the Church, the Pope, the bishops, Church and State. There is an appendix on the primacy text in Matthew and three sets of indexes.

The deserved praise and slight censure in our review of volume one (*THE THOMIST*, XIX, July 1956, p. 410 sq.) is valid for this present work. We would note regarding this volume that the well-written preface anticipates almost every objection, and would serve as a critical review. The bibliographies, general and particular, are excellently contemporary; and the revising translators have introduced (if not always digested) into the text and footnotes worthy recent contributions to theological thought.

This reviewer would wish that in view of recent development the revision were carried still further, and that the entire work would have been made *dogmatic* with the apologies inserted as arguments of aptness or illustration. How can we adequately discuss the properties and marks of the Church from the outside when they flow from the very nature of the Church, Christ's Mystical Body? We do, however, realize that this might call for a fundamental revision of the very order of the whole set, for the Church would be considered after Christology.

Since the "slogan" (that is what it is called), "Outside the Church there is not salvation," is discussed in the dogmatic part, it might have been well to translate the axiom double-meaningly: "Without the Church there is no salvation." A more explicit use of the stated, (but not enough applied) "membership in desire" would have clarified several issues. For example, note four on page 268 should or could read: "they are not actually members, but members in desire."

The chapter on Church and State, which leans heavily on Bender, scientifically and truthfully leaves many an unanswered question after the clear presentation of principles. One might wonder, however, why a work that has faced and professed a solution or solutions to other problems of history has ignored the doctrinal problem of Boniface VIII and Church and State relation. Undoubtedly the fine terminology of the Church's "Precedence" rather than the State's indirect "Subjection" is an excellent clarification.

A generation that might be inclined to substitute statistics for judgment might well be grateful for the statistics given in the text and notes concern-

ing the marks of the Church. But some may be confused when they find on page 179 the text saying that Calvinism flourished, while Calvinists are ignored in the list of statistics.

The book is beautifully, but perhaps too expensively, set up. (There is, however, a flaw on page 222—where does the quote end?).

Fathers Castelot and Murphy and the publisher deserve grateful praise and hopeful encouragement for their work accomplished and projected.

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The Doctrine of Eternal Punishment. By HARRY BUIS. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1948. Pp. 148. \$2.75.

This work on the doctrine of hell by an American Protestant theologian is an historical study of the dogma as expressed in Sacred Scripture and in Christian theological writing, Catholic and Protestant, through the centuries. Although the author writes as a historian, the book is not merely a chronological collection of texts. There is matter here of interest to the speculative theologian, particularly in the arguments in defense of the orthodox teaching of eternal punishment against universalism, which is proposed in varying degrees of explicitness by such influential Protestant theologians as Emil Brunner, Karl Barth, and Paul Tillich, and against annihilationism, defended by the Russian Orthodox thinker, Nicholas Berdyaev.

There are occasional ambiguities in the representation of the Catholic position. For example, the statement in the Preface that there are some in the Roman Catholic Church who question the doctrine of eternal punishment which is "commonly accepted teaching," suggests that this is a matter open to dispute. Deficiencies of this kind are surely outweighed by the array of Scriptural and Patristic evidence for the orthodox doctrine and the cogent discussion of contemporary perversions of the revealed teaching. The value of the book as a scholarly effort, however, is weakened by failure to go to primary sources. The quotations from the Fathers, for example, although they are most important sources for the belief of the early Church, are for the most part taken from Pusey's *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment*. St. Thomas is subjected to this kind of treatment also. The one quotation attributed to him is taken from the *New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge* and no clue is given as to the actual *locus* in St. Thomas' own works. This would not be serious, except for the fact that in this case the statement is taken out of context and used to put St. Thomas in the unhappy company of Tertullian who considers hell to be a beautiful sight to the redeemed. The difference

between the representation of Thomistic doctrine and what in fact it is, is subtle enough to make the misunderstanding understandable, but big enough to make it harmful.

The author begins with a study of the Old Testament. Even without the "apocryphal" II Esdras and II Maccabees he finds enough texts, principally from the Psalms, to support the thesis that there is in the Old Testament the beginning of a differentiation between the lot of the unbeliever and that of the believer in the afterlife, although he does not find in these passages any direct teaching in regard to the eternal punishment of unbelievers. In a separate chapter on the Intertestamental Period, he presents texts from II Esdras and II Maccabees which confirm the differentiation. It is pointed out that the Rabbinical teaching at the time of Christ was of punishment for sin after death. This is taken to be a development of Biblical principles.

Turning to the New Testament, the author substantiates his claim that the bulk of the statements concerning hell are from Christ Himself. If the Old Testament passages were sufficiently unclear concerning the everlastingness of punishment to permit diversity among the Rabbinical schools, Christ is not ambiguous on this point. The principal conclusion drawn from this Scriptural exegesis is that the orthodox doctrine of inspiration and the doctrine of eternal punishment stand or fall together. The only way to escape the doctrine of eternal punishment is to deny the infallibility of Sacred Scripture.

The next part of this book is concerned with the history of the doctrine in extra-Biblical Christian writings. The interest here lies not merely in the collection of quotations but in what they suggest: that the post-Reformation reactionary denial of the teaching is at least in part a denial of the caricature of revealed doctrine which had been so widely disseminated in the medieval and reformation eras. The naive lack of recognition of the metaphorical nature of the language used in the Bible produced absurdities which the more sophisticated modern mentality naturally rejects. The Catholic reader might, in objection to his claim that even in the nineteenth century the Roman Catholic Church continued to propagate an extremely physical version of hell, point out that the Church has defined nothing regarding the temperature and furniture of that region. Intellectual honesty, however, demands the recognition of the existence of injudicious and grotesque writing on this and other theological subjects by Catholics who are more zealous than speculative by temperament, often accepted by non-Catholics as authoritative spokesmen for the Church. The burden of guilt in this matter is not to be borne only by over-imaginative Calvinists and Swedenborgians.

Mr. Buis does not hesitate to challenge the theological double-talk about hell by such neo-Orthodox writers as Emil Brunner, who apparently manages unblushingly to hold two contradictory propositions as true at the same time. His answers to the universalist and annihilationist theories

are cogent and to the point. For example, it is pointed out, in almost Thomistic fashion, in regard to the universalist doctrine that sooner or later all will be saved, that a merely subjective reference of an act is not sufficiently indicative of its weight. The objective reference of a personal act must be considered, and this consideration reveals the sentimentalism of the claim that "a just God would not give infinite punishment for a finite sin." Another argument proposed against universalism is that the denial of eternal punishment is inevitably connected with the denial of other important Christian doctrines, e. g., of the atonement, of the divinity of Christ (without the atonement there is no need that men's Savior be more than a man), and of Biblical inspiration. If the subtlety and originality of the great modern Protestant theologians are missing here, there is nevertheless a keen logic which goes directly to the heart of the problem, a refreshing contrast to the maze of over-sophisticated ambivalence characteristic of so much Protestant theological work done today.

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De Sacramentis in Genere. By W. VAN Roo, S.J. Rome: Gregorian University, 1957. Pp. 390 with index and bibliography.

This is not strictly a textbook of the theology of the sacraments in general. It was designedly written for students studying for the Licence in Sacred Theology at the Gregorianum. The material included and the order followed have been selected for that purpose. It thus proceeds in thesis form with prenotes, statement of the question and resolution. Findings of recent scholarship, especially of an historical nature, have been incorporated. Clear definition of terms, fixing of the problems and the opinions thereon, together with pertinent theological notes attached to the theses, are valuable elements in the structure of this work.

Several personal products have also been included by the author, such as his definition of a sacrament and the theory concerning the instrumental causality of the sacraments. Many features found in a more complete treatment of the sacraments in general, especially concerning individual sacraments, have been eliminated by the author in order to conform to his purpose. Only the principal aspects and major questions of this tract have been included.

The book is divided into questions and then into articles: I: What is a Sacrament (its definition and nature); II: the Causes of the Sacraments (their institution, the role of the Church, the power and intention, faith and probity of the minister, the subject of the sacraments); III: the Effects of the Sacraments (sacramental grace and the character); IV: the Efficacy

of the Sacraments (*ex opere operato*, instrumental causality); V: the Number of the Sacraments. The resolution of this material is summarized throughout in the statement of eight theses.

In the first question there is an extensive survey of the evolution of the terms "mystery" and "sacrament," and the definition of a sacrament. The author's own fuller definition (which relates to his theory of sacramental causality) states: "A sacrament of the New Law is an exterior act of cult by which Christ through His Church and His minister, in representing the mysteries of His flesh, signifies and effects *ex opere operato* the sanctification of a man aptly disposed." (p. 63)

The second question clearly and fully exposes the elements of the controversy concerning the institution of the sacraments. The thesis defended is the immediate institution by Christ who, however, did not determine immutably all those things required for validity in the essential rites. The author notes that the question is still open to judgment and lacks a certain consensus among theologians. His interesting analysis of the role of the Church in the sacraments—which differs from that of her ministers—is completed in his explanation of the causality of the sacraments. A helpful note is the description of the development of theological teaching on the intention of the minister.

In the third question the author holds for the opinion that sacramental grace is a special mode or perfection of habitual grace requiring actual graces. The teaching on the character reveals its nature and efficacy, although it is pointed out that the objective efficacy of the sacraments of the New Law *ex opere operato* does not depend upon the sacramental character as upon an active power.

The major tract of this work, in the fourth question, discusses instrumental causality in the sacraments. The issue is clearly singled out and the three principal theological positions stated: the Thomistic theory of physical, perfective causality, moral causality (Franzelin), intentional dispositive causality (Billot). The author merely states his rejection of the Thomistic teaching in the arguments of those holding for an exclusive moral causality, quoting the words of Lennerz. He refutes moral causality on the ground that it is not efficient but final causality. The opinion of Billot is more carefully analyzed, though ultimately rejected for its serious inherent defects.

Father Van Roo's own theory is contained in the statement: "A sacrament of the New Law is a true instrumental cause by which Christ, in manifesting His divine command (*imperium*), effects *ex opere operato* sacramental grace itself in a subject who places no obstacle." (p. 306) For him a sacrament is an instrument in the genus of sign and not an instrument of art, a conventional sign which by the ordination of the one instituting leads to a knowledge of something else. In the case of a sacrament the sign is an instrument by which the divine command is presented. God works His effects, not by applying the natural powers of

secondary causes in the manner of art, but by manifesting His command, which is unlimited in power. Instrumental power is formally a relation. (p. 324) A sacrament is therefore a sign which is related to the divine command. As the sign is sevenfold, each sacramental sign indicates the way the divine command operates its effects of grace. The true causality of the sacraments is thus explained: the external act manifests the internal act; "although God is supremely independent of every instrument so that He can infuse grace invisibly, yet, if God wishes to manifest His operation, if He wishes to confer grace in a human way, He must use a sign. In the sacramental economy, as in the whole mystery of the Incarnation, the external act, the sign of the divine command, efficaciously attains to the very effect of grace." (pp. 330-331)

Thus the instrumental power of the sacraments is the very divine ordination impressed in them by divine institution and by the application of the minister according to the intention of Christ. (p. 343) As instruments they have their own action and modify the action of the principal agent. The author holds that this latter consists in manifesting the divine command or representing the mysteries of Christ's flesh and the whole mystery of salvation through Christ in this economy. Moreover, he holds that these signs bear upon the effect in that they confer the grace which they signify.

It is difficult to see where and how the author makes the step from the sacraments as instruments which manifest the divine command—whose whole being as signs is a relation to the divine *imperium*—to instruments which *contain* the grace they confer and cause it *immediately* or *directly* produce the effect. This theory does not seem to avoid the basic objections levelled against the theories of moral and of intentional causality, as well as the charge of a formal extrinsic causality and not a true efficient causality with respect to the *term* of the effect or the grace produced in the soul. No authority other than the author's is cited in support of this theory, although the teaching of de la Taille is too germane to be passed over without mention.

The treatment of the number of the sacraments in the fifth question lists the errors of the Reformers and states the positive teaching on this point. The author shows that the fact of seven sacraments is evidenced in the seven sacred rites always present in the Church, while the notion and properties and effects of the sacraments were late in being clarified.

This book is written in a clear and easy Latin style and will not prove a hazard for students. It is a concise and orderly exposition, accomplishing its purpose as an aid for Licence candidates. It will be profitable for all students of the theology of the sacraments in general.

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